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ABSTRACT
Utility planning has evolved to meet regulatory requirements, based upon
the costs of individual technologies and complicated by successive issues
including DSM, NUGs, and environmental externalities. Additional sources of
value exist, based on how options interact with the existing power system, but
have not been generally recognized or evenly applied for planning.
This thesis constructs a framework for comprehensively identifying utility
options and values. It shows how component values can be analyzed
independent of option technologies by using the subset of option and system
characteristics relevant to each component value. Sensitivity analysis of these
characteristics allows construction of component value supply curves.
Component values related to dispatch, transmission and distribution, reliability
and quality, financial risk, and environmental costs are identified and discussed.
Five specific component values were chosen to illustrate the thesis
methodology, based on system reserve margin, unit size, storage for non-
dispatchable resources, system spinning reserve, and thermal dispatch
constraints. These were analyzed for the New England region using three
different types of production cost models. An original algorithm was
implemented for the optimal use of storage with wind and solar generation.
Results range from small to significant. System reserve margin and unit
size for some nuclear technologies can be worth as much as 910 and 365 1995
$/kW respectively. Other component values may be as large, especially those
related to specific network location.
This thesis concludes that utility planning can be significantly improved by
considering a wider range of utility options and adding as many component
values as possible to traditional levelized cost. Increased competition will make
component values even more valuable, as deregulated generation has increased
incentives to consider all sources of value and revised regulation of T&D requires
consideration of component values to create the correct structures and incentives.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard D. Tabors
Title: Principal Research Engineer,
Laboratory for Electronic and Electromagnetic Systems
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1.0 Introduction
Planning for the future of the electric utility sector is an important and
complex problem. This sector is a complicated system with many players that
have a large range of options open to them, and the societal goals that the
industry must aim to achieve have multiple objectives and are subject to
intense debate. All planning must consider the impact of uncertainties in
demand, fuel prices, technological price and availability, and industry
structure, to name just a few.
In this context, the question of what constitutes value to utilities and to
society is an important one. How to evaluate and compare utility planning
options fairly and evenly depends upon recognizing value from many
different sources. At one time, demand growth was relatively predictable and
the primary basis for planning was the cost of new generation capacity. Today
value can be ascribed to many different aspects of utility operation, including
generation, transmission and consumption. The problem is that not all
possible sources of value are generally recognized and used in planning, and
that those values which are recognized may be unevenly applied or claimed
to favor one option over another. Identification of individual sources of
value in specific market niches is important, but the real need is for a
comprehensive system to identify and evaluate the full range of possible
values.
This thesis looks at the question of what constitutes value in electric
utility planning, so that as many different kinds of options as possible can be
compared on a level playing field both for vertically integrated utilities and
for individual organizations under coming scenarios of competition and dis-
integration. Sources of value have been comprehensively surveyed based on
1) the sequential series of utility functions from generation to customer end
uses, and 2) the full range of time scales related to different planning needs.
Based on this survey, a range of individual or component values have been
identified and classified within a coherent framework. In order to separate
the analysis of these component values from the individual options that can
provide them, key subsets of option and system characteristics are identified.
Value supply curves based on these characteristics are then proposed, so that
any option which can supply a component value can be evaluated without
individually modeling it. A subset of the component values identified has
been chosen to illustrate this methodology, and modeled using two
production cost models and an original optimization model to produce
supply cost curves.
This thesis is aimed at the community concerned with long range,
strategic electric utility planning, including utilities, independent generators,
regulators, and concerned intervenors (customers, environmentalists, etc.).
As the industry is in the process of rapid change, the thesis methodology
addresses how component values are affected by industry structure. In
general, component values exist independent of industry structure, but under
competition and dis-integration market players and incentives are emerging
that can change these values from implicit and internal planning
considerations to explicit market price signals.
This chapter introduces the importance and complexity of electric
utility planning, discusses the needs and opportunities in current planning
methods, and outlines the proposed framework for full value estimation.
Later chapters survey the history of value in utility planning, introduce the
full valuation framework comprehensively and discuss the range of
individual values. The methodology is then applied to a subset of sample
component values, and the results and conclusions are presented.
1.1 Importance of Utility Planning
The importance of planning in the electric utility sector is of course
directly tied to the size and importance of this sector in our economy and
society. The most direct and gross measures of this importance can be shown
by the relative amount of capital or infrastructure and annual income for this
sector versus others. Statistics for 1993 show that the US utility sector is the
industry with the single largest gross stock of fixed private capital, equal to 991
billion dollars. This is more than all fixed private capital for the
transportation industry ($636 billion), almost half of all manufacturing
industries ($2,347 billion), and 5.2% of all fixed private capital in the US
($19,090 billion) 1. Gross revenues of the US electric sector were 187 billion
dollars in 1992 for 2735 TWh sold at an average price of 6.8 o/kWh. This can
be compared to expenditures of $222 billion for petroleum products and $473
billion for all major energy sources2.
The importance of the electric utility sector is not grasped by just sheer
size. In a less quantifiable but more direct fashion, we are all intimately
acquainted with its importance by the ubiquity of electricity in our daily lives.
We do not directly consume kWh of electricity, but its myriad secondary
services surround us with heat, light, mechanical power and
communications, to name just a few.
Planning for the utility sector is important not only because of its size,
but because the impacts of planning decisions last a long time. Although
regulatory changes are shifting the market structure rapidly, the sheer scale of
the capital investment and the long life of individual units of physical
infrastructure means that the physical system has a large resistance to change.
Even the most attractive new technology or resource at the most optimistic
market penetration rate requires significant time to make a large impact. This
means that planning must have a long time horizon, and that consequences
may endure for 30 to 40 years or even longer.
1.2 Complexity of Utility Systems and Planning
Apart from the sheer size and longevity of the physical system, there
are also a range of physical reasons for complex system behavior. The sources
of this complexity include the following.
* Electricity as a Secondary Good - People do not consume electricity
directly, but instead use it to provide the many services they desire. As
one well known analyst has said, people don't want electricity, they
want hot water and cold beer.. Utilities have come to recognize that
they sell these services, and not just kWh, and that DSM may provide
1 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, August 1994.
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration, State Energy Price and Expenditure
Report, annual.
more efficient ways to provide such service. The true source of value
is to provide a lower price or more service to the customer, including
energy, reliability and power quality
* The Load Curve - Electricity cannot be directly stored, and indirect
storage (in the form of pumped hydro, pressurized air, or batteries) is
limited, so supply must meet demand instant by instant as it varies
through daily and annual cycles. This implies the need for a range
from base to peak load generation with different balances of fixed and
variable costs. This in turn implies that cost of supplying electricity
varies with total load, and hence by time of day and year.
* Technological Diversity - Existing systems are composed of a wide
range of generating technologies, and the mix of technologies can vary
widely between utilities. Each unit has its own set of characteristics
which are required for planning, including capital cost, fuel cost, heat
rate (efficiency), maintenance costs and time requirements, forced
outage rate, type of fuel, ramping rate, etc..
* Network Flow - Electricity is not dispatched directly from generator to
consumer, but instead flows across a transmission and distribution
network according to physical laws. These laws restrict system dispatch
and operation, so that safety limits are reached sooner than they would
be under switched flow for both normal and failure contingency
conditions.
* Non-Homogeneity - The cost of supplying electricity to customers
varies over the utility network by both space and time, based on the
load curve and network flow. This non-homogeneity complicates both
utility pricing, and utility planning for new options.
* Uncertainty - The uncertainty in future predictions necessary for
planning includes load growth rates, fuel prices, capital costs, O&M
costs, discount rates, and many other assumptions. Planning for a
single predicted future is a guarantee of failure, because "the forecast is
always wrong." Planning needs to consider not just possible sensitivity
cases, but the values of robust options and flexibility in planning.
* Environmental Externalities - The costs of pollution are not included
in the price of electricity. This pollution includes chiefly air emissions,
but also solids like flyash, water pollution leaching from mines, and
thermal pollution. Utilities must plan to meet regulations designed to
limit externalities (e.g. emissions 'bubbles' and emissions trading
markets), based on the best and reasonably available control
technologies, the costs of environmental damage, and the lowest
emissions reduction costs and strategies.
Finally, there is a time spectrum associated with utility planning due to
the physical requirements of operation and construction. At the low end of
this time scale is short term operation and dispatch planning, based on
network safety and demand considerations. As the time horizon increases,
planning includes economic dispatch, maintenance scheduling, fuel purchase
planning, individual unit commitments and strategic planning. This time
scale can thus range from less than a second to over 20 years, or almost 9
orders of magnitude, as shown in Figure 1.13 below.
3 Fernando, C., P. Kleindorfer, R. Tabors, F. Pickel, and S. Robinson,
Unbundling the US Electric Power Industry: A Blueprint for Change, March
1995
Figure 1.1 - Electric System Planning Time Line
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The point to this figure is not just that planning must cover a wide
range of time horizons, but that decisions made on one end of the time scale
can affect subsequent options and decisions on the other end of the scale. For
example, the choice of a dispatch or spinning reserve rule may affect the
choice of new generation options, while the purchase of new equipment (e.g.
static VAR compensators or switching tap transformers for phase shifting)
may affect system stability and control dynamics. This means that there may
be strategic planning value in options that affect operation over very short
time periods.
The physical size and operation of the utility system are not the only
sources of complexity that must be considered in utility planning. The
financial and regulatory structures of the industry are not only diverse and
complex, but also changing rapidly. Both of these factors are extremely
relevant to the question of what constitutes value in planning, because the
financial structure indicates the number and size of the different participants
in the marketplace, and the regulatory structure determines the objectives
and rules by which the participants interact.
Electric utilities in the US are primarily investor owned, generating
2271 TWh or 78.8% of total generation which was 2883 TWh in 19934.
Publicly owned utilities range from municipal utilities with 3.6% of total
generation to rural electricity coops(8.0%) to federal interstate entities like the
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power
Administration(9.6%). Current generation ownership also includes non-
utility generators and independent power producers, with 60.8 GW of capacity
and 325 TWh of generation in 1993. In other countries, the range of
ownership is similar, with the addition of nationally owned utilities.
Industry dis-integration will further increase this complex cast of
participants. Not only will the generation, transmission and distribution
functions be separated under current plans into different entities, but the
marketplace will also be complicated by independent system operators,
independent power brokers, spot and futures markets, and increased mergers
as competition drives advantageous associations. Only a common concept of
what constitutes value can drive markets to recognize and price different
aspects of providing electrical services.
The regulatory process is important to good planning, because it
provides the rules of the game. Good planning is complex because the rules
are complex, and the rules are complex because they come from all levels of
government from local municipalities up to federal agencies. The primary
source of regulation has traditionally been at the state level in the form of the
regulatory compact, where the utility is granted the opportunity to earn a
regulated rate of return on its rate base in return for providing a service
which is a natural monopoly. Both the security of the rate of return and the
monopoly aspects of this compact have been subject to considerable erosion
in recent years, but they still form the fundamental basis of current utility
regulation. On top of this foundation, state or local regulation covers the
siting of generating plants and transmission lines, pollution control, and
4 US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review. 1994.
public safety. Federal regulation is primarily based on the constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce. This clearly includes interstate power
transactions, but has also been interpreted to include air pollution based on
interstate transport of emissions. Additional regulatory control is based on
the protection of public safety, especially in the area of nuclear safety
standards.
The regulatory process is important, because the primary objective of
utilities has been to maximize profits to private investors or minimize costs
to public owners, subject to the constraints of regulatory process. The
historical utility planning paradigm in the US has been dominated by
investor owned utilities under state regulation. Therefore utility planning
has evolved to meet the standards required for rate cases and other regulatory
hearings. More recent steps in this evolution have included consideration of
demand side management, bidding by NUGs and IPPs, emissions adders, and
options contracts.
Deregulation should actually simplify the regulatory process by
limiting monopoly control to the transmission and distribution functions.
New regulations are required for pricing transmission and some ancillary
services related primarily to system security, but by removing regulation of
the generation function the regulatory process will be simpler overall. It will
also be more consistent from state to state because all generators will have the
same competitive incentives. These incentives will reward companies for
planning that considers any and all sources of value, whether they are buyers
or sellers.
1.3 The Planning Problem
Utility planning has evolved to meet the evolving requirements of
state regulatory agencies. If the process for structuring, submitting and
approving utility plans does not include some source of value then it will be
ignored in utility decision making and actions. The following list includes
some of the deficiencies in current planning practice.
* First, the basic incentives or rate structures of the regulatory process
may distort utility planning and operation from the most economically
efficient alternatives. For example, if investment in ratebase is
rewarded and fuel price increases are passed through to customer
through fuel clauses it is not clear whether the optimum capital to fuel
cost balance will be chosen. Other examples include rate structures for
different classes which may conflict with DSM goals, and
environmental externality adders which may not lead to least cost
emissions reductions.
* Second and more fundamental the decision criterion (usually levelized
cost) may not include all possible sources of value. Utilities have
incorporated DSM and environmental externalities into integrated
resource planning or least cost utility planning, but other sources of
value such as spot pricing or T&D pricing are usually omitted.
* Third, the range of options considered may not be complete as a result
either of the solicitation or selection process. Utility options include
the entire range of anything the utility can do to meet future demand
for services supplied by electricity. This means that options can include
not only new kinds of generation, but also transmission and
distribution alternatives, demand side management or other service-
related alternatives, and different policies for system operation like fuel
switching or emissions trading or taxes.
* Fourth, the emphasis is on the competition between individual
options and not upon how they interact with the existing system. For
example, emissions will generally be based upon an assumed capacity
factor rather than system modeling. Incorporating emissions adders
with sometimes dubious economic bases into the levelized cost will
shift the selection toward cleaner generators, but unless the plants are
dispatched with the same adders this does not guarantee the most
efficient way to reduce pollution.
* Fifth, state regulations can vary significantly from state to state,
including what goes into rate base, what the rate of return is, and how
DSM, bidding, and many other issues are handled5 . This means that
different states may have incentives for different types or levels of
efficiency. In addition as interstate mergers and wheeling contracts
become more common, there may be inefficiencies in investment
allocation between states.
Of this list, the first and fifth problems will be basically solved as
competitive incentives replace regulatory incentives nationally. Problems
two through four are more basic. A number of recent and continuing trends
in the electric utility sector illustrate how new options, system interactions
and values not included in conventional average or levelized cost can be
significant. Some of these new sources of value include;
* Spot Pricing or Real Time Pricing - The importance of the time
dependent marginal cost of electricity is generally well accepted, but in
most regulatory venues, it is used either for selecting between utility
options, or for electricity pricing in a limited fashion. If spot pricing is
used for planning, and ignored in operation this may eliminate the
advantages of the option selected.
* Unit Size - The use of many small generation units at a single site may
yield benefits in both reliability and maintenance, which are easy to
recognize but generally not incorporated in planning.
* Option Flexibility - The ability to choose flexible options that can adapt
to future shifts in load growth or fuel prices can have significant value
in the face of uncertainty. Example can include early site purchase for
later construction of generation, or use of combustion turbines that can
be switched to coal gas.
* Dispatchability - Whether or not a generation or DSM option can be
controlled by system operators affects its value. The value of non-
dispatchable options may depend on both their time correlation to
system demand and the total system fraction of non-dispatchable
capacity.
5 NationalAssociation of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Utility Regulatory
Policy in the United States and Canada, Compilation 1993-1994.
* Transmission & Distribution - The value of reducing the need for T&D
maintenance, replacement, and new construction is well recognized,
but rarely if ever used in strategic utility planning.
* Reliability - The value of reliable service is easy to recognize, and the
damage costs of unreliable service have been estimated, but the
marginal cost and marginal benefit have no market and are not
currently used for planning.
* Emissions - Utility air pollution may be valued by the cost of control
technologies, the cost of damages, the least cost to reduce, or the market
value under emissions trading. Any one (or none) of these values may
be used in utility planning or operation, depending upon the local
regulatory regime.
This list of examples is by no means complete, but it is certainly long
enough to show that there are many sources of utility value that are either
unevenly applied or uncommonly recognized. In some cases, these values
may be recognized or applied in planning, but not in operation, while in
other cases the reverse is true. In either case, the planning decision reached
can be less than optimum. Sometimes these values are claimed in order to
make an individual option more competitive, but they are not generally
applied across the board to all options. For example, photovoltaic generation
can claim credits for reducing T&D losses and reducing or deferring T&D
capital costs, but these benefits are not always given to other forms of
distributed generation.
It is worth understanding that most (if not all) of these sources of value
exist independent of the industry structure, but that industry structure may
make them easier or harder to recognize, evaluate or include in planning and
decision making. For example, the value of some characteristics affecting
dispatch (like a short startup period) may be incorporated implicitly by
experienced planners within a monopolistic utility, but this value may be lost
in a dis-integrated industry unless an appropriate price signal is attached to it
and passed between participants. Conversely, some values (like reliability or
dispatchability) may be difficult to price under a monopolistic structure, but
may be priced directly by competition in a deregulated industry with a market
for the appropriate transactions. Most of these values exist independent of
market structures (as cost savings), but some cannot be obtained unless
electric services are unbundled. In either case, market structures should
attempt to recognize and incorporate them. Most unconventional option
values result from the interaction between the existing utility system and
whatever new option is considered. It is a more subtle consideration whether
such values still exist if and when the system has been disaggregated into a
market of many individual participants that are not centrally dispatched or
coordinated. This thesis contends that such values may endure in spite of
such disaggregation, but that to obtain their benefits correct price signals will
be needed.
While recognizing and applying any and all recognizable sources of
value is an improvement, the point is that for good decision making all
available sources of value for each available option need to be compared in an
equitable way, so that options compete on a level playing field. What is
needed, and what this thesis supplies, is an organized way of identifying all
possible utility options and sources of utility value and to show how these
values can be quantified and compared.
1.4 Thesis Outline and Methodology
Given the importance, complexity and difficulties associated with
electric utility planning, what is needed for a more comprehensive view of
utility planning? First, it is necessary to have a more comprehensive
economic theory of value, recognizing all the savings or services for which
utilities, their customers, and new participants in a competitive marketplace
will be willing to pay. Utility planning is a multi-attribute problem with
uncertainty, so multi-attribute utility theory and financial options theory are
important planning tools, but this thesis does not focus on these two issues.
Instead it concentrates on taking a comprehensive view of the individual
aspects of utility options that have (or may have under competition) a direct
monetary value. Because these individual sources of value can be added to
each other and to conventional levelized cost they are called component
values throughout this thesis6. Second, there needs to be a framework to
search for and to identify such individual values in a comprehensive way.
Third, there needs to be a way to analyze separate individual utility values in
a generic way, so that they can be applied to all options which can claim them.
Fourth, there needs to be quantitative proof of steps of the generic individual
values identified. Finally, there is a need to show how these generic values
can be applied to allow a wide range of utility options to compete on a more
level playing field as the sector moves to a competitive structure.
This thesis proposes a methodology that will meet these needs by using
a series of steps that are show in Figure 1.2 below.
6 In prior presentations of this thesis material, component values have also
been called niche values because the sources of these values are found in
different market niches.
Figure 1.2 - Overview of Thesis Methodology
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The question of what constitutes value in electric utility service is
discussed first in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The framework established for
identifying the whole range of utility options and individual sources of value
is shown in the first box above, using the utility functions and time frames
relevant to utility planning as shown in Figures 1.1 and 2.1. Chapter 2 then
discusses the theoretical separation of options and values as shown in the
second box, and then discusses how individual component values can be
analyzed by identifying and using the relevant subsets of option and system
characteristics for production cost modeling. By varying the parametric
values of these characteristics, supply curves for each individual component
value are established as shown, so that the overall system cost or benefit
associated with different levels of the individual value can be read off and
applied to other appropriate options. Chapter 3 then classifies and discusses
the individual component values identified. Chapter 4 takes a subset of these
values chosen to demonstrate the methodology quantitatively, and discusses
the scenarios, assumptions, and modeling methods used to analyze them.
Chapter 5 then discusses the results for these values and compares their
relative size, and Chapter 6 draws the overall conclusions.

2.0 Theory of Full Value Planning
This chapter describes the theory of the thesis methodology which
attempts to remedy the deficiencies in comprehensive identification of utility
options and values, and the lack of consideration of the interaction between
utility options and the systems in which they are placed. It defines the terms
used in the methodology, and proposes a framework for the comprehensive
identification of utility options and values. It then discusses how a range of
component values can be analyzed based on option and system characteristics.
The concept of component values is then extended to include value supply
curves through variations in the option and system characteristics. The range
of component values identified is discussed individually in Chapter 3,
including the source and scale of value, existing theory and models, and
which present or potential planners should use them.
2.1 Definition of Terms
For the purposes of this thesis it is useful to define the following terms.
* Utility option - In the context of this thesis, a utility option is any
planning choice which the utility may implement to meet customer
demands for electrical services. This includes traditional supply side
options that generate, store or transmit electricity, and more recently
accepted demand side options that shift or reduce the electricity
required to provide services. Other non-technological options may
include system operation choices like dispatch policies, financial
structures like fuel or power purchases, or rate structures like real time
pricing.
* Component value - This term is used to indicate any single source of
value available to a utility or its customers. Traditional planning
value (i.e. levelized cost per kWh generated or saved by a technology)
could be considered the first of many component values, but in this
thesis the term refers especially to those values not currently included
in utility planning or regulation. While a component value may be
based on multiple attributes, in this thesis a component value is
monetary and may be either positive or negative.
Full value estimation - Full value estimation is an evaluation of utility
options which is based on summing all available component values,
including conventional values and new component values.
2.2 The Multi-Attribute Chain of Utility Functions
In order for full value estimation to be most valuable, it is important to
be as comprehensive as possible in identifying individual options or
component values which are available. There are two ways to attempt this.
The first is to review the planning literature to see what range of options and
values have previously been considered for use in the planning process.
Where such references have been found, they are mentioned in Chapter 3
which discusses specific component values. The problem with this method is
that it contains no systematic basis, and it is impossible to prove completeness
(i.e. that prior work is definitive and can all be found).
The other method is to structure the search for individual options and
component values through a conceptual framework. This thesis proposes
that such a framework can be formed by combining the spectrum of time
scales used for different planning purposes as shown in Figure 1.1 with the
sequence of utility functions which are shown in Figure 2.1 below.
In this diagram, energy flows downward, from fuel purchases through
generation, transmission, distribution and end use. Information flows
related to the state of the system (load, outages, etc.) flow back up and are used
for economic and security dispatch. Capital additions to the existing
generation, transmission, distribution and end-use capital stocks enter from
the left, while externalities from each sequential function exit to the right.
Note that these functions are independent of ownership. The chain of
functions may be split between more than one utility, by wheeling, or by
complete vertical dis-integration of the generation, transmission, distribution
and dispatch functions.
Figure 2.1 - The Chain of Utility Functions
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By looking at each link in the chain of utility functions, considering the
inputs and outputs of each step, and thinking about all the possible actions
which can be taken over the short run to long run time frames, a
comprehensive framework for identifying utility options is formed. The
strategic utility planning process has traditionally focused on the long term
end of the time scale, and upon the choice of individual capital additions in
the form of specific generation technologies, transmission capacity or end-use
technologies (DSM). However other options characterized by different time
scales or different locations on the chain of utility functions deserve to
compete with traditional options in the planning process. For example
seasonal fuel switching, and non-economic dispatch (i.e. emissions adders)
are options with medium and short term time scales that may compete
directly with long term capital addition of emissions control technologies.
Other dispatch options may reduce cost or risk or increase reliability. Rate
structures (e.g. time of day pricing or interruptible rates) are options that can
compete directly against DSM technologies. Maintenance, refueling, or life
extension options may extend the use of current generation capacity, just as
the addition of switchable capacitors or transformers may extend existing
transmission capacity. Spatial and temporal heterogeneity also play a role, so
that the siting and time of day operation should also be considered part of
how an option is specified. The point is that range of options that can be
combined into a balanced planning portfolio should not be limited, and these
options should be considered and evaluated on the most fair and even basis
possible.
The same conceptual framework that is used to identify utility options
can also be used to identify sources of utility value, with some additional
considerations. These include the number of market participants who
perform the chain of utility functions, the multi-attribute nature of the inputs
and outputs at each stage of the chain, and the spatial and temporal
heterogeneity of the utility system.
Options can be identified and considered independently of whatever
market participant would actually build or implement them. The question of
value is more complex, because economic value depends on what the
customer is willing to pay. In conventional planning there has only been the
utility and the customer, with the dividing line at the electric meter. Because
the price of electricity has been fixed by regulation, value has existed in any
option that allows the utility to pay less for its inputs, or in any option that
has provided more or better end-use services to the customer at the same
price per kWh, including DSM or load management. When the utility is
integrated, the value associated with each function may or may not be
recognized. Even if such value is implicitly recognized, it may not be
quantified as an internal price or used for planning purposes. However this
relatively simple view of value is changing with the onset of deregulation
and competition. The functions which have been combined into the
vertically integrated utility need to be considered separately, based on the
values of inputs, outputs and externalities at each stage. As the industry
becomes segmented, it is even more important that these values become
recognized and explicitly used for planning. In some cases this valuation may
be an internal price for whatever organization is performing the function,
and in others there may exist a competitive market which will generate a
price.
The second consideration that makes finding values somewhat more
complex is that at every step in the chain of utility functions the inputs and
outputs have multiple attributes. Utility inputs are primarily capital goods
and fuels, both of which have costs, but these inputs are also characterized by
future price uncertainty, heat contents and efficiencies, pollutant contents and
emissions rates, etc., all of which must be traded off against each other. Once
electricity is generated, it too is characterized by several measures. Cost per
kilowatt hour is the most important, but electricity is also characterized by
capacity cost, VARs, power quality and reliability, which have different values
for different customers. The value of electricity for customers also depends
upon multiple attributes of the electricity input and the electrical services
produced. Figure 2.1 lists some of the major electrical services, including
lighting, HVAC, motor drive, electrochemistry, communications, and
computation, and each of these provides a blend of cost, efficiency, safety, etc.
compared to other sources. Finally, society as a whole bears the cost of multi-
attribute externalities which are born neither by utilities nor customers.
These include air and water pollution, land use, waste heat, and nuclear
waste. As shown in Figure 2.1, these occur upstream of generation in fuel
production (mining and drilling, refining and beneficiation, and
transportation), as a product of generation, and downstream as byproducts of
electricity use (although electricity is cleaner than competing fuels).
Uncertainty could be mentioned as an additional attribute, but it really applies
to all of the many attributes mentioned above, from price to forecast load to
emissions impacts.
The third consideration with finding utility values is that state of the
utility system is not homogeneous. Instead, the many attributes described
above vary with both time and location, as indicated by the attribute labels at
the different steps of the transmission and distribution chain shown in Figure
2.1. The variations in daily and seasonal load means that the marginal cost of
generation is temporally inhomogeneous, that is it varies over time with
changes in load. This has obviously been recognized since the earliest days of
utility planning, but using this marginal cost as the basis for purchasing
power from non-utility generators was first implemented in 1978 by the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA). Presenting this value to the
customer through the rate structure as the basis for load management is more
recent, with the theoretical basis for time of day pricing first presented in 1981
by Schweppe, Tabors and Kirtley 7 . Time of day pricing is now common in
wholesale power transactions, but retail time of day rates are still uncommon.
However the marginal system cost is not just time dependent. It is
obvious that different generating plants have different costs, and that these
plants are located at different points on the transmission network. Because
power transmission and distribution depends upon the electrical laws of
network flow, the geographic distribution of load on the network may mean
that plant dispatch may vary from the economic optimum in order to
maintain synchrony between generators. This means that increasing load at
different network nodes may produce different marginal costs. Wheeling
power across the system also affects nodal prices, and may both increase
and/or decrease them depending upon the direction of the transaction. In
addition to this short term spatial heterogeneity of marginal dispatch cost,
7 Schweppe, Fred C., Richard D. Tabors and James Kirtley, Homeostatic Control: The
Utility/Customer Marketplace for Electric Power, MIT Energy Laboratory Report, MIT-EL 81-
033, September 1981.
local transmission and distribution capacity constraints also imply
heterogeneous long term T&D expansion costs.
Other attributes in addition to system marginal cost may also be
temporally or spatially heterogeneous, including power quality and reliability
and environmental externalities. Air pollution emissions are a good
example of this, since health and environmental impacts depend upon urban
v. rural origin, wind direction, and seasonally dependent atmospheric
chemistry transformations.
The recognition of the heterogeneity of system attributes also leads to
questions of equity. Obviously prices or emissions that are based on
geographic location or time or day or season will favor some customers over
others. As a regulated monopoly supplier with an obligation to serve all
customers, utility rate structures have incorporated social policy through rate
structures (e.g. average pricing) and obligation to serve. The question of how
to deal fairly with customers who may lose essential service due to peak hour
needs or remote location will need to be dealt with as part of deregulation.
2.3 Component Values and the Structure of Full Value Estimation
Traditional valuation has been based only on technological options,
whether a single generator or DSM program. Even when additional sources
of value like environmental externalities have been added into the planning
process the emissions have been assumed to depend only on the technology
and not on the future dispatch of the system in which the option is placed.
The M.I.T. Energy Lab has been prominent in the use of multi-attribute
studies that analyze option/system interactions, and utilities also use
production cost models to study how technologies will be utilized, but the
point is that this is not generally carried through to the regulatory process
which approves utility supply plans.
On the other hand, component values tend to be based on the
interaction between the option being evaluated and the rest of the utility
system. They can be generally related to the following areas which are used to
organize further discussion in Chapter 3.
* Dispatch
* Transmission and Distribution
* Reliability and Quality of Service
* Financial Risk
* Environmental Impacts
Dispatch values are based on the way that the system is operated, which
can be based on the addition of a traditional generating technology or system
security or environmental reasons. Transmission and distribution values are
based on different ways that options can avoid investment in new T&D
capital. Reliability and quality component values are based on how options
may either provide better service to customers who need it, or less expensive
but adequate service to customers who do not. Financial component values
can be identified based on the number, size, diversity, risk and contractual
terms of both capital and fuel purchases. Environmental values can be based
on costs or savings in meeting emissions or other pollution standards. This
classification is somewhat arbitrary, since a T&D option may claim both
dispatch and reliability benefits, and the value of spinning reserve may be
classified as either a dispatch or reliability component..
These component values can be separated from the options which may
possess them. A single option (e.g. distributed natural gas fuel cells) may
have several component values, including dispatchability, reduced
transmission and distribution requirements, high reliability, and low
environmental impacts. On the other hand, the economic benefit of reducing
spinning reserve can be evaluated regardless of whether this is a dispatch
option which reduces system reliability or a fast interruptible rate structure
option which reduces necessary spinning reserve without reducing system
reliability. Component values have been primarily claimed to date for
individual, non-conventional technologies, e.g. the transmission benefits of
distributed photovoltaic generation, but correct planning requires that they be
identified and comprehensively applied for all options.
This thesis defines component values in monetary terms, so in general
the dependence of component values on multiple attributes is based on the
willingness to pay for each attribute. Electrical service is characterized not just
by energy and capacity, but by VARs, security reserves, reliability and quality.
With unbundling of electrical services these different attributes will each
have a market and a price based on supply and demand.
Environmental component values are different. There is still a utility
supply curve relating costs to emissions, based on the most efficient strategies
for reducing emissions. However, by definition there is no direct customer
for externalities whose cost is born by society as a whole. Stakeholders in the
policy making process do not in general agree on what these costs (e.g. for air
emissions) may be. Markets for trading emissions allowances go part way
towards setting a value on externalities, but only in the sense of efficiently
allocating emissions caps and not in setting emissions levels where marginal
societal cost equals marginal societal benefits. Therefore utility planning can
at present only address the question of efficiency in reducing emissions and
not the question of an optimum level.
Not all component values are equally simple to quantify, and this leads
to the question of how component values can be classified. Figure 2.2 below
shows the classification scheme used for discussion in this thesis.
Figure 2.2 - Classification of Component Values
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This classification is similar to the one used for fuel reserves, where
one axis is based on information (known or unknown) and the other axis is
based on availability (economically recoverable or unrecoverable). In this
case, the information axis is based on whether the relevant utility system data
is uniform or variable across space or time. If the information relevant to the
component value in question is uniform or homogeneous then the value is
generic for the entire system, whereas if it is heterogeneous the value is
specific. Transmission and distribution component values are generally
specific, since they depend not only upon the option but where it is placed in
the system due to spatial heterogeneity of the T&D network. Dispatch
component values are generic, and can be evaluated based only on option
characteristics and/or generic system characteristics. On the availability axis a
component value may be either quantifiable with current analytic models or
methods, or unquantifiable where current methods are not identified,
available, or agreed upon.
This classification means that generic, quantifiable component values
will be the easiest to determine, but analyzing a specific, quantifiable value
will still depend upon the available of the heterogeneous data. If a
component values cannot be found due to the lack either of tools or data, it is
still important to establish the relative scale of the component value as far as
possible. This may make it possible to compare a qualitatively large but
indefinite component value from one source to a smaller but quantifiable
component value from another source. For example, some options will
definitely have a long term transmission and distribution component value
and we know simply from the amount of capital invested in T&D that this
value could be large, but strategic models that combine generation and
transmission expansion analysis do not currently exist.
2.4 Evaluation of Component Values
The structure which this thesis proposes to evaluate component values
is shown below in Figure 2.3
Figure 2.3 - Structure for Evaluation of Component Values
As this figure shows, the analysis proceeds from the identification of a
single component value. Option and system characteristics are defined as
facts which describe the option or system and which are used to model the
interaction between the two. The subsets of these option and system
characteristics which are relevant to the evaluation of a particular component
are identified, and an appropriate value model is used to quantify the
monetary value of this component. This value model may be either a
theoretical mathematical analysis or simulation model. Production cost
models are the most common computer simulation models used for
analyzing utility systems, and may be based on either hourly load dispatch or
load duration curves.
This mapping from component value to subsets of option and system
characteristics is important, because it means that a value can be quantified
independent of any specific option technology or system. The options or
system in question can vary in other ways, but as long as the relevant subsets
of characteristics are the same the component value will remain unchanged.
For example, the value of spinning reserve depends upon a subset of system
characteristics. If a utility rate structure option increases prompt interruptible
load and allows lower spinning reserve, or the spinning reserve level is
simply changed as a dispatch option, the value will depend only on the
system's marginal cost supply curve and unit dispatch constraints.
Table 2.1 and 2.2 below illustrate this mapping. Table 2.1 shows the
subsets of characteristics which are relevant to the different general classes of
component values which have been identified. Table 2.2 then shows the
mapping between characteristics and three individual options which vary
significantly. Some characteristics apply to all options (like cost), while others
apply only to some kinds of options. A similar table mapping system
characteristics to different options can also be constructed, but this is not very
interesting because all systems have the same set of characteristics, although
their quantitative values obviously vary significantly.
Table 2.1 - Utility Value to Characteristics Matrix
System Characteristics
Plant Base (Number & Size)
System Fuel Mix
Plant Efficiencies
System Marginal Cost Curve
Storage Fraction
Non-Dispatchable Fraction
Load Distribution - Temporal
Load Distribution - Spatial
Network Topology & Limits
Load Forecast & Uncertainty
Fuel Prices & Uncertainty
Financial Condition/Risk Level
Rate Structure
Emissions by Plant and Fuel
Option Characteristics
Unit Size
Capital Cost
Fuel Type & Cost
Heat Rate (Efficiency)
Dispatch Cost
Maintenance
Forced Outage Rate
Energy Storage/Efficiency
Load Shifting/Efficiency
Dispatch Constraints
Dispatchable/Non-Dispatchable
Central/Distributed
Network Location
Temporal Distribution
Option Flexibility
Fuel Flexibility
Emissions
Power Quality (e.g.VAR support)
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Table 2.2 - Utility Option to Characteristics Matrix
Option Characteristics
Unit Size
Capital Cost
Fuel Type & Cost
Heat Rate (Efficiency)
Dispatch Cost
Maintenance
Forced Outage Rate
Energy Storage/Efficiency
Load Shifting/Efficiency
Dispatch Constraints
Dispatchable/Non-Dispatchable
Central/ Distributed
Network Location
Temporal Distribution
Option Flexibility
Fuel Flexibility
Emissions
Power Quality (e.g.VAR support)
Utility Options
ALWR Solar PV DSM
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This method of analyzing a single component value by proceeding
from value to the relevant option and system characteristics to an appropriate
model to some quantitative value can be repeated, since a single option may
have more than one component value which applies to it. By adding up all
of these individual component values, a wide range of utility options can
compete on an even basis.
2.5 Construction of Value Supply Curves
Section 2.3 above has described how to evaluate a single component
value using a subset of option and system characteristics, independent of any
single option technology. This thesis further extends this framework by
varying parameter data for the subset of option and system characteristics, so
that a value supply curve can be constructed. It is not interesting to vary most
system characteristics for analysis, because in reality the inertia due to sheer
system size makes them slow to change. However, some system parameters
such as dispatch policies (e.g. for emissions control or spinning reserve) can
be changed rapidly and these may be of interest. Figure 2.4 below shows a
schematic value supply curve which illustrates how this may be done using
the example of generating unit dispatchability. This graph shows the expected
result that increasing generator dispatchability will increase overall value by
decreasing total system dispatch cost, and this value shows decreasing returns
as dispatchability is increased. The label on the horizontal axis will depend
upon the parameter which is varied and the way in which dispatchability is
defined. The figure below shows several alternate horizontal axes, including
a generic label of percent availability when needed, and specific labels
indicating real dispatch constraints for thermal units and storage capacity for
otherwise non-dispatchable units such as solar PV or wind generators.
Figure 2.4 - Schematic Value Supply Curve
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In some cases, it may be interesting to explore the component value's
dependence on two or more option characteristics, and the component value
supply curve can be extended to a value surface (in 3D) or a family of curves
(in 2D). In the example of generating unit dispatchability, the value depends
not only on the speed of dispatch, but also upon the dispatch cost of the
generating unit in question. Figure 2.4 illustrates this by showing two curves
for two different unit dispatch costs (xl and x2).
L
The benefit of this approach is that the value of certain options can be
determined independent of option technology. The supply curve for the
value can be compared to the cost curve for the option that supplies it to find
the optimum. In the example above, the two dispatch cost curves could
reflect the value of dispatch response for a base load and an intermediate
generating unit. Each of these units may be able to vary its response time by
some amount for a certain cost, and by using the value supply curves above
the optimum response time for a new base or intermediate load unit could be
determined. By constructing supply curves for a range of component values,
it should therefore be possible to screen the relative importance of certain
option characteristics, and to design options or portfolios of options that
combine the best levels of these component values to maximize the full
value.
The schematic value supply curve shown above raises several issues.
In the first place the option characteristics must be defined in a way that is
capable of continuous variation. This may or may not be true for all options.
For example, thermal line losses avoided by distributed generation are an
obvious benefit, but these losses depend only on transmission line voltage
and resistance, neither of which can readily be varied. The measure or scale
of the variable characteristic may also be defined in several possible ways. :For
the example given above, the measure of dispatchability could be the unit's
ramping rate, minimum run time or the minimum time between shutdown
and the next start. The value shown on the vertical scale above will generally
be in terms of total dollars for the period modeled, but for the purposes of
comparison with other technologies it may be more useful to show it in
terms of $/kW or $/MWh.
If the component value in question is generic, the value supply curve
obtained will apply to any location in the utility system modeled, but a
specific component value (e.g. deferral of T&D investment) can only be
obtained for and apply to a specific location. Repeated modeling of specific
component values for different locations is not theoretically difficult, but may
depend upon how easy it is to gather the relevant data.
A more theoretical question is the issue of option/system
independence which is assumed in this value supply curve approach. A
component value can only be mapped against a variation in some option or
system characteristic if the state of the fixed utility system is independent of
the state of that variable parameter. This may hold for a snapshot in time, but
fails at first examination over a long planning period (e.g. 20 years), when
enough of a new option can be built to change overall system performance.
This means that for strategic, long term planning the size of a component
value may change with the system as it changes, so a single value supply
curve is insufficient. However, it is possible to construct a family of curves
based on both system and option characteristics, and read the value off
successive curves as the system changes. If the state of the utility system is
effectively independent of the option characteristics (e.g. for short time
periods), then separate component values can also be considered independent
of each other as long as the subset of option characteristics on which they are
based are mutually exclusive.
In order to use component value supply curves to evaluate a specific
utility option, the option is first analyzed to determine how many component
values it may claim. If a value is generic, the option's characteristics can be
used to directly read the component value from the supply curve for the
system in question. If the component value is specific, the value of full
supply curves can be calculated for that location. The component values
(benefits or costs) for all the components identified are then added to the
conventional value (or cost) to give the full value (or net cost). If the option's
characteristics can be varied the supply curves can be used to maximize the
full value.
Under current industry structure, these component values can be used
by utilities as part of their integrated resource planning to compare internal
utility options against those received from independent generators or DSM
providers (often through a bidding process). Under industry deregulation,
these component values can be used by whatever entity takes over the
particular utility function which is the source of the component value. For
example, transmission will presumably remain a regulated monopoly acting
as a common carrier. By recognizing and incorporating component values
into the transmission cost, generators and purchasers will receive the correct
price signals. Distributed generators would reap the benefit of avoiding these
charges. Likewise, whatever agency takes over the role of network
coordinator for the purposes of system security may use component value
information to pay for the correct level of spinning reserve or other security
services.
Current changes in utility industry structure and regulation may be
both good and bad in the context of calculating and incorporating component
values. As mentioned above, some component values may be recognized
and considered by utilities in their daily operation (e.g. dispatch constraints),
but not explicitly included in current long range planning. Dis-integration of
the industry will mean the loss of internal utility communications, and
increase the need for such values to be more formally recognized and
incorporated. On the other hand, utility deregulation provides the possibility
of directly providing direct, bilateral market transaction prices for component
values through unbundling of various services (e.g. spot pricing, reliability,
and VAR support). Planning will likely benefit as free market players
consider all factors that affect the bottom line, not just those contained in the
present regulatory structure. However, it will be the states' responsibility to
structure new markets and regulate the remaining monopolies to provide the
correct price signals, including component values.
It is believed that the component value framework and supply curves
described above will meet the deficiencies outlined at the end of Chapter 1 by;
1) showing how to find the complete range of utility options and values
available, 2) incorporating option/system interactions, 3) separating
component values from individual options and outlining how they can be
classified and quantified, and 4) extending component values to supply
curves that provide the parametric value of changes in option characteristics.
Chapter 3 next describes and discusses the range of specific component
values identified, but the main thrust of this thesis in Chapters 4 and 5 is to
demonstrate how to generate supply curves for a limited number of generic
component values.
3.0 Review of Component Values Identified
This chapter reviews individual component values that have already
been conceptually identified, and classified into the areas of dispatch, T&D,
reliability, financial risk and environmental. This classification is
summarized in Table 3.1 below, which also shows whether the component
value is generic or specific, and whether it has been chosen for evaluation in
Chapters 4 and 5. The discussion of individual components includes the
following areas.
* What is the source of value.
* What option and system attributes are relevant to it.
* The current status of research or use.
* What models if any currently exist to evaluate it.
* How the component value may be used in traditional and competitive
planning.
Several possible schemes for competitive deregulation exist. The
power pool method where a central pool company purchases power from
independent generators is not far removed from traditional planning, while
the most extreme method of competition is to allow independent bilateral
purchase and sales transactions. The discussion below presents how
component values may be used under the two extremes of traditional
planning and in a competitive bilateral transactions market.
Table 3.1 - Classification of Component Values
Component Values Generic Specific Evaluated
Dispatch Components
Load Curve Shape
Load/Cacity Mismatch (Excess RM) 4
Thermal Dispatch Constraints 
_ _
Non-Dispatchable Resources
Spinning Reserve _ _
Non-Economic Dispatch
Transmission & Distribution Components
Line Loss
Changes from Network Flow
Reduction/Deferral of Capital T&D Costs ----- --
Reliability & Qualit Components
Loss of Service _
Inadequate Service
Financial Risk Components
-Excess Unit Capaci!y (Lumpiness) ---- ---
Construction Flexibility 
_
Capital Cost Risks 
_
Fuel Cost Risks 
_
Supply/Demand Diversity
Environmental Components
Externality Supply Costs 1
3.1 Dispatch Related Component Values
Options that affect or constrain utility system dispatch produce a
change in the total production cost of the system. Such dispatch related
values are some of the most obvious reasons why utility options must be
evaluated by how they interact with an existing system, and not on an
individual technology basis. The problem with this definition of course is
that almost every utility option affects dispatch in some way. A system is by
definition interrelated, so classification can be arbitrary. For example, options
that affect dispatch due to network transmission constraints are considered as
part of the T&D class of component values below, and the effects of excess
option size are considered below under economic risks. For the purposes of
this thesis, the category of dispatch related component values has been chosen
to include values related to system load shape, the match between load and
capacity, and individual unit dispatch constraints, all or which are generic
and not linked to any specific network location.
Change in Load Shape
The importance of a flat load curve has been recognized since the very
beginning of utility planning, as described in Appendix 1, and the impact of
load shifting can be very large if the shift is significant. Current utility
options that can produce load shifts include the following.
* DSM efficiency programs, depending upon the time correlation of the
end-uses with system load.
* Load management, depending upon the amount of peak load shifted,
and whether utilities have active control or not.
* Hydro, compressed air and battery storage.
* Non-dispatchable resources (wind or solar PV), which affect the net
load curve remaining for thermal generation.
* Electric vehicle market penetration.
* Utility rate structures, including especially RTP pricing.
Some of these options are included under load forecasting in current
utility planning so that they do not compete directly against supply side
technologies. The option/system characteristics which are relevant to
calculating this component value are;
System Option
Hourly load curve Amount of load reduced or shifted
Supply cost Curve Correlation with system load
This value is well recognized, if not explicitly incorporated in all utility
planning. Conventional production cost modeling can be used to model the
effects of changes in load shape. The chief impact which deregulation wil
have for this value is to decentralize its consideration in planning. Under a
competitive market of bilateral transactions, prices based on marginal cost
will let customers choose whether supply or demand side options are more
attractive, and suppliers choose whether to sell generation or DSM services.
Match of Generation Capacity to Load
Given the net load shape to be met by dispatchable generation, the
system capacity needs to have both sufficient total capacity, and the correct
blend of base, intermediate and peaking load generating units. A mismatch
of load and capacity is given solely by a subset of system characteristics..
System Option
Hourly load curve
Supply cost curve
Excess capacity can occur due to incorrect load forecasts, and effectively
shifts the normal capacity balance because excess capacity effectively shifts up
the dispatch order and is used to meet intermediate or peak loads. The
savings in fuel costs and emissions due to base load dispatch of newer, more
efficient plants may or may not justify the high reserve margin. The value
(or cost) of either excess capacity or a system whose plants' capital to fuel cost
balance is mismatched to load is well recognized by conventional analysis, but
since this problem arises out of prior planning decisions whose costs are
already sunk it has not played a large role in planning. Normally there is no
'cure' for a high reserve margin, except to wait for load growth to catch up (or
claim that it is necessary for reliability). With the advent of competition
however, recovery of sunk costs is not guaranteed and non-competitive
individual generating plants will presumably be sold at their new and lower
market value or be retired. Normal production costing models can be used to
determine the cost of excess reserve margin, and this is presented in Chapters
4 and 5.
Dispatch of Generation Capacity
System dispatch can also be affected by constraints on the operation of
individual plants. These constraints can be based on the physical limits of the
generation technology or energy resource, or upon non-economic dispatch
constraints or rules.
* Thermal Generation Dispatch Constraints - Due the economics of
matching generation to the load curve, base load units are large, efficient, and
have slower response times than peaking units which are smaller with
higher dispatch cost and faster response times. This value can be evaluated
solely from the existing system, and then applied to new options based on the
following characteristics.
System Option
Hourly load data Dispatch constraint
Supply cost curve Variable cost
Unit dispatch constraints
Unit dispatch constraints may mean that a unit is kept in (or out) of the
optimal, unconstrained dispatch order because expected short term load shifts
mean that it will (or won't) be needed again soon. Dispatch constraints and
reduced thermal efficiency during startup impose costs that are not captured
in the production cost modeling usually used for strategic planning, which is
based on load duration curves that ignore sequential hour-by-hour load
changes. This component value may be calculated by using an hourly
production cost model, but because of time and cost these models are usually
used for tactical rather than strategic planning. Reduced dispatch constraints
can incur higher maintenance costs and unit startups can incur increased
emissions, so this value can be used under current market structure to
determine the cost tradeoff of different maintenance and emissions levels.
Under deregulation, this value can used to set a price on unit response times,
including the value of advance notification time for interruptible load
customers, which would affect the rates they pay. This method may also be
used to evaluate the value of power purchases from other utilities or IPPs,
based on contractual terms or constraints that may affect dispatch. The
component value is analyzed and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
* Non-Dispatchable Resources. - Some energy resources are not
dispatchable, including run of river hydro, wind, solar, and some
cogenerators. Although most of these resources have low or zero variable
dispatch cost, their value is still diminished by their non-dispatchability
because the resource availability is not correlated to the daily or seasonal load
curve. In order to analyze what dispatchability is worth, it is possible to add it
by means of storage capacity. For run of river hydro this is done by building a
dam, but this can also be done for the other resources above by means of
batteries or other storage. To analyze the value of dispatchability, the
following characteristics are relevant.
System Option
Hourly load data Hourly resource data
Supply cost curve Variable cost
Storage capacity
Inverter capacity
The value of the correlation between generation and marginal system
cost is recognized in utility planning, but the value of increasing
dispatchability by adding storage and the optimization of storage and inverter
capacity is not. This thesis finds the value due to the optimized use of storage
as an example which is presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
For reasons of system security, there is also expected to be a practical
limit to the total fraction of non-dispatchable generation in a system, and
there would be a cost associated with this as the limit is approached.
However it is estimated by Dr. Richard Tabors that the marginal economic
value of non-dispatchable resources will probably by zero before security
related limits are reached, and this cost has not been included in the non-
dispatchable component value.
e Spinning Reserve - Spinning reserve consists of generating units in
operation below their full capacity and is necessary to provide power on short
notice when a generator or transmission line in service experiences a forced
outage. As system load increases, spinning reserve units are dispatched at
their full capacity and new units are selected for spinning reserve. This
process is reversed as system load decreases. North American Electric
Reliability Council recommended levels for spinning reserve are generally
given in MW, but because the amount needed is related to the size of a
possible outage, spinning reserve is also given by some standards as a fraction
of the capacity of the single or two largest generating unit(s) in service at any
time.
Several options can reduce the need for spinning reserve. Fast
interruptible customers can shed load, or new instrumentation and control
options may allow utilities to operate closer to their safety margin
(substituting knowledge for error factors). Utilities may also simply make a
cost tradeoff of how much reliability they wish to purchase by the spinning
reserve level they set. In any case, the value of the spinning reserve is of
interest for planning. This component value supply curve depends upon the
following system characteristics and is independent of option characteristics,
unless the new option becomes the new largest unit in service.
System Option
Hourly load data
Supply cost curve
Capacity of largest unit
Spinning Reserve Level
The component value can be positive or negative, depending upon
whether the option under consideration reduces or increases the spinning
reserve level. Spinning reserve can be calculated by production cost
modeling, and although some load duration curve models allow changes in
spinning reserve level it will be more accurately calculated by an hourly
model that can also include dispatch constraints. Under traditional utility
planning the value of spinning reserve can be used by the utility to evaluate
their cost v. reliability tradeoff, or to evaluate the increase required or
decrease allowed by some planning option. Under a system of competitive
bilateral transactions, spinning reserve is an ancillary service required for
system security. The system operator may require buyers to pay for some
amount of spinning reserve along with their power purchase, or the cost of
spinning reserve may be added to the cost of transmission. In either case,
options which reduce the need for spinning reserve would decrease the
transaction cost. The value of spinning reserve is calculated and discussed in
Chapters 4 and 5.
* Non-Economic Dispatch. - Fuel or emissions constraints or energy
limited generation can cause changes from unconstrained economic dispatch.
Such dispatch rules or constraints can include fuel switching, emissions caps
or bubbles, emissions trading, seasonal emissions constrained dispatch, or
emissions based cost adders. Under the framework of this thesis, these
methods are utility options that compete against technologically based
methods of reducing emissions, such as DSM, clean generators, or pollution
control technologies. Dispatch options may be more cost effective, but must
be properly evaluated for comparison with other, unconstraining options.
When additional generation capacity is needed, then dispatch rule options
can be analyzed with other options to find a portfolio that has the lowest
overall cost. A production cost model that can handle these types of dispatch
rules or constraints is normally used to see the systems effects on costs and
emissions, but since a full porfolio analysis is not normally done when new
capacity is needed such a model is not usually used. The option and system
characteristics required for this type of model include the following.
System Option
Hourly load curve Dispatch rule
Supply cost curve
Unit fuels and emissions
Emissions taxes may also be evaluated under this component value,
since they affect dispatch in the same way as emissions adders. However
since emissions taxes are actually collected, the dispatch is not constrained but
rather optimized to a new objective function. Indeed, if a dispatch constraint
option is the most efficient way of achieving emissions reductions (or some
other goal), then the changed dispatch will not be constrained, but rather
most economical under the imposed regulation. Under deregulation,
emissions or emissions permits must have a real price since there will be no
other means of enforcing non-economic behavior.
3.2 Transmission and Distribution Component Values
Transmission and distribution component values can be important,
because T&D costs are significant in two ways. First, the capital investment in
T&D is large; approximately 40% of total utility investment as discussed in
Section 4.1 and shown in Table 4.2. Second, line losses due to thermal
resistance represent a large cost (approximately 10% of total generation
overall). These losses can be minimized by higher transmission voltages or
lower line resistance, but they can only be eliminated by distributed
generation or increased end-use efficiency.
Utility T&D planning has been largely secondary to generation
planning, focusing on expansion to meet growing generation and load under
a range of outage scenarios. This planning covers a wide range of time
domains, each of which can contribute to value, from long term planning
(years) to operation and maintenance (months), dispatch(hours), and security
(minutes and seconds). The longest term T&D planning has been at the
boundary between strategic planning and operation, focusing on specific
projects like generator location and line construction or upgrades. T&D
planning tools to date have been concentrated on the constraints of network
flow and a range of security limits (including thermal limits, voltage support,
phase angle, and system synchronization) all under assumed outage
scenarios.
Utility deregulation and increased wholesale power purchases wheeled
across the T&D network are producing new models for improved
transmission pricing8 . Transmission networks are built to accommodate
economic dispatch, based on generator location, daily and seasonal patterns of
load distribution, and network flow. Imposition of large wheeling
transactions across a transmission network can force a departure from strict
economic dispatch in order to maintain generator synchronization and
system security. Such models can produce the marginal cost of electricity at
individual transmission network nodes, based on unit location, security
constrained dispatch, and line losses. The value of transmission between two
network points is then simply the difference in their marginal costs. The
difficulty in expanding these models for long range, strategic planning lies in
predicting the size and location of new generators, transmission lines, and
load demand. Current production cost models used for generation expansion
and strategic planning assume that the network is a single node, with all
generation and loads at a single point. Thus, a comprehensive model for
integrated planning has yet to be developed.
8 Ilic, M.D., J. R. Lacalle-Melero, F. Nishimura, W. Schenler, D. Shirmohammadi, A. Crough,
and A. Catelli, "Short-term Economic Energy Management in a Competitive Utility
Environment", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.8, No.1, pp. 198-206.
Given this perspective on T&D planning, there seem to exist at least
four different sources of component value, including 1) line losses, 2)
departures from economic dispatch, 3) departures from network flow, and 4)
deferral of maintenance, replacement or new construction of T&D capital
equipment. T&D component values are specific to their network location,
and some are difficult to calculate. The most complete consideration of T&D
component values by a utility to date appears to have been performed by
Pacific Gas & Electric on their Kerman substation located in the San Fernando
Valley9 .
Line Losses
Departures from Economic Dispatch.
These two sources of value have been outlined above. At the crudest
level, line losses can be evaluated based on average system losses. In this case,
line losses could be considered a generic component value, and DSM and
distributed generation options could claim it. Line losses depend upon
voltage and line resistance, so there is little way to vary line losses to
construct a value supply curve.
At a more sophisticated and correct level of analysis, these two sources
of value are calculated by the models which produce heterogeneous network
marginal costs. Although the two values are conceptually distinct, the results
do not separate them. In this case, they can be considered together as a specific
component values which depend upon the network location of the option in
question. The size of the option (e.g. generator or DSM capacity) can then be
varied to see how the combined component values change.
Under a traditional utility structure the network marginal cost model
can be used by utility planners to help locate generators and transmission line
upgrades, and a component credit could be added to the bidding process for
DSM and distributed generation options. Under competition, the network
marginal costs will form the basis for economically correct transmission
9 Shugar, Daniel S., "Photovoltaics in the Distribution System: The Evaluation of System and
Distributed Benefits", Twenty First IEEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference, Kissimmee,
Florida, May, 1990.
pricing by the transmission company, subject to regulation. This
transmission price information would form the basis for new generators to
make location decisions and customers to make purchase decisions, although
some social equity concerns may arise of prices vary too much geographically.
Marginal network prices are based on the the existing system and loads. For
long term, strategic planning it is possible to either extrapolate current prices
or forecast system additions and load growth, but neither approach appears
very reliable.
Departure from Network Flow.
Transmission options such as switchable capacitors, inductors,
transformers or high power solid state devices which can affect network flow
by actively altering the transmission system configuration are becoming
increasingly available. The first use of these devices will be to alter network
flow and relieve the most highly stressed network sections. At the most
extreme example, these changes could alter the transmission network from
network flow to a switched network that could be actively controlled. These
options provide value by enabling the existing network to carry power more
efficiently, since their cost would be less than increasing transmission line
capacities. This component value is specific to network location, and the
same type of marginal network cost model can be employed to calculate their
value.as long as the voltage, phase, and impedance alterations which these
options provide can be handled. Option size can then be varied to construct
component value supply curves.
Under traditional utility structure, these options can reduce costs and
avoid the siting opposition that is associated with more traditional
transmission network expansion projects. In a competitive environment, the
transmission company will remain a regulated monopoly, and regulators will
need to provide incentives for T&D options that will minimize overall costs.
Reduction and Deferral of T&D Costs
Load growth requires the existing T&D network to work closer to its
operational limits. This stresses components like transformers, increasing
maintenance and shortening service life. Further load growth requires the
construction of new T&D capacity. In either case there is a significant cost for
maintenance, replacement or new construction of capital investment.
Distributed generation and DSM can reduce or defer this investment, creating
a component value credit which can make DSM and distributed generation
more attractive. The benefits of distributed generation may be reduced if it is
non-dispatchable (as with many renewables), since T&D capacity for load
backup may be required at times when load and generation do not coincide.
Appropriate siting of new generation, transmission, or loads may also reduce
stress on the T&D network and allow reduced T&D costs. This component
value is well recognized, and has been the subject of both publications and
conferences10
This component value is site specific, and depends upon the loading
and physical condition of specific transmission lines, substations, and
distribution lines. The value supply curve depends on how long an option
can defer new or replacement T&D capacity, and so depends upon the set of
options and system characteristics shown below.
System Option
Local hourly loads Capacity
Local T&D limits Correlation with local hourly loads
Local equipment condition
In remote locations the cost of a distribution power line is high enough
that wind and photovoltaic power with storage are already economic. This
component value can also help to make DSM and distributed cogeneration,
photovoltaics, and fuel cells competitive in specific niche locations where the
distribution system for existing utility service is stressed.
This component value can be used by traditional utilities as a credit to
make qualifying options compete more fairly in their internal planning or in
open bidding. Under deregulated competition, companies offering
10 Lamarre, Leslie, "The Vision of Distributed Generation", EPRI Journal, April/May 1993.
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distributed generation or DSM services will claim this credit by avoiding
transmission (and possibly distribution) costs. Depending upon how these
remaining T&D monopolies are regulated, new and replacement capacity
costs may be evenly or locally applied. Local costing will enhance this
component value for stressed or constrained network locations, but
regulatory pressures for social equity may prevent this.
3.3 Reliability and Quality Component Values
The reliability of a generator in supplying power has value, but this
section focuses on the component value of the reliability and quality of
electrical service supplied to the customer. Reliability and quality are not
strictly independent attributes of electrical power service, but they can be
considered as orthogonal measures of this service. Perfect quality will include
the correct sinusoidal waveform, voltage level, frequency, and reactive
power, while perfect reliability wil mean the lack of any interruptions.
Reliability and quality are heterogeneous over time and location on the
T&D network. Outages due to major generation and transmission failures
can cause rolling blackouts that affect large areas simultaneously, but most
outages are due to distribution failures that depend on weather and surface
power lines or transformer failures. Quality varies due to power factor due to
line and equipment inductance and due to waveform contamination by
lightning strikes and large customers.
Reliability and quality both have value to customers that depends
upon the customers' needs. For reliability, this value depends upon the time
and duration of an outage, the amount of prior warning which may be given,
and the end-use service to the customers. The value can be especially high
for some manufacturing processes (such as glass making, heat treating,
tempering, baking, etc.). Hospitals require backup generators, so the value of
utility reliability to them is low, but for home dialysis the value can be very
high indeed. Studies have been done of how value depends upon customer
class and outage characteristics 11 . Customer demand for reliability also
depends the customer's end use. Most early services provided by electricity,
including heat, light and motor drive, were relatively insensitive to
waveform, but the increased dependence on electronics has placed an
increased emphasis on this attribute.
This discussion of value in effect means that the customers needs
define a demand cost curve, and that different customers may be willing to
buy (and sell) different levels of reliability and quality service. The utility
supply cost curve is based on many alternate means of providing these
services, and the most economical means may not always be through major
generation or transmission improvements. For reliability, the cost of backup
generation or battery storage can be the backstop price, and other methods
must be more cost effective. For reliability, power filters and capacitors to
improve the power factor can also be more effective than systemwide
improvements. The point here is that reliability and quality are services that
can be unbundled from plain energy service and supplied at different levels
to different customers under deregulation, and many ways of supplying these
services can be purchased by either the utility or the customer.
From this discussion it can be seen that the value of reliability and
quality depend upon time and location, and so constitute specific rather than
generic component values. Supply curves for these values will depend upon
the most efficient combination of all the different technologies which can
supply them. Distributed cogeneration and fuel cell generation may deserve a
component value credit for reliability or quality, while photovoltaic or wind
generation without storage may incur a debit. For these reasons it is difficult
to find a model to generate such reliability and quality component value
supply curves.
Generators may supply some services related to bulk reliability,
including energy, spinning reserve, VAR supply and system stability services
related to automatic generation control (AGC) and voltage control. It has
been estimated that approximately 75% or more of the value of generation is
11 Sangvhi, A.P., "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Power System Reliability: Determination of
Interruption Costs", EPRI Report EL-6791, Project 2878-1, Palo Alto, CA, 1990.
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due to plain energy (bulk kWh), while slightly more than 20% is due to
reserve power service, and less than 5% due to system AGC, stability and
voltage control12 . Spinning reserve has been discussed above as a separate
component value under the dispatch category. Reactive power (VARs) can be
supplied by generators over a certain range determined by the VAR supply
curve at only a slight cost, so this value is not high.
Under current industry structure, the emphasis has been on the
reliability of bulk supply, and quality has been more of a customer service
issue related to power factor correction and filtering. Reliability and quality
services have been implicitly valued as part of the utilities obligation to serve,
but not systematically considered or disaggregated for different customers.
Under a competitive market regime, the possible unbundling of
reliability and quality from bulk energy service will mean that the supply of
these services can be matched to customer needs according to the supply and
demand cost curves. Regulators may need to still impose some minimum
service standards for remote network locations that could not otherwise
afford adequate service. Reliability and quality services supplied by generators
(like spinning reserve) may be charged directly to customers or included in
transmission costs by whatever agency acts as a network coordinator.
Customers may wish to purchase equipment to supply their own reliability
and quality needs, or these may be offered along with DSM services by the
utility. Large customers may also sell some of these services (like
interruptible service, VARs, and voltage filtering) back to the utility.
3.4 Financial Risk Component Values
Financial risk is an inherent aspect of utility operations, although it has
been somewhat mitigated by the regulated rate of return due to monopoly
status. The chain of utility functions shown in Figure 2.1 illustrates the chief
sources of risk by the arrows that enter and leave the utility boundary. The
input risks are related to the purchase of capital investments and fuel, while
the output risks are related to forecasting customer load, the cost effectiveness
12 Ongoing conversations with Dr. Richard Tabors.
of DSM, and possible changes in the costs imposed by externalities (e.g.
through decreased emissions caps or tradeable emissions permits). Markets
for trading wholesale electricity, electricity futures and emissions permits
have been recently established that permit utilities to reconcile their
expectations about the future, including future risks.
While utilities recognize risk, the normal utility planning process has
focused on sufficient generation to meet an approved forecast, and on the cost
per kWh generated or saved by specific technologies. The benefits of
diversification and flexibility in planning strategies that will perform robustly
over a range of possible futures deserve to be better quantified and included
in the utility planning process. This thesis subdivides financial risks into the
categories of capital risks and fuel risks, because risks in load forecasting are
really risks in matching capacity to forecast load, and risks due to changed
emissions regulations are met by capital and fuel choices. This section focuses
more on capital risks because the specific component value associated with
generator size relative to system size is further explored in Chapters 4 and 5.
Fuel price clauses which exist in 38 states13 have also partially insulated
utilities (if not the public) from sudden changes in fuel prices.
Capital Cost Risk.
Large, capital intensive options may be risky, either because of
uncertain costs (e.g. nuclear plants), or because of uncertain reliability or
efficiency (e.g. DSM programs). These capital costs risks are usually balanced
against fuel cost risks, due to the fuel to capital cost balance which shifts across
the range from base load to peak load generators. Capital cost risks can be
minimized by the choice of technology, unit size, the terms of purchase (such
as turnkey contracts), and obtaining prior regulatory approval (e.g. advanced
siting or standardized reactor designs). One of the larger and easier to analyze
component values is associated with unit size.
13 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Utility Regulatory Policy in
the United States and Canada, Compilation 1993-1994, Table 176.
* Excess or lump capacity - Electric utilities have had a historic trend
towards ever larger generating plants, driven by load growth and economies
of scale and culminating in the construction of the current generation of
nuclear power plants. This trend has reversed in the recent past as generators
based on natural gas-fired aero-derivative combustion turbines and the
growth of non-utility generators have combined to drive down the average
size of new units. Economies of scale in size have been replaced by
economies of scale in number as major components have become more
standardized.
Generators which are large relative to utility system size have had
historic problems with the consequences of cost overruns, including rate
shock and prudency hearings. This has led many utilities to joint ownership
of large nuclear units, so that their large capacity is spread over a larger total
system size. Large generators also require longer construction periods, which
lead to risk from changes in fuel markets and load growth. The advantages of
small unit size relative to system load growth are also seen in some utility
options like wind power or DSM. These are generally evaluated at some
aggregate level (e.g. a wind farm with many individual turbines, or a DSM
program with many different types and locations of efficiency
improvements), but the diversity of many small units reduces the maximum
size of probable outages and simplifies maintenance requirements.
Building a new generating option that is too large means that capacity
increases in a large step function and most of this 'lump' of excess capacity is
not required until system load growth grows enough to need the capacity.
Because large plants are generally baseload and new plants are more efficient,
this excess capacity is used, and the 'excess' shifts up the dispatch order to less
efficient baseload and mid-load plants. The savings in fuel costs and
emissions may or may not justify the large size of the plant.. The balance
between these factors may give an advantage to smaller plants built
sequentially, especially with decreases in economies of scale for large plants
and increased availability of modular generation units. Thus there appears to
be a component value associated with smaller unit size relative to the system.
This value may be captured by conventional production cost modeling, but
will be ignored if a utility compares individual technologies without
considering how they interact with the existing system. The key subset of
characteristics that matter for this component value are as follows.
System Option
Load growth (MW/yr.) Size (MW)
Supply cost curve Variable cost
Load demand curve
Since there are only two technology characteristics that are of major
importance, it is clear that a graph can be constructed comparing size against
cost, and a family of curves for different variable costs can also be constructed,
as shown below. In the example shown in Figure 3.1 below, the 'lumpiness'
scale is geometric, and the graph of capacity additions show three possible
trajectories as a single large generator is replaced first by two units of one half
the size, and then by four units one quarter as large. Although this value will
depend slightly upon variable dispatch cost, it is clear that the most value is
available at low dispatch costs, because base load plants are the largest.
Figure 3.1 - Schematic Value of Unit Size
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Although this component value is conceptually similar to the value of
reserve margin considered under dispatch components above, it has been
separated for two reasons. First, the value associated with overall reserve
margin can be given to options which reduce the total amount of reserve
margin the system needs for maintenance and reliability. The value of
'lumpiness' is concerned with the short term jump in reserve margin above
normal levels which can be produced by a single large unit.
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This component value which measures the value of unit size represents a
lower limit, and additional component values for smaller plants can be based
on flexibility in planning. In the simplest case this means that if load growth
should change in the example above, construction of later units could simply
by halted. In a more sophisticated example, a gas combustion turbine unit
could be expanded into a combined cycle unit, and then have a coal gasifier
added. The flexibility to make decisions in stages over time as more
information becomes available produces more value than if the final plant
were built from the beginning. Decision analysis models for this type of
decision making are well known, and extend to other situations, including
fuel switching and construction of options portfolios. The value of flexibility
is discussed further in Section 5.2.
Fuel Cost Risk
The risks associated with future fuel costs can be observed by looking at
the comparative historical variability in prices for different utility fuels.
These risks may be minimized in a number of ways, including; 1) long term
fuel contracts, 2) fuel switching in the event of future price shifts, 3) fuel
diversity to reduce dependence on a single fuel, and 4) the choice of
technologies with low fuel price risks (e.g. DSM, nuclear, or renewables).
Options 2, 3, and 4 also minimize the risk from increased emissions
constraints. These four options also apply to non-utility generators, who may
either bear the fuel cost risks themselves or pass them on to their customers
through contracts which are indexed to fuel prices.
Although utilities need to consider competing strategic planning
options based on consistent fuel price forecasts, the emphasis is on using the
best forecast available and not on the fact that any single forecast is bound to
be wrong. Clearly, a risk related component value would be useful to reward
options with low fuel risks and penalize options with high fuel risks.
The impact of utility strategies on both capital and fuel risks can be
evaluated by a number of techniques, including the following.
* Financial options and portfolio evaluation techniques.
* Risk-adjusted discount rates for uncertain cost streams (e.g. fuel
prices) 14 .
* Decision tree analysis for flexible options.
* Insurance premia
From a societal point of view a diverse and flexible power system is an
advantage, and a power supply market that considers its own risks
appropriately should incorporate these benefits. Under traditional electric
utility planning, capital cost risks are born primarily by utility shareholders
and to a lesser extent by utility bondholders, and fuel cost risks are shared
with customers. Risk based component values could be used by the utilities
to choose options that reduce these risks.
Financial risk appears to be the class of component values which a
competitive market will most readily incorporate with out imposing any
market structure or signals, because these types of risks are part of the normal
course of any business. Under competition, generation capital cost risks are
born by the generation company. The way in which fuel risk is shared
between generator and customer depends upon the terms of their contract.
The generator may pass its risks on to the customer, or if the contract
insulates the customer from risk by a fixed price or a limit on price increases,
then the generator may choose to diversify or insure against its own risks by a
blend of fuels and long term fuel purchase contracts. The customer in turn
may choose to trade low price for the risk of future price increases, or he may
pay a price premium for decreased risk.
3.5 Environmental Component Values
The electric utility sector produces a wide array of environmental
externalities, both directly and indirectly. Air pollutants (including SO 2, NOx,
CO 2 and particulates) are the emissions of predominant concern, but other
externalities include radioactive waste, thermal pollution, flyash, mine
14 Awerbuch, Shimon, Risk-Adjusted IRP Procedures: Reflecting the True Costs of
Conventional and Solar Options, draft report submitted to National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, Golden, CO, July 1992.
leachant, and noise. The utility planning process has focused on direct power
plant emissions, but numerous studies have been done which calculate fuel
cycle and life cycle impacts for different fuels and generation technologies.
These many different types of pollutants produce a wide array of impacts,
which range from direct and local to diffuse and global.
In order to reduce externalities, utilities have implemented a wide
range of measures, including control technologies, emissions caps or limits
for plants, utilities or regions, trading of emissions permits, emissions adders
for non-economic dispatch, and the inclusion of emissions adders in the
bidding process for new generation. Production costing models have been
adapted and developed to track emissions and handle the many different
forms of dispatch constraints and optimization involved.
Classical economics argues that environmental externalities should be
internalized (i.e. through emissions taxes) until the marginal benefit of
pollution (tax income) is equal to the marginal cost of environmental damage
and morbidity. However the difficulties involved in modeling air transport,
atmospheric chemistry, and damage and morbidity impacts are significant,
and transforming damage and morbidity into dollars involves ethical
considerations that make it difficult to reach consensus. For these reasons
utility environmental planning has addressed primarily the issues of
efficiency and allocation in reducing emissions, rather than finding the
optimum level of pollution. In economic terms the supply cost curve for
individual pollutants can be found, but not the 'demand' or damages cost
curve. For these reasons, pollutant limits have been determined politically.
The problems with current utility planning and regulation are several.
First, when the choice of new generation includes environmental adders in
the selection or bidding process, the size of the adders may be questionable
(e.g. damage costs) or economically irrational (e.g. emissions control
technology costs). Second, the total cost of environmental adders is usually
based on an assumed capacity factor, instead of how the plant will actually be
dispatched based on interaction with the existing utility system.
Prior planning work by the M.I.T. Energy Lab has evolved a multi-
attribute, multi-scenario approach that presents the results of many strategies
over many different possible futures15 . The cost v. emissions results for each
pollutant contain a dominant set of options which form a tradeoff curve or
frontier, as shown below in 3.2.
Figure 3.2 - Dominant Set of Least Cost Pollution Strategies
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At least one member of the dominant set of options is always both
cleaner and cheaper than any member of the dominated set. For this reason
the tradeoff frontier represents a cost supply curve for a single pollutant,
which shows the total system cost and marginal cost for different pollution
levels. This curve is directly analogous to the component value supply
curves discussed in this thesis. The major problem is that the dominant set
for different emissions does not necessarily contain all the same options or
have them in the same order. This means that a compromise option is
sought that is at least close to the tradeoff frontier for each pollutant.
This multi-attribute, multi-scenario approach can be applied to
traditional utility planning in order to find the most cost effective option for
meeting predetermined emissions limits. The production cost modeling
involved is based on the following set of characteristics.
15 Connors, Stephen R., "Informing Decision Makers and Identifying Niche Opportunities for
Windpower. Use of Multiattribute Trade-Off Analysis to Evaluate Non-dispatchable
Resources.", Energy Policy, Volume 24, Number 2, pp. 165, 1996.
68
System Option
Hourly load curve Unit Size
Supply cost curve Variable cost
Unit emissions Emissions rates
Hourly availability
Dispatch rule (if any)
Under a competitive market with bilateral transactions, emissions
controls must be based on real price signals. The government can limit
emissions by setting the total amount of tradeable emissions permits (in
which case the initial allocation may be an issue), or by imposing emissions
taxes on generators. In either case, these costs would be passed to customers
and the market would act to limit sales (and emissions) by these generators. If
revenue neutrality was desired it would be possible to rebate the emissions
taxes to customers, perhaps through reduced transmission or distribution
costs.
The concern of incorporating global sustainability into local utility
planning would extend the methods already mentioned in this section. This
could be done by adding attributes to track input and output materials flows,
including resource depletion, and relative contributions of virgin and
recycled materials. In this context, emissions from fuels produced 'upstream'
of the electric utility sector should also be separately tracked to provide a
better comparison of emissions across various utility options. If taxes on
emissions 'downstream' of generation are considered as an option, then
correct economic decision making would mean that upstream emissions
should also be taxed and this tax included in the price of fuels to the electric
sector.
By individually identifying and explaining individual component
values, this chapter puts too much emphasis on their separate analysis.
These individual components are aspects of overall system operation and the
option and system interaction. Any model that could completely simulate
the utility system would calculate all these values, without necessarily
quantifying them individually. No such model exists, but current production
cost models can evaluate several, as demonstrated in Chapters 4 & 5. The
separation of individual component values and the construction of
component value supply curves can only be done with the models used by
varying only the relevant parameters associated with each value. The point
here is that it is less important to uniquely classify and separately quantify
these values than it is to identify them and to make sure that they are
included in the overall analysis. Only those component values (such as most
financial risks) which are excluded from complete production cost modeling
will need to be separately modeled and added to obtain full option values.
4.0 Methodology of Evaluating Specific Component Values
The structure of how component values can be based on certain
characteristics distinct from individual technologies, the range of component
values which have been identified , and how the values quantified may be
used and by what parties have been discussed in previous chapters. Five of
these generic and quantifiable component values have been chosen as
examples to illustrate the process of constructing and evaluating component
value supply curves. This chapter describes the methodology and
assumptions used to model these component values, including the models
used or developed, the choice and range of parameters used to illustrate the
benefit supply curve for each component value, and the data for relevant
system and technology characteristics. The results of the component value
analyses are not given in this chapter, but instead are presented and discussed
in Chapter 5 in the same order as they are described below. Figure 4.1 below
shows the five component values chosen, the production cost models used to
evaluate them, and the flow of the modeling process.
Figure 4.1 - Component Value Modeling Diagram
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As shown in this figure, the component values chosen can be
evaluated by the use of the system marginal cost curve or by two different
kinds of production cost simulation models; either a load duration curve
(LDC) model or an hour by hour simulation model. The distinction between
the basic methodologies, capabilities and limitations of these two major kinds
of models are important and worth discussing, because they determine which
is appropriate for modeling different types of component values.
In a load duration curve model, the hourly loads for a year or any sub-
period are sorted, and the number of hours spent within a specific load
interval or below a specific load level are aggregated to determine the total
time spent at different states of system dispatch. The load duration curve can
be represented in a piece wise linear way, or by using other mathematical
means to describe the probability of being at or below a certain system load
level. Generation units are dispatched to meet the different levels of
aggregated load, and forced or planned outages which can affect this dispatch
may be handled in different ways. In some models, the probability function
for time spent at remaining load is recalculated after each unit dispatch by
convolving the forced outage rate for the unit with the original load duration
probability function. In other LDC models, maintenance periods or forced
outage rates may also be handled by derating capacity for the analysis period.
In contrast with LDC models, hourly models proceed sequentially hour
by hour through historical or forecast loads, specifically incorporating the
sequential information that is lost in a LDC model. As loads change, units are
started or stopped in dispatch order as necessary. Units with maintenance
outages or dispatch constraints are unavailable, and dispatch skips to the next
unit. Outages are handled in a method similar to Monte Carlo simulation,
summing results with and without a unit in an average which is weighted
using the outage rate. Hourly models require the same basic information
about system composition and demand, but typically contain greater detail
about unit loading blocks (generation levels below full capacity), and heat rate
curves giving efficiency for each loading block. Data is also required for
minimum unit run times, unit shutdown times, ramping rates and startup
costs.
Hourly models are capable of analyzing detailed dispatch which LDC
models cannot, including issues like spinning reserve and unit constraints,
but because of the greater detail and chronological approach, hourly models
also have significantly greater computational requirements than LDC models
for similar time periods. For these reasons LDC models are most commonly
used for strategic planning over time periods that run from one year to 20 or
30 years, while hourly models are used for tactical planning or actual dispatch
over periods that typically run from days up to a year. Both types of models
can trade computing time v. accuracy by modeling a representative sub period
and expanding results to a longer time period.
An important effect of the difference in typical time periods is that LDC
models have been used more in generation expansion planning, while
hourly models have been used more for operational questions. However,
some component values which can only be evaluated using an hourly model
may also be significant in utility option planning. Part of the goal in using
both types of models to evaluate the generic component values presented in
this chapter is to compare the relative scale and significance of the two types.
The choice of LDC model for this thesis was both simple and obvious.
This thesis stems in part from the study of option and system interactions
performed over several years by the Analysis Group for Regional Electricity
Alternatives (AGREA) at the M.I.T. Energy Lab for the New England region
using the Electricity Generation Expansion Analysis System (EGEAS). This
large LDC model was developed by researchers at M.I.T. for the Electric Power
Research Institute in 1982, and has become a well accepted industry standard
in the US. Although EGEAS incorporates a choice of several methods for
optimizing generation expansion plans, the AGREA approach has focused on
a multi-attribute, multi-scenario approach which models a broad range of
strategies (each composed of a blend of options). Thus, a pre-specified pathway
of construction has been formulated for each run. The AGREA team has
used EGEAS to model the New England region and study issues ranging from
S02 and NOx emissions, natural gas dependency, repowering, solar and wind
power and electric vehicle impacts. The New England project is composed of
an advisory group which suggests issues, attributes and key assumptions for
each round of analysis. This advisory group includes all the major utilities in
the New England region, as well as regulatory, customer, and environmental
stakeholders. The AGREA team has developed its EGEAS database in close
cooperation with these utilities, as well as from EPRI and other industry
sources. This AGREA EGEAS database for the New England region has been
regularly updated for each major round of analysis, and was used for all
EGEAS modeling done as part of this thesis. The base year for all information
in the database is 1994, and system simulations are performed for 1995 on.
Obviously, a large (and the most uncertain) part of the assumptions in the
database are composed of expected future trends in load growth, fuel prices,
capital costs, etc. The component values for reserve margin and the
dispatchability of uncontrolled resources were modeled using a 1 year study
period (1995) which reduced dependence of the results on these future
uncertainties. Analyzing the value of generating unit size was performed
using the normal AGREA study period of 20 years (1995 through 2014).
For the evaluation of component values requiring an hourly analysis,
several different hourly models were reviewed. The Polaris 17 model
developed by Decision Focus Incorporated was selected for several reasons.
First, a review of the model documentation indicated that the model could
handle the analysis required. Second, the Polaris model is currently used by
the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) for planning purposes, and NEPOOL
has a Polaris data base covering all member utilities. Third, Polaris is also
used by the New England Electric System (NEES) which agreed to perform
Polaris runs on its computer for this thesis. Polaris is not as prevalent
compared to other hourly models as EGEAS is compared to other LDC
models, and some major New England utility (including Boston Edison) use
other models, but the first three reasons were decisive.
For these reasons a request was made to the New England Power
Planning Committee for use of the NEPOOL Polaris database. Whereas this
database was considered practically in the public domain as recently as a
couple of years ago, the trend towards utility competition through
deregulation and dis-integration has made this data much more tightly held.
For these reasons, a confidentiality agreement was required by NEPOOL and
the database was released directly to NEES with the stipulation that all
17 Decision Focus Inc., POLARIS Version 1.8, May 1995, Mountain View, CA.
inspection and use of the data was to be performed on NEES premises. For
these reasons, it is impossible to discuss in this thesis the assumptions
inherent in the Polaris data as can be done with the EGEAS database.
However in the case of the Polaris modeling, all analysis was done for a one
year study period (1995), eliminating the impact of future uncertainties. Also,
all the key data differences between different Polaris model runs were made
exogenously either in system wide parameters or through generic units
which were added to the NEPOOL system. Because the AGREA EGEAS
database was developed in close collaboration with NEPOOL companies, data
in the Polaris database is closely reflected by the data in the EGEAS database.
The heat rate curve data linking efficiency to the generation level for
each unit were considered to be the most sensitive information in the
NEPOOL database and were removed from the database supplied to NEES.
Because these data were omitted and had to be added back, the abbreviated
Polaris unit names and block sizes were released. Prior work by the AGREA
team using EGEAS to perform limited loading block modeling in 1993 led to
the AGREA team receiving the NEPOOL heat rate data which were then
available. These older data were matched to the data lacking in the present
NEPOOL database, and used where matching units were found. However
new unit construction, retirements and refueling meant that there were a
significant number of units where data were missing. The largest number of
new units were non-utility generators (NUGs). Polaris distinguishes between
energy-limited generating units (including hydro units, some power supply
contracts, and most NUGs) and demand-limited units (most utility owned,
thermal generation units), and the model requires only average heat rates
instead of a complete heat rate curve for energy-limited units. The EGEAS
database contains average heat rates for all plants, which is public
information available on the FERC Form 1 filed by all utilities with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. By matching Polaris model names
with EGEAS model names, average heat rates were found for all but a few of
the missing data in the Polaris database. Finally, the remaining holes in the
Polaris database were patched by using data from other plants of similar fuel
and size, adapting the heat rate curve to the block sizes of the plants in
question. Heat rate curves for generic units in the EPRI Technology
Assessment guide were also examined, but it was felt that a closer match was
obtained using the data for similar specific plants as outlined above.
Because of the heat rates omitted in the Polaris database provided by
NEPOOL, and the slight differences in heat rate curve data added back to fill
this gap, the results of the Polaris modeling below will (as intended) be
slightly different than if all of NEPOOL's data could have been obtained and
used. Nevertheless, the results obtained from the cases described below and
presented in Chapter 5 are believed to be quite close in accuracy. More
importantly, the relative scale of the component values compared against
each other and the relative impacts of the parameters varied for each
component value should be accurate.
In order to understand the reliability of results presented in Chapter 5,
it is necessary to understand the reliability and uncertainty of the data and
assumptions which are presented in this chapter and used in the analysis.
The fundamental data used in this thesis describe the New England power
system. These data can be divided into two main categories for the purposes
of reliability and uncertainty. The first category is data which describe the
currently existing system using real or historic data. This is primarily
engineering data and prices contributed by member utilities or summarized
by regional organizations, and has a high degree of certainty. The second
major category of data in the models describes assumptions about how the
system will change in the future, including fuel prices, load growth, unit
performance, etc. Obviously these data are less reliable because the future is
uncertain, but both categories of data have been accepted as appropriate by
other groups. NEPOOL uses the Polaris database in their own modeling, and
the regional advisory group containing a wide range of industry participants
which assists the M.I.T. Analysis Group for Regional Electricity Alternatives
has accepted the EGEAS database for its analytic purposes. One reason for the
broad consensus on the assumptions contained in these databases is that they
are largely engineering based and used for bottom-up systems modeling
purposes.
Having said this, it is important to point out that four of the five
component values analyzed were modeled using only the base year 1995.
This means that they were based on existing rather than projected data, and
should be quite reliable. Only the value of unit size was analyzed using a 20
year modeling period, because it was necessary to look at additions of
generating capacity over time. The key assumption in system data required
for this analysis is load growth over time, and as described below in Section
4.3 the NEPOOL base case load growth scenario was used. The nuclear
technology characteristics which are most important are unit size, capital cost,
capacity factor and dispatch cost. The utility system is complex and non-linear
in the way it transforms assumptions into results, so sensitivity analysis was
used to analyze these factors. In fact, the basic concept of finding value supply
curves for unit size is a sensitivity analysis of the impact unit size has on
capital cost, so the first two factors are addressed directly by this thesis.
Sensitivity analysis has also been done on the capital cost of the competing
ALWR technology which is fixed in size. Sensitivity analysis of dispatch cost
and capacity factor are discussed and presented with the other results in
Chapter 5.
Finally, it is important to note that the thrust of this thesis has been to
analyze the benefits which derive from certain component sources of value,
and not upon the cost of the options which provide them. For example, the
value of storage in shifting PV or wind generation is based solely on the spot
price value of electricity at low v. high load hours, and not upon the cost of
PV or wind generation. This thesis does discuss some costs for storage and
compare them to its benefits, but the real thrust is aimed at finding a benefit
supply curve rather than individual option cost curves, which industry
participants will need to make their own decisions. With dispatch options
like spinning reserve level, the cost of implementing an option may be
essentially zero, and the value supply curve associated with different
spinning reserve levels must be compared to the costs of different levels of
reliability.
4.1 Reserve Margin
As previously outlined in Chapter 3, the reserve margin of a utility
system has a significant value, based on the reliability it supplies. This value
depends upon the reliability and diversity of the units which make up the
system, the size of the reserve margin (and hence which plants are or are not
dispatched), and the value of reliability to the customers. Reserve margin
also has a cost based on the need to recover capital investment in all plants,
including those which are only lightly used. Historic reserve margins for
investor owned utilities during the period from 1945 through 1993 are shown
below in Figure 4.2. As can be seen, the average national reserve margin has
varied significantly, with a low of 6.1% in 1947, a high of 41.0% in 1982, and
an average of 24.4% over this 49 year period.
Figure 4.2 - Historic US Reserve Margins for Investor Owned Utilities
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Although it is much harder to track the historic performance of
national average reliability associated with these reserve margins, it is clear
that reserve margins of 15% to 20% have been historically considered
adequate, or else generation would have been constructed to raise the reserve
margin. The reserve margin standard which utilities have used as a
guideline, or claimed as necessary for adequate reliability has also varied over
time, although it is difficult to determine whether this standard is leading or
trailing the actual physical reserve margin.
For the NEPOOL system, the reserve margin was 32.3% in 1994. This is
projected to decrease over time due to projected load growth, and presently
committed capacity additions and retirements as shown in Figure 4.3 below.
Figure 4.3 - NEPOOL Reserve Margin Trajectory
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This figure is based upon a projected demand growth which
incorporates NEPOOL's base case projection of DSM savings and which is
used as the reference base case for AGREA modeling using EGEAS. As can be
seen by comparison with the graph of the historical national average above,
the current NEPOOL reserve margin is relatively high by historic standards,
reflecting lower load growth rates and significant increases in NUG capacity
over the recent past. As can be seen, the reserve margin based on projected
base DSM load growth declines to approximately 20% by the year 2001, and
new capacity will be required before 2005.
In order to determine the net value of reserve margin in an existing
system it must be compared with an alternate system that has a higher or
lower reserve margin. The problem lies in choosing the composition of this
alternate system. In the current environment of deregulation and
disintegration, the most interesting alternate system with decreasing reserve
margin would be achieved by removing plants according to their competitive
free market value (per MW capacity), from most to least expensive. This free
market value does not yet exist because the market does not (quite) yet exist,
but it can (and will) be found by calculating the net present value of the
projected future net revenues (sales minus variable and fixed costs) for each
plant. This calculation is of intense interest as New England proceeds
towards deregulation and competition. One of the key questions therefore is
how sunk capital costs for the system may be allocated, and in particular if
they may be allocated as fixed costs to existing plants.
Instead the issue of reserve margin was framed in two other, alternate
ways. The first question asked was, "What is the value of the present
NEPOOL system, compared to another system identical except in the amount
of generating capacity?" Such a system would have the same number of
plants, with the same characteristics including efficiency, fuel diversity, etc.,
except that all units (including purchases) would have their size multiplied
by a single fraction sufficient to reduce the NEPOOL reserve margin to some
target reserve margin. This capacity multiplier was chosen as the parameter
to be varied for the first set of reserve margin cases, and is shown in Table 4.1
below, as reserve margin decreases from 30% to 5%.
Table 4.1 - Capacity Fractions for Reserve Margin Valuation
Reserve Margin 32.3% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%
Capacity Multiplier 1.000 0.982 0.945 0.907 0.869 0.831 0.793
Reserve margins below 15% or so seem unrealistic with the present
system, but they were evaluated for comparison purposes. Future trends
which may decrease the need for reserve requirements would include more
reliable, smaller, lower maintenance and diverse generating technologies (e.g.
combined cycle combustion turbines and fuel cells), and growth of
interruptible loads. Whether these factors may overcome the increasing need
of existing large and aging plants for a certain level of reserve margin is
uncertain, and the type and age of plants which survive in a competitive
market may determine the balance which is struck.
A system with a fractionally smaller generation capacity will require
less future revenue to recover capital costs. Because system composition
remains unchanged except for size in this case, it is possible to apply the same
capacity multiplier fraction to NEPOOL capital recovery requirements. To
find these requirements it is necessary to look at NEPOOL's projected base
revenues 18 , which are revenue requirements associated with existing and
assumed future plant as given by the NEPOOL Forecast Report of Capacity,
Energy, Loads and Transmission (the CELT report) 19 . These revenues cover
all fixed costs, including fixed O&M costs, pollution control costs, capital
recovery costs, transmission and distribution costs, and general and
administrative (G&A) costs. They also cover future power purchases and
non-utility generation.
The cost of future capital cost requirements had already been calculated
for prior AGREA EGEAS modeling by subtracting out forecast costs for fixed
O&M, pollution control costs (at the 1995 RACT standard), T&D expenses, and
G&A costs. The remaining capital recovery costs include existing and forecast
utility generation capacity, non-utility generation capacity, power purchases,
and T&D capital expenses, with a 1995 value of $6.063 billion and a net
present value of $68.29 billion (in 1995 dollars) over the 20 years from 1995 to
2014. All of these costs would be proportionately smaller for a power system
with lower reserve margin, except for the T&D capital expenses.
To separate T&D costs from this estimate of future capital recovery
costs, it was necessary to find the what fraction T&D is of total electric utility
plant. The Edison Electric Institute collects this information from Energy
Information Administration for all US investor owned utilities, as shown in
Table 4.2 below 20.
18 NEPOOL Load Forecasting Committee, NEPLAN Staff, NEPOOL Electricity Price Forecast
for New England, 1994-2009, Appendix A, Exhibit 13, April 1994.
19 The New England Power Pool, NEPOOL Forecast Report of Capacity, Energy, Loads and
Transmission, 1993-2008, April 1, 1993.
20 Edison Electric Institute, EEI Financial Info, Construction Expenditures Survey 1995, July 5,
1995.
Table 4.2 - Gross Existing 1993 Investment in Electric
Utility Plant by US Investor Owned Utilities.
$ Billions Percent of Total
Steam 128.7 23.1%
Nuclear 143.5 25.8%
Other 19.5 3.5%
Total Generating Plant 291.7 52.4%
Transmission 59.0 10.6%
Distribution 139.7 25.0%
General & Miscellaneous 46.8 8.4%
Nuclear Fuel 20.0 3.6%
Total Electric Utility Plant 557.2 100.0%
It is interesting to note the sheer scale of total investment in the electric
utility sector, which is over half a trillion dollars by 1993. The gross
investment shown is not decreased for depreciation and is the sum of mixed
dollar investments from all past years. What is needed are the total
percentages after depreciation, but these are difficult to obtain. The gross
percentages seem approximate since the summation over many years reduces
the effect that year to year fluctuations in capital expenditures and inflation
may have on the depreciated totals. The fraction of T&D capital for the utility
sector as a whole will be somewhat larger than shown above, since investor
owned utilities sell to other utilities (like municipals and rural electric
cooperatives) whose primary physical capital is in T&D. However NEPOOL is
composed of investor owned utilities so these numbers are appropriate.
The $6.063 billion of 1995 capital recovery requirements derived from
NEPOOL data have already been reduced for general and miscellaneous
expenditures, and the NEPOOL data does not explicitly include nuclear fuel
costs (although these are commonly capitalized), which together sum to 12%
of the EEI gross investment figures. Therefore the relative ratios for the
NEPOOL capital recovery requirements are 59.5% generating plant, 12.0%
transmission plant, and 28.5% distribution plant. Therefore the 1995
NEPOOL capital recovery requirements for generating plant which could be
reduced by fractional unit capacity is $3.607 billion. It should be remembered
that this number is reached by applying a national T&D percentage to a
regional capital recovery total, and if New England varies from the national
average in its need for T&D capacity there may be some error. As a check, the
FERC Form 1 for Boston Edison only gives T&D investment as 44% of total
depreciated generation and T&D capital.
The second method of addressing the question of reserve margin in a
less general way was posed by reducing the number of nuclear generating
units in operation. Anti-nuclear sentiment expressed through debate on
issues involving pressure vessel embrittlement and license renewal makes
the issue of possible nuclear retirements relevant. This case is instructive
because reducing the reserve margin by reducing the number of nuclear
baseload units measures the cost of losing base load energy with the second
lowest variable dispatch cost (next to hydro).
Existing nuclear plants have a depreciated capital cost balance in the
utility's ratebase which must still be recovered. If this future capital recovery
cost is ignored, then the question is basically "what if this plant were never
built," whereas if this future cost is considered then the question is "what if
this plant is retired?" In the case of retirement, or under the scenario of
impending deregulation, the most controversial question is how these future
stranded costs will be shared or allocated between customers and
stockholders, but from an overall societal point of view the cost to be born is
still the same.
This thesis poses the first question, by removing existing nuclear units
as though they had not been built, so that their capital cost requirements are
removed. This has been done in order of the plant's ages, as shown in Table
4.3 below. The oldest plant (Yankee Rowe) has already been retired, so it was
not included, and the youngest plant in the New England Region (Seabrook)
was not removed because it would have reduced the reserve margin below
zero. It is an artifact of the New England system that these nuclear plants
each represent a 3% to 6% reduction in reserve margin, so that the steps in
reducing the reserve margin in this case roughly parallel those in the first,
fractional capacity reduction approach.
The future capital cost recovery requirements which are shown below
are based on information from the 1995 FERC Form 1's filed by the companies
owning the nuclear plants. These forms were downloaded in electronic form
from FERC's electronic bulletin board, and include comprehensive financial
data on the utilities which file them. In order to find the future capital cost
recovery requirements it is necessary to know the original cost minus the
amount of depreciation, which is also called the embedded cost. The
embedded cost minus the value of the stream of future revenues from the
plant is the stranded cost. The relevant data from the subsections of the FERC
Form 1 were the original cost of plant in service (Form 205g) and the
cumulative depreciation (Form 219b). These data are subdivided by
categories, including steam fossil and nuclear investments, but are not
divided by individual plants. The individual plant data given in Form 402
include original cost, but do not include depreciation. This means that it is
easy to find the embedded cost for utilities that only own one nuclear reactor,
but much more difficult to apportion the total cumulative depreciation
between several plants.
Fortunately, four of the seven plants in question are wholly owned
either by one company (Pilgrim, owned by Boston Edison), or by holding
companies that have shared utility ownership, but file separate FERC Form
1's (Connecticut Yankee, Maine Yankee, and Vermont Yankee). The oldest
plant considered (Connecticut Yankee) began commercial operation in 1967
and the original cost was exceeded by cumulative depreciation ($350.9 and
$353.7 respectively). This is possible because retired equipment decreases the
original cost, but the embedded cost given in Table 4.3 below.
The remaining units Millstone 1, 2 and 3 are owned by Connecticut
Light and Power (81%, 81%, and 52.933%) and nine other minority owners.
By using a database from Mr. Gene Fry of the Massachusetts DPU, the original
and annual costs of the Millstone units were depreciated using straight line
depreciation over the remainder of the 40 year book life of the plants. This
produced estimates of total original cost, total cumulative depreciation and
total embedded cost which were within 6.1%, 10.4% and 15.2% respectively of
the FERC Form 1 totals after correcting for the Connecticut Light and Power
ownership share. The individual unit costs were adjusted proportionately so
that their totals agreed with the FERC Form 1 data, producing the embedded
cost (or depreciated capital cost) shown in Table 4.3 below. Because of the
assumptions and adjustments just described there may be some small error in
these embedded costs, but they are believed to be reasonable estimates.
Table 4.3 - NEPOOL Individual and Cumulative
Nuclear Capital Recovery Requirements
Name of Plants Year Depreciated Cumulative Plant Cumulative Reserve
Retired Installed Capital Cost Reduction Capacity Reduction Margin
(M$) (M$) (MW) (MW)
None n/a 0 0 0 0 32.3%
Connecticut Yankee 1967 0 0 600 600 29.4%
Millstone 1 1970 150 150 662 1262 26.2%
Pilgrim 1 1972 744 894 678 1940 22.8%
Maine Yankee 1972 190 1084 890 2830 18.5%
Vermont Yankee 1972 149 1233 563 3393 15.7%
Millstone 2 1975 365 1598 910 4303 11.3%
Millstone 3 1986 2555 4153 1253 5556 5.1%
In both cases, reductions in system reserve margin were modeled using
the EGEAS model for a 1 year study period (1995). No other assumptions
were changed from the base AGREA EGEAS database other than those
fractional deratings or retirements outlined above. As noted above, the one
year study period eliminates uncertainty based on forecasts, trends or
predictions. The one year study period also illustrates the fact that the value
of reducing the reserve margin is based on the state of the overall existing
power system rather than any single technological option added to it. The
value is subject to change depending upon the composition of the generation
mix, and the flatness of the load duration curve. Conversely the benefits of
reducing the reserve margin can be claimed by any new technology which
allows system operation with a lower reserve margin.
The results of the analyses for the two reserve margin cases described
above are presented and discussed in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5.
4.2 Unit Size
As outlined in Chapter 3, the value of unit size in new construction
compared to the rate of system load growth may have a significant value,
based upon the key unit characteristics of unit size and cost, and the key
system characteristics of load growth, existing reserve margin, and the supply
curve of dispatch costs..
In order to evaluate the value of unit size, it was necessary to choose a
modular technology where multiple units could be added either all at once or
gradually over time. Although some new gas-fired technologies like
combustion turbine combined cycle units can be considered modular, the
modular high temperature gas reactor (MHTGR) was chosen for several
reasons. First, this value is related to front loading capital costs for capacity
that is not initially needed, and nuclear units have high capital cost. Second,
nuclear reactors have always been the largest single thermal units so they
have been particularly prone to this particular diseconomy of scale. This
makes the advantages of a modular nuclear reactor particularly interesting.
Third, a conventional choice for the next generation reactor (advanced light
water reactor or ALWR) can be compared to the MHTGR, and the benefits of
the modularity can be compared to the other relative benefits of the two
nuclear technologies.
The advanced light water reactor is an evolution of existing light water
reactor technology, with improvements in safety and reduced cost due to
standardized design and simplified systems. In contrast, the MHTGR is a
marked departure from current reactor design, although several older
MHTGR designs have been built as test reactors with varying degrees of
success. Modern MHTGR designs are built around a fuel where the uranium
is encased in a graphite matrix instead of having a uranium oxide pellet
encased in a zirconium tube. The graphite fuel moderates neutron speed
with negative thermal feedback, and the high heat capacity provides safety
from decay heat during a loss of coolant accident. The graphite fuel is cooled
by helium which may be used either to boil water in an intermediate heat
exchanger for a conventional steam cycle, or used directly in a Rankine cycle
to drive a high temperature gas turbine. With regeneration, the most
advanced designs can reach thermal efficiencies of 47% (equivalent to a heat
rate of 7262 Btu/kWh). The MHTGR is a constant temperature design, so that
as power drawn from the reactor increases the core temperature drops and the
negative thermal feed back increases reactivity and power output. This
response time is equivalent to that for modern combustion turbine
generating units. The fast response time and high efficiency are significant
advantages over conventional reactor designs.
The generic characteristics for the ALWR were taken from the 1993
EPRI Technology Assessment Guide. Based upon consultation with Dr.
Lawrence Lidsky of the M.I.T. nuclear engineering department, the MHTGR
design chosen for this thesis was a General Atomics reference design. This
design was part of a study performed by a consortium of engineering firms
and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the Department of Energy 21 . This
work covers three reference designs, including the MHTGR-SC (Steam Cycle),
the MHTGR-GT/IC (Gas Turbine/Indirect Cycle), and MHTGR-GT/DC ( Gas
Turbine/Direct Cycle). Cost estimates for these three designs are provided at
three different points along the learning curve; prototype cost, replica cost,
and final target cost. For the purposes of this thesis, the final target cost for
the most advanced direct cycle high temperature gas reactor was chosen. The
primary characteristics of both the ALWR and MHTGR technologies are
shown below in Table 4.4
Table 4.4 - Primary Characteristics of ALWR and MHTGR Reactors
Reactor Technology ALWR MHTGR
Fuel Uranium Graphite
Oxide Block
Plant Life (years) 30 30
Rated Capacity (MWe) 1360 170
Equivalent Forced Outage Rate (%) 17.2 10.5
Full Load Heat Rate (Btu/kWh) 10200 7070
Capital Cost (94$/kWe) 1370 1800
Fixed O&M (94$/kW/yr) 63.61 33.56
Variable O&M (94$/MWh) 0.316 0.966
Fuel Cost (94$/MBTU) 0.550 1.324
Dispatch Cost (94$/MWh) 5.93 10.33
Several comments are appropriate, based upon this choice of reactors.
First, the analysis was performed on a 'what if' basis, so that the time required
to build sufficient units to reach the final target price was ignored. Second,
the capital costs are overnight construction costs, including an allowance for
contingencies but no interest charges since these are calculated in EGEAS
21 ABB/Combustion Engineering, Inc., Bechtel National, Inc., Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates,
General Atomics, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.,
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Commercialization and Generation Cost
Estimates, DOE-HTGR-90365, issued by Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates, September
1993.
based on the construction expenditures trajectory. For the MHTGR, the 1800
$/kW cost is based on 4 170 MW units being built at the same time. Third,
the reference reactor design incorporates a graphite block fuel, rather than a
spherical pebble bed fuel. This was based upon the choice of the General
Atomic company which participated in the design study, and happens to have
a patent upon this particular fuel design. However, conversation with Dr.
Lidsky indicates one expert opinion that the pebble bed fuel is more likely to
succeed in actually being built. Nevertheless the costs in this design study
were used because of its cost detail, the recent date of the design, and the fact
that fuel fabrication is a relatively minor fraction of overall cost. Fourth,
there is some uncertainty in the assumed design characteristic values shown
above, and the sensitivity of the results to changes in dispatch cost and
equivalent forced outage rate (EFOR) is discussed in Chapter 5.
Since the value of unit size is relative to system load growth (in
absolute units of MW/year instead of %/year), it was necessary to inspect the
need for future capacity additions in the NEPOOL service territory. The
trajectory of future capacity needed, based upon predicted load growth and an
18% reserve margin are show below in Figure 4.4
Figure 4.4 - Future Capacity NEPOOL Need Trajectory
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As can be seen in this figure, the current reserve margin of 32.3%
shrinks to 21.2% by the year 2001. Adding a 1360 MW ALWR plant in the
year 2001 increases the reserve margin to 27.5% in that year, which then
decreases to 20.1% in 2007 and 16.4% in 2008. Using the target reserve margin
of 18% shown in the figure above therefore gives an 8 year window during
which no major additional capital construction would be necessary. The
MHTGR design module size is 173 MW, or approximately one eighth of the
size of the ALWR. By adjusting the MHTGR module size to 170 MW, it was
then possible to compare the ALWR to eight MHTGR modules built in the
same year (2001), four MHTGR modules built every four years (2001 and
2005), two MHTGR modules built every two years (2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007),
and eight MHTGR modules built every year from 2001 through 2008.
The reference design selected assumes that four individual MHTGR
units are built on a single site. These four units share common facilities and
costs, including land, electrical switchyard, some buildings, etc. The average
cost/kW for all four units was used for the four cases described above, since
this gives the value associated with a geometric decrease in unit size. A more
realistic option would be to attribute common costs to the first of every four
units. This would represent an intermediate case because it would restore
some of the capital cost front loading which the modularity is used to avoid,
and would make a difference only in the two cases where the modules are
constructed singly or in pairs. Unfortunately, the reference design report does
not break down its costs by common v. individual items, but instead breaks
down costs by different technical subsystems. In an effort to provide this
more realistic but less certain comparison, the cost of land, structures, and
electrical plant were allocated to the first unit of every four. Table 4.5 below
shows the major subsystems, this allocation, and the difference between the
average cost and the cost for unit 1 v. units 2, 3 and 4. For the two cases where
this allocation occurs all other MHTGR assumptions were retained
unchanged.
Table 4.5 - MHTGR Costs for Average, First, and Follow-on Units
MHTGR Target Plant Costs Units 1-4 Unit 1 Units 2-4
(Gas Turbine Direct Cycle) (94 M$) (94 M$) (94 M$)
Land & Rights 2 2 0
Structures & Improvements 136 136 0
Reactor Plant Equipment 486 121 121
Turbine Plant Equipment 129 32 32
Electric Plant Equipment 56 56 0
Misc. Plant Equipment 32 8 8
Heat Rejection System 28 7 7
Total Direct 870 363 169
Construction Services 106 27 27
Home Office Engineering 68 17 17
Field Office Engineering 48 12 12
Owner's Costs 169 42 42
Total Indirect Costs 391 98 98
Base Construction Costs 1261 460 267
Contingency (50% confidence) 302 110 64
Overnight Construction Costs 1563 571 331
Total Cost (94$/kWe) 1800 2630 1524
The capital costs of the MHTGR and ALWR designs are shown above
in Table 4.5. Both are overnight costs, including an estimated contingency
cost which is based on a 50% confidence level. This means that these costs
may not be the single most probable value, but the chances are estimated to be
50/50 that the final cost will be either higher or lower. The capital cost of the
reference ALWR design taken from EPRI was lower than the MHTGR cost,
and arguably lower than the actual cost might be. Because of this, a final case
was also modeled where the cost/kW of the ALWR was raised to be the same
as that for the MHTGR. In this way, the differences between the two designs
could be determined, based upon the fuel cost, efficiency, and dispatch.
Construction periods for both the ALWR and MHTGR technologies were
given by the stated references as 5 years. In order to model the present value
of the capital cost streams, it was necessary to assume a construction cost
trajectory over this period. Both the references omitted such a spending
trajectory over time, and so a typical generic trajectory was selected from the
AGREA EGEAS database, with expenditures of 1%, 1%, 4%, 44%, and 50% of
the total cost during years one through five respectively. The real discount
rate of 7%, and the projected trajectory for the assumed rate of inflation were
also both taken from the AGREA EGEAS database.
The final set of 8 cases modeled is summarized below in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 - Summary of Unit Size Cases Modeled
Reactor Capacity Cost Number of units coming on-line in each year
Case Technology (MWe) ($/kW) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 ALWR 1360 1360 1
............... ............................... ........................ .. ...............................................................................................................
2 ALWR 1360 1800 1
3 MHTGR 170 1800 8
4 MHTGR 170 1800 4 4
5 MHTGR 170 2630 1 1
MHTGR 170 1524 1 2 1 2......... ... . ........ ....... .. ... . .. ........ ..... . . . ....... . .... .......... ................ . ............................. .   ".............." ..........."
6 MHTGR 170 1800 2 2 2 2
......  .......... T.  , .............70 .............. ....... ...................... .......2  ................ .... 
7 MHTGR 170 2630 1 1
MHTGR 170 1524 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 MHTGR 170 1800 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
All eight cases were modeled with EGEAS for a 20 year period. To
maintain the target system reserve margin of 18% from 2008 through 2014,
additional capacity was needed. This capacity was chosen to be a blend of
natural gas fired advanced combustion turbine (ACT) units and advanced
combined cycle (ACC) units in a 20/80 ratio of total capacity. The number of
both ACT and ACC units for each year was chosen to meet the minimum
reserve margin and the capacity ratio as shown below in Table 4.7. This same
construction trajectory was used for all eight cases discussed above.
Table 4.7 - Non-Nuclear Capacity Fractions and Construction Trajectories
Technology ACT ACC
Capacity (MW) 40 250
Target Capacity Fraction 20% 80%
Year Capacity Number of Total Fraction of
Needed Plants Built Built Total Capacity
(MW) ACT ACC (MW) ACT ACC
2008 362 3 1 370 0.324 0.676
2009 1562 5 4 1570 0.204 0.796
2010 1961 4 1 1980 0.242 0.758
2011 2816 2 3 2810 0.199 0.801
2012 3820 2 4 3890 0.165 0.835
2013 5353 12 4 5370 0.209 0.791
2014 5700 2 1 5700 0.211 0.789
Legend: ACT = Advanced Combustion Turbine
ACC = Advanced Combined Cycle
Based on the plant characteristics and construction trajectories
described in this section, all eight cases were modeled using the EGEAS model
and the existing AGREA EGEAS database. The results of this modeling are
presented and discussed in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5.
4.3 Dispatchability of Uncontrolled Resources
The value of adding dispatchability to an uncontrollable generation
resource has been theoretically outlined in Chapter 3. As described there, the
way to add the value of dispatchability to an otherwise uncontrollable
resource is by placing intermediate storage between the generation and the
system grid. This section describes the renewable resources chosen for
evaluation, how the range of storage was defined, the addition of inverter
capacity as a variable to be evaluated, the development of the model used to
optimize the use of the storage capacity, and the way in which the system
impacts were modeled.
The most common renewable resources generally have several
inherent faults; they are diffuse, often remote, and the availability over time
is uncontrollable. These drawbacks can be overcome by investment, but the
question is generally how much capital cost can be balanced against the use of
a resource that has no direct cost. In the case of the most widely used
renewable resource, dams both concentrate and store the hydropower energy
in a way that is cost effective. In the case of wind and solar power, energy
concentration at the most favorable locations is diffuse, and the benefits of
storage to match weather-based electricity generation to system load patterns
have not been economic.
This thesis has chosen to evaluate the value of adding different levels
of storage and inverter capacity to both wind and photovoltaic generation.
This creates a family of supply curves for the benefits of storage and inverter
capacity for each of these two different resources. These curves show how the
total amount and value of generation depend upon both the resource and the
amounts of storage and inverter capacity chosen.
For both wind and photovoltaic generation, the succeeding links in the
chain from resource to load are illustrated in the schematic diagram in Figure
4.5 shown below. Each resource has an hourly pattern which is based on the
year and location of the data chosen. Each generation technology has a given
raw capacity size and on-site conversion losses. Power from the NDT
generation goes into storage, and when it is withdrawn must be converted to
the correct voltage and wave form by a semiconductor inverter. The amount
of storage and inverter capacity for transmission are parameters to be varied,
and depending upon these capacities some generation may be dumped
because it cannot be used. Finally transmission and distribution losses
depend upon resource location, and the net load to be met by other
generation resources depends upon hourly system load and the optimal use
of the storage.
Figure 4.5 - Schematic Diagram of
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The key characteristics of both the wind and photovoltaic technologies
chosen are given below in Table 4.8. The technology capacity, location, year of
resource data, and losses are exogenous input data, while the peak day and
total annual generation and capacity factor are results presented here for
comparison. While the generation technologies are explicit, the means of
storage has been left completely general and unspecified. Although battery
storage seems the most likely current option, any future storage technology
could produce the same cost benefits. No costs are listed in Table 4.8 below for
either the PV or wind generation or for the energy storage because they are
not relevant to finding the benefits of storage, which depend only upon the
ability to shift generation from hours with low marginal system costs to
hours with high marginal system costs. This means that the benefits of
storage presented in Section 5.3 are independent of the uncertainty in
generation costs. However, the benefits of storage are compared to the costs of
battery storage (the most likely technology) and inverter capacity.
Table 4.8 - NDT Generation Data
Photovoltaic Wind
Generation Capacity (MWe) 1000 1000
Resource Location Boston, MA Longfellow
Mountains, ME
Year of Resource Data 1968 1990
Site Losses (%) 10 15
Spur Losses (%) 0 10
T & D Losses (%) 2 10
Max. Day's Generation (MWh) 5,564 6,652
Annual Generation (MWh) 768,983 841,353
Capacity Factor (%) 8.8 9.6
Note: Maximum day's generation is net of site losses but not of T&D
or spur losses.
The primary source of the technology and resource descriptions used
for this analysis are previous research work done at the M.I.T. Energy Lab 22.
This includes the choice of generation technologies, the resource to
generation conversion curve for the wind turbine chosen, the raw data for
the hourly resource data at the locations given, and the various losses shown
above. These losses deserve explanation because of their differences. The site
losses are specific to the resource and technology. The wind resource was
situated at a remote location requiring a spur transmission line to reach the
rest of the grid, so an extra transmission loss was added to the normal T&D
loss. In contrast, the photovoltaic generation is distributed at a low level in
the distribution system so the normal T&D losses are reduced for this
technology.
The choice of 1000 MW of raw generation capacity (before site losses)
for both solar and wind resources was based on the need to produce a
discernible impact on a system with approximately a 20 GW peak load. A
smaller amount might have been sufficient if only the gross impact were
considered, but for comparison over a range of storage capacity it was
necessary to be able to determine cost changes due to an optimized shift in the
load duration curve, while keeping the total annual generation constant. On
22 Cardell, Judith B., Renewable Energy Technologies in the New England Electric Sector,
MIT Energy Lab Working Paper MIT-EL 94-002WP, June 1994
the other hand, the renewable generation needed to be kept small enough
that it did not affect the relative dispatch of the rest of the system. The 1000
MW level of capacity for 1995 was postulated without worrying whether the
rate of market penetration would be feasible (especially since this is written in
1996). However the total capacity size is less than the 1500 MWe judged to be
reasonable in the prior work23, albeit with a more gradual and reasonable 10
year penetration rate from 1995 through 2004.
The raw PV and wind resource data were gathered during the previous
work cited, where the analysis was performed over a 20 year study period.
Where fewer years of resource data were available, the 'weather' was repeated
to fill the entire period. However the present analysis was performed only for
the year 1995 for two reasons. First, the benefits of storage are likely to change
slowly as load patterns shift due to customer trends and DSM. Second, the
burden of optimizing storage dispatch for a full twenty years was both
onerous and unnecessary for the purposes of illustrating storage valuation.
The question was then how to pick a single representative year from both the
wind and solar data available. Averaging hourly loads across the years of data
was inappropriate since this would reduce the hourly variability of the
resources, and change the value of the storage used. Instead, a simple
program was written to calculate the total annual generation for each year.
The years were ranked by their generation and the median year was chosen.
For the photovoltaic data the year 1968 was chosen, and for the wind data the
year 1990 was chosen. The annual variability of these resources, their
average, and the range of plus or minus one standard deviation are shown
below in Figures 4.6 and 4.7.
23 Cardell, p. 26.
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The 1995 hourly system load file used was taken from a 20 year hourly
load file obtained from NEPOOL for prior work by the AGREA team. This file
incorporates an assumed load growth rate and a base, reference trajectory of
DSM penetration. The present research used only the 1995 hourly data, so
that projected trends had effect.
The value of the benefits due to storage increase with the amount of
storage available (more is better!), until diminishing returns set in and a
maximum benefit is reached. However, the index or measure of this scale is
not predefined. Clearly the scale begins at zero and could go (non-
economically) to infinity. Several measures of storage were considered. The
first was the number of gross MWh of storage capacity. To make this measure
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comparable between units of different capacity, it can be transformed to the
number of hours of generation at peak capacity which can be stored (i.e.
MWh/MW = hr.). This measure is better, but does not include any
consideration of the resource shape due to diurnal and seasonal variation.
For this reason, storage was instead chosen to be measured as a fraction of the
peak day's generation for 1995 for both wind and photovoltaic plants.
Likewise, the choice of an index for the amount of inverter capacity is
not pre-defined. The most obvious choice would simply be MW of inverter
capacity, but this is not a generic measure that can be used for comparison
between installations of different size. Instead, inverter capacity was
measured as a percentage of the net NDT generation capacity, after on-site
losses have been subtracted.
Once the amount of storage and inverter capacity are chosen, the
problem is clearly how to optimally transfer the energy generated during low
value hours where low system load means low marginal generation costs to
high value hours where high system load means high marginal generation
cost. An optimization based on the marginal generation cost would be
complex, because the marginal cost is a non-analytic function depending
upon system composition that changes over the year with scheduled
maintenance, fuel switching and other factors. Even at any one instant it is a
step function, where the step for each generating unit is not flat but curved,
depending upon the loading blocks and heat rate curve. Fortunately it is
sufficient to know that the marginal cost is monotonic, so that higher load
implies higher marginal cost (otherwise units would be dispatched out of
their correct loading order). This means that the problem is reduced to
shifting wind or PV generation from hours with low system load to hours of
high system load.
Formulating this type of optimization problem is usually a
straightforward application of linear programming, and is often framed as a
network transportation problem where the goal is to minimize the cost of
transferring a product (in this case, energy) between nodes (or time periods)
across paths that have limited capacity (storage or inverter generation capacity
in the present case). One thesis by Daryanian 24 has explored this formulation
for the related case where customers or generators wish to optimize their
production or generation schedules based on forecast electricity spot prices.
This thesis develops an algorithm with two nested iterative loops for
swapping energy between cheap and expensive hours which solves this
restricted problem faster than the simplex method. The problem described in
this prior thesis differs from the present one in that the product out or fuel in
is shipped or arrives in a steady flow and the utility grid is an infinite source
or sink for the electricity consumed or generated, whereas the NDT resources
in the present case are not only limited but variable. This difference is not
fundamental and requires only minor changes in the algorithm to
accommodate it.
Unfortunately, the present problem was found unsuitable for a linear
programming formulation for two reasons. The first reason is that the LP
formulation is based on a known schedule or forecast of spot prices, while the
current problem has as its basis an hourly forecast of system loads. As
mentioned above, the transformation from system load to spot price is
complex and non-linear. The problem can be solved by using a system
marginal cost curve or an hourly simulation model to convert load to spot
price data, but since the relationship is monotonic it was deemed simpler to
optimize using the NEPOOL load data. The second and determining reason
that linear programming could not be used is that the net NEPOOL hourly
loads, and hence spot prices, are not fixed. This is not based upon the
probabilistic uncertainty associated with forecast load, but rather upon that
fact that net system load is changed as a result of the optimization itself
(which is of course the goal). In order to make the benefits of different levels
of dispatchability apparent for the PV and wind resources, a relatively large
generation capacity was postulated (1000 MW). This is enough that the
relative rank of net load and spot price for some hours can be shifted. It was
for this reason that a new and original optimization algorithm was developed
and implemented. The flow chart for the final algorithm is shown below in
Figure 4.8.
24 Daryanian, B., The Definition and Application of an Optimal Response Algorithm for
Electricity Consumers and Small Power Producers Subject to Spot Prices, S.M. Thesis,
Technology and Policy Program, Mechanical Engineering Department, MIT, 1986.
Figure 4.8 - Flowchart for Storage Optimization
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The full text of the complete FORTRAN program that implements this
algorithm is attached as Appendix I of this thesis. This code is well
commented to supply a detailed description of the algorithm in addition to
the general discussion below following the flow chart.
The first step in the algorithm is initialization, which includes reading
data, calculating and initializing variables, calculating hourly NDT generation
from the hourly NDT resource data (insolation and wind speed), and
generation of an initial solution. The initial solution essentially ignores
storage, so that NDT generation (minus losses) equals energy into storage
equals energy out of storage. Separate variables for energy in and out of
storage rather than a single plus or minus variable was used so that NDT
generation in excess of inverter capacity can be dumped when storage is
already full.
The basic algorithm is similar to that of Daryanian, in that it consists of
two nested searches to match high and low net load hours and to swap energy
between them based on storage constraints. The high hour is found first, and
the low hour found next. If storage allows, energy is swapped. If not, the low
hour is marked unavailable and the next best low hour is found. If no more
low hours are available or the high hour generation is exhausted, the next
high hour is found. When all feasible swaps have been exhausted, the
optimization is complete.
Beyond this basic similarity, several very significant differences exist.
The objective of producing power at hours with peak net loads and spot prices
means that as far as possible all peak hours will be flattened to the same net
load. Likewise, the cheapest way of charging storage from generation will
occur at the lowest hours and will tend to flatten the net load across the
lowest hours. Because of this flattening effect, there may be several hours
with the same high or low net load, each with a different amount of energy
available for a swap. Because of this the high and low hour search sweeps not
only mark the available highest and lowest net load hours, but also find the
minimum energy available to swap (which is also the maximum energy that
all candidate hours can swap). This amount of energy is called the "gap" in
the flowchart above and in the program documentation. To speed up the
process, the program attempts to swap energy between all the high and low
101
hours identified if storage constraints remain unviolated. If storage
constraints are binding, then energy is only swapped between a single pair of
high and low hours and the amount of energy swapped may be reduced to
just meet the constraints.
On top of this basic algorithm, several refinements were added. To
improve total run times over the entire year, the planning period was made
of variable length and exogenously specified. Periods which were an even
number of weeks caused the first period to be adjusted so that successive
periods ran from Sunday to Saturday. Periods which are not even weeks lead
to problems with weekend/weekday storage optimization, since successive
periods cover different days of the week. To meet this problem and reduce
calculation times, planning periods were overlapped by 24 hours, so that the
last day planned was appended to the leading edge of the next planning
period. During the course of model development, planning periods of 2 to 4
days appeared to be the best balance between speed and reducing the amount
of total period overlap. This seemed appropriate since this period is about the
same length as medium range weather forecasts used to forecast both
renewable generation and system load. The forecast resource and system load
data used were assumed to be certain for the purposes of optimization. There
seems little advantage to significantly longer planning periods given the
forecast horizon and the largely diurnal variation in the resource patterns,
but it would be possible to add uncertainty into the algorithm and have
increases throughout the planning period. Finally, although only the year
1995 was optimized, the model allows for a variable number of years to be
optimized, including exogenous input of a trajectory for NDT generation
capacity over time.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to present mathematical proofs of
optimality, but this algorithm can claim to produce optimal storage allocation
because, 1) the algorithm selects possible swaps in order of attractiveness, and
2) it checks all combinations of hours for possible swaps and 3) it stops only
when available energy to swap is exhausted or the storage constraints become
binding.
The speed of the algorithm was not compared to other methods of
solution, but its dependence upon problem size can be judged from the
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iterative nature of the nested search loops shown in the flow chart. Finding
the high and low value candidate hours both involve sweeping through the
entire planning period, which means that the calculation time is theoretically
on the order of n squared, or O(n 2), where n is the period length. This means
that as the planning period doubles in length, the calculation time would
quadruple. The energy constraint check also involves a sweep through the
entire period, but is only done once for each proposed energy swap so it does
not increase the overall order of the calculation. Obviously increasing the
planning period length decreases the number of planning periods required
per year (by a factor of n), so the overall order of calculation is O(n). However
for the short planning periods used in testing and running the optimization
model, the calculation increase required by the period overlap of one day
added to each planning period was significant, so the net order was judged to
be approximately O(nl.5). For the final year long optimization runs which
were performed, a planning period of two days was used. The average
calculation time using a MicroVAX 3400. was 23.19 CPU minutes for each PV
optimization run, and 35.85 CPU minutes for each wind optimization run.
The wind runs take an average 55% longer to optimize because of their
greater resource variability and the increased complexity of having generation
available at night.
Figures 4.9 through 4.12 show how this algorithm behaves for
photovoltaic generation with 40% storage capacity and 50% inverter capacity.
The first weeks in January and July 1995 were modeled and the two days of
January 7 (a Saturday) and July 2 (a Sunday) were chosen to illustrate the
model's performance because they were representative, relatively easy to
understand, and no storage was carried between days.
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Figure 4.9 - NEPOOL Hourly System Load for January 7, 1995,
With and Without Optimized Storage
Hour
Figure 4.10 - Hourly Energy Flows and
Cumulative Storage for January 7, 1995
Hour
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Figure 4.11- NEPOOL Hourly System Load for July 2, 1995,
With and Without Optimized Storage
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Figure 4.12 - Hourly Energy Flows and
Cumulative Storage for July 2, 1995
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Figure 4.9 and 4.11 show the original NEPOOL system load without PV
generation by the total height of the bar graph columns, while the white block
at the top of the column shows the total amount of inverter capacity available
(in this case 50% of PV capacity minus site losses, or 446 MW). This band of
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white blocks in successive hours shows the range of net loads possible using
storage. The lines superimposed over the column graphs show the system
net load with PV generation added, both before and after the optimized
addition of storage and inverter capacity, and both lines must lie within the
white box at the top of each column. When the dotted line is above the solid
line energy is stored, and when they are reversed energy is generated from
storage. Figures 4.10 and 4.12 show more directly 1) the energy flow into
storage, 2) the inverter generation from storage or directly from PV
generation, and 3) the cumulative energy in storage.
These figures show that in January the brief hours of PV generation are
stored and used to reduce the peak load in only two hours, while in July both
PV generation and generation from storage are spread over more hours. Due
to the way that the variables are defined, inverter generation may come either
from storage or directly from the PV generation. For the July example
generation is high enough in hours 12 and 13 that even after inverter
generation is at the maximum there is still energy available to add to storage.
The storage and inverter capacity parameters were varied for both the
wind and PV cases as shown in Table 4.9 below. As described above, the
storage parameter is a fraction of the maximum day's generation for the year,
and the inverter parameter is the fraction of NDT generation capacity net of
site losses. Storage optimization and valuation were done for each
technology for all combinations of these storage and inverter capacity
parameters, so that a total of 84 runs in all were performed.
Table 4.9 - Storage and Inverter Capacity Parameter Ranges
Parameter Range (%)
Storage Capacity 0 10 20 40 60 80 100
Inverter Capacity 25 50 75 100 150 200
The optimization algorithm was also used to keep track of the top ten
peak loads before and after optimized storage was added. This load reduction
can be used to figure the capacity credit for NDT resource generation, and
depends only upon inverter capacity once a minimum amount of storage
capacity has been reached. Table 4.10 below shows before and after results for
the single peak hour and the average of the top ten peak load hours as a
function of the amount of inverter capacity used for both the wind and PV
generation.
Table 4.10 - Annual Peak Load Before and After Storage
Technology Inverter With Storage Without Storage
Capacity Peak Average Peak Average
(%) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW)
PV 25 227 223 216 223 223
PV 50 455 446 397 446 446
PV 75 682 466 445 668 668
PV 100 909 466 445 891 793
PV 150 1364 466 445 1015 853
PV 200 1818 466 445 1027 871
WIND 25 217 21 46 180 147
WIND 50 435 21 46 277 224
WIND 75 652 21 46 277 235
WIND 100 870 21 46 277 235
WIND 150 1304 21 46 277 235
WIND 200 1739 21 46 277 235
Once the 1995 hourly net load files were generated, they were
converted to EGEAS input files containing load duration curve information,
using an EGEAS preprocessor. EGEAS model runs were then performed for
the year 1995 using the AGREA EGEAS database discussed in previous
sections. The hourly net load files obtained could have been used directly as
input for the Polaris model, and the hour by hour model might have given
slightly better results for the storage optimization. However given the need
for many runs, the greater difficulty in using Polaris at NEES rather than
EGEAS at MIT, and the need to limit the burden on NEES's generosity in
performing these runs, whatever analysis could be done using a load
duration curve model was performed on EGEAS at MIT.
The results of the EGEAS runs were inconclusive, with almost no
difference in results between the runs, apparently for two reasons. First, the
EGEAS model results were given in units of millions of dollars to the nearest
tenth. Second, using the EGEAS model means that the energy value of NDT
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generation was not given directly, so that only the differences in value
between the different cases can be obtained by the delta in total system
operating costs. The benefits of simply shifting energy from low value hours
to high value hours for a 1000 MWe PV or wind plant with their relatively
low capacity factors were not enough to show up as significant differences
with the EGEAS output as set.
Instead, a different approach was taken to obtain more precise results.
As noted above, the marginal cost of each additional MW of load depends
upon its point in the loading order, and the savings due storage are the
product of the energy shifted times the marginal cost difference between the
hours when energy goes in and comes out of storage. The marginal cost
supply curve for the NEPOOL system is shown below in Figure 4.13.
Figure 4.13 - NEPOOL Marginal Cost Supply Curve
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The most obvious thing about this figure that it is not monotonic, but
instead split into two monotonic segments. The capacity shown 0 to
approximately 8000 MW does actually have the dispatch cost shown, but is
designated as "must-run" capacity for various reasons in the AGREA EGEAS
database used. The largest amount of this must-run capacity is the first 5000
MW of capacity which is nuclear and costs 5 to 6 $/MWh. Most non-utility
generators are also designated as must-run units. In reality, the NEPOOL
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system load does not drop below 6934 MW in 1995, so that most of this
capacity does run all the time. For analytic purposes any unit that is must-
run has a marginal cost of zero. Above the must-run capacity in the dispatch
order is approximately 3000 MW of hydropower capacity with a zero dispatch
cost, followed by coal, natural gas, and oil fired capacity in ascending order.
The second thing of interest in this figure is that there are two
marginal cost supply curves, one for January through February and one for
March through December. The reason is that during these two winter
months, 3450 MW of capacity in the AGREA EGEAS database are subject to
fuel switching from natural gas to fuel oil. This changes the unit dispatch
order, but as can be seen the difference is not dramatic since the curves for
both periods are approximately parallel.
The last, least obvious, and most important thing about Figure 4.13 is
that the approximately 27.5 GW of NEPOOL capacity have been derated on the
x axis to less than 20 GW for several reasons. All units require maintenance
and are subject to forced outages, and many units have energy limited
generation due to contractual, fuel supply, or other reasons. Since units are
not withdrawn from the dispatch order in this method of analysis, it is
necessary to derate the individual unit capacities for these factors. In the
AGREA EGEAS database the forced outage rate was increased to include
maintenance requirements, while maintenance scheduling was used for fuel
switching purposes, so both these factors could be included by derating unit
capacities by their forced outage rate. Likewise, if a unit had an energy limit
the capacity was reduced so that at full output for the year the required energy
would be reduced.
Applying both of these deratings reduced capacity by too much, so they
were each applied singly to unit capacity for all must run units, and the
minimum capacity was chosen. This method was necessary to keep total
must run capacity below the minimum system load and also have enough
total capacity for peak system load. It makes sense because the dispatchable
units are not energy limited (except for hydro) and are more able to schedule
maintenance.
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Finally, the unit capacities in MW must also be derated by the NEPOOL
average T&D losses of 7.2% in order to be on the same basis as the MW of
hourly net load produced by the storage optimization model. After derating
unit capacities for all these factors, total cumulative NEPOOL capacity was
reduced to 19,296 MW, which was exceeded by system load for 36 hours out of
the year modeled. This indicates that the way in which units were derated
may yield costs which are slightly higher than given by an LDC or hourly
model which handles the derating factors more realistically.
Once the marginal cost supply curve had been obtained, the storage
optimization algorithm was modified to sum the total value of inverter
generation based on the marginal cost of each hourly net load for the year.
Additional modifications were also added to track NDT generation, energy
storage and inverter generation, and NEPOOL system load before and after
NDT generation for the annual peak hour and the average of the annual top
ten hours.
The results of the optimized PV and wind storage across the range of
storage and inverter capacities described above are presented and discussed in
Section 5.3 of Chapter 5.
4.4 Spinning Reserve
As discussed in Chapter 3, spinning reserve is required for reliability of
customer service, and any utility option permitting the spinning reserve to be
reduced deserves a benefit or credit for this reduction.
Analysis of spinning reserve requires an hourly model because system
load changes hour to hour and this sequential information is lost in a load
duration curve model. In addition, hourly models contain more detail about
unit loading blocks and constraints on unit dispatch due to minimum down
times and run times, both of which are needed to correctly calculate spinning
reserve. EGEAS requires an input for the spinning reserve level, and it was
initially hoped to vary spinning reserve on both models as a means of cross
calibrating the models. However, using EGEAS for this purpose requires
loading block data that is not presently in the current EGEAS database, so all
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results were obtained from the Polaris model. Since spinning reserve is a
system level operating parameter, no other additions or changes were
required to be made to the base Polaris database described above.
The level of spinning reserve may be defined or specified in several
ways, and the operating level required may vary depending upon the source
of the standard. Spinning reserve needed depends upon the size of the
system, and in particular upon the size of the single largest unit which may
fail unexpectedly. For this reason, the spinning reserve requirement is
generally stated as some percentage of the capacity of the single largest unit in
operation. It may also be stated as a percentage of the total capacity of the two
largest units in operation. In practice these definitions are not much
different, because the largest baseload units in NEPOOL are nuclear plants
which are similar in size. The Polaris model allows spinning reserve to be
defined in three ways; 1) as a constant MW amount 2) as a fraction of hourly
busbar load, and 3) as a percentage of the largest unit in operation, but only
the first measure was used in the work performed.
Spinning reserve standards are set regionally by each power pool which
has common dispatch. The North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC) has nine regional council which set individual standards (usually in
total MW) for 10 and 30 minute response categories. The 10 minute response
category is called reliability reserve and subdivided into spinning reserve and
non-spinning reserve (which includes interruptible load and units which can
respond within 10 minutes without spinning standby), and the 30 minute
response reserve is called supplemental operating reserve.
For New England, the standard of operating reserve required by
NEPOOL Operating Procedure No. 8 (OP-8)25 is 100% of the single largest
contingency loss (generally the largest generating unit in operation) which is
synchronous reserve available in 10 minutes, plus 50% of the second largest
contingency loss which is asynchronous reserve available in 30 minutes.
However, when Polaris is actually used for NEPOOL final dispatch with little
or no alteration by the dispatchers, a much lower spinning reserve level of
25 NEPLAN Staff and the NEPOOL Generation Task Force, Summary of the
Generation Task Force Long-Range Study Assumptions, p. 4, August 1993.
approximately 50% of the single largest contingency loss is used, based upon
the standard given by the NERC. For some short periods an even lower level
is sometimes used, and for the purposes of planning studies a minimum
standard of at least 200 MW of operating reserve is assumed.
The difference between 10 and 30 minute reserve capacity is of course
blurred when using an hourly model, because smaller time increments
cannot be distinguished. In this case, spinning reserve is a marginal
increment of capacity above the hourly system load operating at the lowest
loading block. For this analysis, the spinning reserve parameter was varied
from 0% to 200% in 10% increments. The extreme ends of this range are
understood to be unrealistic, but were included to observe their effects.
The purpose of spinning reserve is to reduce generation-based outages,
and Polaris has an input parameter which determines how closely it adheres
to the standard supplied. The first option ("degrade") allows a limited
amount of flexibility so that the model may drop below the standard for very
short periods due to unit operating constraints. The second option ('shed") is
stricter, and produces a larger cost for unserved energy. The stricter choice
was used in the present analysis so that the maximum effect of varying
spinning reserve on total variable cost could be observed. The Polaris
database cost/MWh for unserved energy was quite high, but the cost set on
unserved energy is often arbitrary and lacking any real economic basis. These
results which are presented and discussed in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 exclude
the costs of any possible unserved energy, and instead focus on the balance
between variable operating costs and capital recovery costs.
4.5 Dispatchability for Thermal Units
Unlike the non-dispatchable wind and solar resources discussed in
section 4.3 above, more conventional thermal units can be directly controlled.
They are dispatched following their variable cost in the loading order which
is at the heart of power system operation, modeling and planning. This
dispatch is constrained however by physical and operational limitations. This
section describes the source and definition of these constraints, the choice of
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generic plants used to illustrate them, and the choice and range of parameters
which were varied in this analysis.
The most obvious and physical bases for dispatch constraints are the
thermal mass of a generating unit and the thermal stresses involved in
cycling them on and off. Simply put, it takes a long time for a big generating
unit to warm up or cool down and turning it on too rapidly can cause damage
and increase maintenance costs. These limitations are obviously linked to
size. Large baseload units require longer to respond, while small peaking
units are built for fast response times. For the purposes of description and
analysis, dispatch constraints are separated and defined using several different
measures. These include the following.
* Minimum Run Time - The minimum time a unit can be operated
before it can be shut off.
* Minimum Down Time - The minimum time a unit must be shut off
before it can be restarted.
* Hot to Cold Start Time - The time it takes for a unit to cool down so
that a startup incurs the higher cost of a cold startup instead of a hot
startup.
* Ramping Time - The time it takes for a unit to increase from zero to
full capacity generation.
These measures are somewhat interrelated, and not every source or
model uses all of them or necessarily agrees upon their exact definition. The
current version of the Polaris model uses only the first three, implicitly
assuming that units can be turned on immediately without ramping up.
Typical values of these constraint measures are given for different size
units with different technologies and fuels by the Generation Task Force
(GTF) Assumptions Book 26, although they are somewhat conspicuously
missing from the Electric Power Research Institute Technology Assessment
Guide (EPRI TAG) which describes generic technologies for more strategic
26 NEPLAN Staff and the NEPOOL Generation Task Force, Summary of the
Generation Task Force Long Range Study Assumptions, Exhibits 27 and 28,
August 1993.
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purposes that are generally modeled by load duration curve production cost
models.
At the start of this analysis it was believed that these dispatch
constraints were based primarily, if not solely, upon the physical grounds
stated above. However, in conversation with NEES personnel it was learned
that the minimum time constraints are also based on other factors, including
maintenance costs, emissions, and how the plant may be dispatched. It is
more correct to view the definition of dispatch constraints as a scale or
spectrum, where the minimum limits of operation may be based on physics,
but normal limits are based on a decreasing scale of maintenance costs and
emissions.
These operating limits are apparently supplied to dispatchers by plant
personnel, but the impacts of unit dispatch back upon plant generation and
total system cost are not considered (or known). The present analysis is
aimed at remedying this lack, so that plant dispatch constraints can be reach
by balancing plant v. system costs. It should be noted that under deregulation,
the market value of each plant is based upon the net present value of future
revenues and costs. When revenues are attributed to individual plants based
on their generation rather than to the utility as a whole, the operating
constraints may have a significant impact, and the system operator or
coordinator will need to supply correct pricing signals to ensure minimum
total system cost.
It was expected a priori that the cost of dispatch constraints ( and the
benefit of relaxing them) is not equal across the loading order. Although
baseload plants have the tightest constraints (i.e. the longest minimum
times), they are turned on and off so infrequently that the value of faster
operation was expected to be small. Peaking units at the other end of the
loading order have such fast response times that no further benefit can be
expected. It was therefore expected that the greatest benefit of faster response
would be found for intermediate units.
To illustrate this range of values it was necessary to select a number of
generic generators with a range of variable dispatch costs and representative
fuels. Figure 4.14 below shows the distribution of dispatch cost against the
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cumulative utility owned capacity of the NEPOOL region, based on the
AGREA EGEAS database. Unlike Figure 4.13 above, must-run and
dispatchable units have not been separated nor unit capacities derated. This
figure also gives the 1995 NEPOOL load duration curve, showing the
percentage of hours above a given load level. This figure correctly shows that
peak load is approximately 20.5 GW, and that generation capacity is larger by
the reserve margin, but the peaking units shown beyond the end of the load
duration curve are still used during planned and forced outages since the unit
capacities are not derated.
Figure 4.14 - NEPOOL Load Duration
and Marginal Cost Supply Curves
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Representative plants were chosen at five evenly spaced points along
this curve, with a range of fuels. As far as possible, larger plants at each cost
point were chosen so that the impacts upon total system cost would be more
discernible.
As noted above, the Polaris model includes three constraints;
minimum run time, minimum down time, and the hot to cold startup time.
Based on the Polaris manual, the hot to cold startup time does not affect
dispatch, but only changes the startup cost incurred each time a unit begins
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operation. Because of the need to limit the number of runs, it was chosen to
concentrate upon the minimum run and down time constraints as
parameters for variation in the study. Typical values for these parameters
were obtained from three sources, including the GTF Assumptions Book, the
NEPOOL database examined on site at NEES, and consultation with NEES
personnel 27 . Based on these references, typical base values for the minimum
run and down time parameters were chosen for each of the five plants
selected according to their dispatch cost. These parameters were varied above
and below the base values, with larger variations for base load plants with
slower response times and smaller variations for plants with faster response
times. These parameter variations were combined by combining all
minimum run times with the base minimum down time and vice versa for
each unit. This yielded a total of 50 cases to be analyzed by Polaris runs, which
are shown in Table 4.11 below with the base parameters shown in bold.
Table 4.11 - Unit Dispatch Constraint Variations
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5
Min. Min. Min. Min. Min. Min. Min. Min. Min. Min.
Down Run Down Run Down Run Down Run Down Run
6 4 4 2 4 2 1 1 0 0
12 8 8 4 8 4 2 2 1 1
24 12 12 6 12 6 4 4 2 2
36 18 18 8 18 8 6 6 4 4
48 24 24 12 24 12 8 8 6 6
(Note: All times in hours)
Having selected from the AGREA EGEAS database the five generic
units listed above, and the parameter variations to apply to them in the
modeling analysis, it was then necessary to make the appropriate changes to
the Polaris database. The first possibility was to create new generic units and
add them to the existing Polaris database, replicating similar existing units
and changing the total NEPOOL capacity. Instead, an existing unit was
chosen, removed from the existing database, and replaced with a similar
generic unit. The generic units had the same fuel and heat rates, but
capacities were changed so that results would be representative of the
27 E-mail correspondence from Mr. Tom Mikulis, Thermal Administrator, New
England Electric System, 8 January 1996.
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NEPOOL system but not exact. This replacement of existing units by generic
ones was done for two reasons. First, it was easier to do, since it was not
necessary to modify the Polaris database in every detail for the new plants.
Second, and more importantly, it was deemed more realistic to change system
size by modifying the size of an existing plant rather than by adding an
entirely new one. The existing plants were replaced by the generic ones singly
for analysis, rather than replacing all five and then varying the parameters for
only one at a time. This choice was a tradeoff between accuracy in results for
each single unit v. the comparability of results between units, and it seemed
that the former was to be preferred. As required by the confidentiality
agreement signed with NEPOOL, the identities of the units selected for
generic replacement are not revealed in this work.
Although Polaris does dispatch units based on the constraints described
above, its algorithm has some shortcomings which were discussed with
Decision Focus, Inc. (the authors of Polaris) and which should be mentioned.
As system load changes Polaris follows the loading order, starting or stopping
plants as required. This is first done without consideration of the dispatch
constraints. This initial dispatch is then checked for violations of the dispatch
constraints. If a unit violates the minimum run time, it is kept running
longer. If a unit violates the minimum down time, it is kept running
through the down time period. The dispatch is then feasible, and is checked
for optimality. If it is cheaper to keep a unit running, rather than shut it
down and then incur the startup cost later, it is kept running through the
feasible shutdown.
The difficulty with this algorithm is that the only option considered for
both feasibility and optimization is to keep units running longer. However, it
is easy to postulate a situation where it would be more economical for a unit
not to run at all, but to instead be replaced by a unit further up the loading
order which would run for a shorter time or have a lower startup cost. In
addition, ramping times are not considered (at least separately from
minimum run times), and the ramping profile is an on/off step function for
each loading block.
Decision Focus recognizes these issues, and is addressing them in a
new model upgrade that was scheduled to be released in March, 1996. This
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thesis was not delayed for this release, not only because of the uncertain
release date, but more importantly because the additional detail of the new
release will require new operating data to be collected for each existing plant
which will require a significant amount of time for NEPOOL to gather.
However, the fact that Decision Focus is updating the model to improve its
handling of these issues illustrates the important role which dispatch
constraints can play. Because any improvement in the algorithm will bring
its results closer to optimality, the results of the analysis described above can
be considered conservative minimum estimates of the benefits due to
relaxing dispatch constraints.
This chapter has described the basis and methods of analysis for the
five sample component values chosen in Sections 3.1 through 3.5. This
includes the ranges of parameter variation, database assumptions, and the
choice and development of the models used. The results of the component
value analyses described in this chapter are presented and discussed in the
same order in Sections 5.1 through 5.5 of the following chapter.
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5.0 Results for Component Values Analyzed
This thesis proposes that there are sources of value which are not
included in conventional average or levelized cost methodology. These
sources of value are becoming increasingly important to those who generate,
transmit and consume electricity as the competitive deregulation of the
market continues. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework of how
utility options and individual component values are related, while chapters 3
and 4 discuss individual values, identify the subset of values chosen for
analysis, and lay out the methodology and assumptions used for their
evaluation.
This chapter describes the results for the five sample component
values chosen to demonstrate the theory developed (% reserve margin, unit
size, resource dispatchability, % spinning reserve, and thermal unit dispatch
constraints). Component value supply curves have been obtained by
sensitivity analysis, varying one or two parameters in the set of option
characteristics. These supply curves can be used to value utility options
which possess the component value in question, regardless of the option
technology. These value supply curves can also be used to choose the
optimum level for each option by comparing them with the cost curve for the
option in question. This chapter also reduces component values to a
common $/kW or $/MWh basis so that they can be compared with each other
and to conventional option costs to show which are most significant. The
five component values chosen to demonstrate the new economic
methodology developed are not necessarily the largest available, and other
component values described in Chapter 3 (such as T&D values) appear
capable of being equally as significant, if not more so.
In four of the five cases evaluated, the results presented in this chapter
are based on analysis of the New England system over a single year study
period, because only a single year's modeling was necessary to demonstrate
them. However the benefits of different utility options will endure for
different lengths of time, depending upon the set of key characteristics upon
which they depend. Some characteristics (e.g. system composition and the
variable cost supply curve) are slow to change due to the sheer inertia of the
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capital investment in the existing utility system, while others (such as
dispatch rules) may be switched on and off.
In order to compare benefits that have different duration's, it is
necessary to set a common time basis. One way of doing this is to assume that
all value benefits will have a common life span, and use a net present value
factor to discount the future benefits. For example conventional utility
options (new generating plants) have life times that range from 20 to 40 years,
although these are often more tied to financial than technological reasons.
For this thesis, the primary common time basis was set to be the year 1995.
For the one case with results over a 20 year period, the net present value was
levelized to produce a 1995 annual value. Based upon the AGREA EGEAS
data base, a nominal discount rate of 10% and an assumed long run inflation
rate of 3.3% were used for these calculations. However, it may also be
desirable to compare these annual results with the capital costs of
conventional utility options. For this purpose only it was assumed that the
benefits could be maintained for a life time of 30 years, which gives a net
present benefit of 9.427 times the 1995 annual benefit.
Converting the results in this chapter to common units and time basis
makes it possible to compare the relative scale of different component values,
but some caution should be observed in transferring these values to other
utility systems. The NEPOOL system is composed of a fuel and generation
mix that is different from other regions of the country (particularly in the
amount of oil burned), and so these component value supply curves will not
transfer directly to other regions.
5.1 Reserve Margin
The major question in determining the value of system reserve
margin is the balance between fixed capital recovery costs which decrease with
reserve margin, and variable dispatch costs which increase as reserve margin
decreases. For the NEPOOL system, this question was posed in two ways, as
described in Chapter 4. The first way was by asking what if the existing system
had been built, only smaller, by fractionally reducing the capacity of all units.
The results for this case are shown below in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
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Figure 5.1 - Change in Total NEPOOL System Costs
as a Function of Reserve Margin (%)
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These two figures show the same results in slightly different ways.
Figure 5.1 shows the changes in total 1995 NEPOOL system costs as reserve
margin decreases from 30% to 0%. As expected, the total variable system
operating costs increase, but only slightly from $2726.9 to $2915.7 million as
the reserve margin decreases from 30% to 5%, a net increase of $188.8 million
or only 6.9%. This slight increase is dominated by the large decrease in
revenue requirements necessary to recover the capital costs of the smaller
system. The NEPOOL capital recovery requirement for generation,
transmission and distribution plant is $6.063 billion for 1995 as described in
Chapter 4, including NEPOOL's payments for non-utility generation and
power purchases (NUGs and IPPs are 12% of total 26.5GW NEPOOL capacity).
The decrease in reserve margin from 30% to 5% means that 1995 revenue
requirements decrease proportionately from $5958 to $4812 million, or a
decrease of $1146 million. The total system cost is of course the sum of the
fixed and variable costs, and declines from $8685 to $7728 million. This
decrease of $957 million is shown in Figure 5.1 above, next to and above the
fixed cost line.
Although the capacity of each generating unit was reduced fractionally
in this case, the amount of transmission and distribution capacity cannot be
reduced because the system load remains the same, and hence the reduction
of capital recovery costs above is overstated. As noted in Chapter 4, T&D is
40.5% of the national gross investment in existing electric utility plant for
generation, transmission and distribution, so NEPOOL 1995 capital recovery
requirements for generation plant only are $3.607 billion. The fourth line in
Figure 5.1 above shows the total savings benefit due to the reduced reserve
margin from 30% to 5% after T&D costs have been excluded. These total costs
decrease from $6272 to $5779 million for a total savings of $493 million. As
discussed in Chapter 4, the results for operating and total capital recovery
costs are relatively certain, as they are based on historic system data, but the
adjustment excluding T&D costs is less certain due to the uncertainty of
applying an average national T&D fraction to New England capital recovery
requirements.
The benefits of reducing transmission, and especially distribution,
requirements are notoriously site dependent, and for this reason this very
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important component value was not evaluated as a generic example in this
thesis. However, note that if DSM measures or distributed generation had
been used in the past to reduce T&D investment by amounts proportional to
generation capacity reductions in the present case, this would represent an
average savings of 40.5%, and would have been worth $2.456 billion in 1995.
Figure 5.2 above shows the same information, but instead of giving
reserve margin in percentages, it shows the change in NEPOOL reserve in
absolute MW. This is more relevant when comparing NEPOOL results
against another system. Because the impact of variable costs is so small
compared to fixed costs, the fuel blend and unit efficiencies of a different
system will not be very important compared to the capital cost of the existing
plants in that system.
For the purpose of comparison with the other component value
benefits presented in this chapter, the slope of these two graphs can be
expressed in $/kW. The 25% reduction of reserve margin modeled (from
30% to 5%) represents 5106 MW for the NEPOOL system. Because the net
benefits of reducing reserve margin are dominated by the linear reduction in
capital cost requirements, it is reasonable to state the average benefit available
is $493 million/5106 MW, or 96.6 $/kW. If DSM measures or distributed
generation could have reduced T&D capital recovery costs by the same
amount as the fractional capacity reductions in this present case, then this
would be worth 90.9 $/kW for a total value of 187.5 $/kW.
As described in Chapter 4, the second reserve margin case is one where
nuclear plants were successively eliminated (that is, hypothetically never
built) in order of their age from oldest to youngest. This gives results for 8
different levels of reserve margin, from 32.3% (all nuclear plants in service)
down to 5.1% (7 plants totaling 5556 MW not built). The newest plant
(Seabrook) was always kept in service, because its elimination would have
reduced reserve margin to -0.7%. The results for this case are shown below in
Figure 5.3, and 5.4 below which again show the differences in 1995 NEPOOL
system costs versus percent reserve margin and versus the decrease in
NEPOOL reserve in absolute MW of capacity respectively.
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Figure 5.3 - Change in Total NEPOOL System Costs
as a Function of Nuclear Units Unbuilt (% RM)
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As these figures show, the increase in total variable operating cost for
the NEPOOL system is dramatically larger than in the first case, because
nuclear power is approximately 20% of total capacity, and constitutes almost
all the non-hydro base load capacity (minimum system load is 6934 MW and
averages 7212 MW for the 10 lowest hours, while nuclear 'must-run' capacity
totals 6753 MW and hydro totals 5745 MW, excluding pumped storage). As
nuclear capacity is reduced, the system operating cost increases from $2707
million to $3410 million. This is a total increase of $703 million, or 20.1%.
This cost represents the additional 1995 cost if these plants were retired now
(as opposed to never built, as in the current case). These costs are based
uponcribing the existing system so they are relatively quite certain.
In contrast, the future capital recovery requirements are significantly
reduced, because nuclear plants are the most expensive base load capacity. As
explained in Chapter 4, sunk costs prior to 1995 have been ignored, and the
capital recovery requirements for these plants are based on their depreciated
rate base values (or embedded costs) which are the remaining amounts which
must be paid off. These embedded costs equal original unit cost minus
cumulative depreciation, both of which are accounting numbers calculated in
mixed year dollars. In order to compare these numbers with the 1995 variable
costs, the embedded costs were converted to annual payments over the
remaining life of each plant (assuming a full 40 year license life), using the
nominal NEPOOL interest rate of 10%. As described in Chapter 4, a number
of assumptions were made in deriving the embedded cost estimates so these
results are slightly less certain than the operating cost results.
Combining the variable and capital recovery costs gives the total
change in NEPOOL system costs due to the successive elimination of nuclear
units. The overall trend of these results is in the opposite direction from the
first fractional reduction reserve margin case. It shows that had existing units
not been built, there would be a very significant total cost increase (or
negative value) for all but two units.. For the Pilgrim unit the marginal
variable cost increase and the decrease in depreciated capital cost (embedded
cost) are approximately equal. The Millstone 3 unit was so expensive and is
so relatively young that its remaining capital cost is greater than the increase
in variable costs had it never been built. Table 5.1 below shows the 1995
capital recovery cost, variable cost, total cost and marginal value per kW for
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each plant's elimination. The total's line gives the sum of each column for
all seven nuclear units, except for the final column where it gives the overall
average value per kW.
Table 5.1 - Marginal Value of Removing NEPOOL Nuclear Units
Name of Plant Capacity A Cap. Cost A Var. Cost A Total Cost Marg.Value
(MW) (95 M$) (95 M$) (95 M$) (95 $/kW)
Connecticut Yankee 600 0 77 77.3 -128.8
Millstone 1 662 -19.7 93.9 74.2 -112.2
Pilgrim 1 678 -92.8 92.0 -0.8 1.2
Maine Yankee 890 -23.7 113.8 90.1 -101.2
Vermont Yankee 563 -18.6 62.8 44.2 -78.5
Millstone 2 910 -42.9 107.5 64.6 -71.0
Millstone 3 1253 -269.5 156.2 -113.3 90.4
Total 5556 -467.2 703.5 236.3 -42.5
The two reserve margin value cases considered above do indeed show
that the value of reserve margin depends upon what type of system with
lower reserve margin is compared to the present case. In the first case, the
reduction in fixed costs dominates a slight increase variable costs, while in the
second case the reverse is true. Of the two cases considered the first one
seems most interesting, because it seems more indicative of how much could
be saved in the future by reduced reserve margins since the structural inertia
of system composition makes it slow to change.
The benefits for these two cases are for a single year, based on the
assumption that less capacity was built in the past. If future reserve margin is
allowed to decrease relative to the current target level it may be reasonable to
take a present value of the future savings due to such a policy. These future
savings would depend upon the type of plant in which investment would
otherwise be made, but if they were to remain the same for 30 years then the
net present value would be 1169 95$/kW for the first case. It is not reasonable
to assume a 30 year life for the nuclear case, because it is based on current
depreciation and remaining lifetimes, but solely for comparison with the
other values studied it would be a negative 401 95$/kW. The first case result
is somewhat less than the current cost of a coal-fired plant (approximately
1385 95$/kW for a 300 MW subcritical unit28), and is significantly higher than
28 Electric Power Research Institute, Technology Assessment Guide, 1993, Exhibit 2, p. 8-27.
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the more likely future avoided capacity which is an advanced combined cycle
unit, at 682 95$/kW for 500 MW 29.
The amount of benefit from a smaller reserve margin can obviously be
quite significant if the whole system is reduced and not just baseload units, so
the question is how much reserve margin is really needed and how can it be
reduced to obtain this value. Reserve margin is necessary for reliability in
case of outages due to maintenance and breakdowns. Additional reserve
margin may be considered necessary due to the amount of time before new
capacity can be brought into service and the uncertainty of future load growth
during this period.
The simplest way to reduce reserve margin would simply be to avoid
construction of new capacity and wait until load growth reduces it naturally.
As shown in Figure 4.2, the current NEPOOL reserve margin is significantly
above the historic national average. It is less clear how much reduction in
the reliability of service to customers would be produced by a lower reserve
margin, whether this decrease would be less acceptable now than it apparently
was in the historic past, and indeed whether or how any correlation between
such a gross measure as reserve margin and customer reliability will endure
competitive restructuring of the industry.
Fortunately there are other measures which seem to make a lower
reserve margin acceptable. The most obvious is to decrease outages of
existing plants. This is difficult to do because reducing unplanned outages
generally require increased maintenance outages. Increased use of acoustic
and other plant diagnostics during operation are one trend that is already
helping to find problems before unplanned outages occur, but there is already
enough incentive to reduce outages that further major advances are unlikely.
The next two most obvious ways to reduce reserve margin is to build
plants which are smaller and require shorter construction lead times. These
measures are obviously interrelated, but both help in different ways. Smaller
plants help because they reduce the temporary increase in reserve margin
which occurs when they start operation. This benefit has been measured in
29 New England regional database maintained by the Analysis Group for Regional Electricity
Alternatives, M.I.T. Energy Lab.
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Section 5.2 below. The shorter lead time is also valuable because it reduces
the necessary time horizon for forecasting and hence the uncertainty of the
forecast load. Obviously, increasing capacity by building a nuclear (or any
other) plant requiring a ten year lead time means planning to meet the upper
range of a ten year load forecast for the sake of security and thus taking the
risk of overbuilding capacity. Improved load forecasting can also reduce the
risk of overbuilding, but since load growth is primarily based on regional
economic growth the only currently significant way of doing this is to reduce
the forecasting time horizon.
Less obvious are the roles of energy efficiency and load management in
assisting reduced reserve margins. Increasing energy efficiency will slow load
growth and slow the decrease in reserve margins, which does not reduce the
balance of depreciated capital cost that must be paid either by ratepayers or
shareholders (whether or not the capacity is a stranded asset). However by
slowing load growth, energy efficiency reduces the necessary reserve margin
(in MW, not %) and also reduces the variability in forecast load which
planned construction must meet. Peak shifting by load management also
reduces the required reserve margin (measured in MW and not %), because a
system with a higher load factor requires less total capacity to meet the same
total energy requirements.
5.2 Unit Size
As observed in the preceding section, systematically smaller unit size is
one way of reducing system reserve margin. The value for a single new unit
however lies in reducing the sudden rise (or step function) above the target
reserve margin when the unit starts operation, rather than in reducing the
underlying, long term target level of reserve margin as was considered above.
The value of size for a single new unit is therefore relative to the rate of
system load growth because this determines how long the excess capacity
above the target reserve margin will endure.
As described in Chapter 4, this section considers the cost of adding 1360
MW of new capacity either by an advanced light water reactor or by eight 170
MW modular high temperature gas cooled reactors added all at once, four
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every four years, two every two years, or one every year. This is equivalent to
reducing new unit size geometrically from 1360 MW to 680 MW, 340 MW
and finally 170 MW. The number of cases modeled was increased from five
to eight by adding three cases for capital cost sensitivity analysis. The first
sensitivity case increases the capital cost of the ALWR from the base value of
1370 94$/kW to equal the MHTGR cost of 1800 94$/kW. The second two
sensitivity cases were formed by changing the average MHTGR cost, so that
the first unit of every four includes common facilities at a cost of 2630
94$/kW, and the second, third and fourth units have a reduced cost of 1524
94$/kW.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figures 5.5 through 5.9 below.
The legends for these figures summarize the description of the eight cases
analyzed which was given in Table 4.6 by showing the technology, size, cost,
and schedule for the number of units which come on-line in the years 2001
through 2008. These figures show the relative differences between the eight
cases in the 20 year net present value of new system capital costs, variable
operating cost, and total cost. Because the results are relative one case must be
considered the reference case, and for the purposes of graphical clarity this
case was chosen to be number eight. Although the results of this section are
given relative to case eight, for reference the absolute capital, variable and
total net present value costs for case eight are $3,256, $34,777, and $38,033
million respectively. The capital costs calculated by EGEAS are only for new
units, including the nuclear units and the fossil units common to all eight
cases. They do not include capital recovery costs for existing units, but since
these are the same for all eight cases this does not matter in the relative
results presented below.
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Figure 5.5 - Change in NPV of New Capital Cost Due to Unit Size
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This figure shows the net present value of savings in capital cost
expenditures due to the reduction in ALWR unit size for cases 3 through 8.
Cases 1 and 2 are ALWR cases presented for comparison. Case 1 is based on
an EPRI cost of 1370 94$/kW which seemed unrealistically low, while the case
2 price of 1800 94$/kW was chosen to be equal to the ALWR price. A more
recent expert opinion of the ALWR price however was 1500 96$/kW or 1433
94$/kW30 . The difference between the capital costs for cases 1 and 2 (3508 v.
4104 or 596 million 95$) is not simply the capacity (1360 MW) times the cost
difference (1800 - 1370 or 430 94$/kW) because the base year inputs are in 1994
dollars, and the EGEAS model results include the construction cost trajectory,
AFUDC, CWIP, taxes, and weighted rate of return to produce a stream of
annual capital recovery costs starting in 1995 whose net present value
difference is given in 1995 dollars.
30 Private conversation with Dr. Regis Matzie, Vice President of Nuclear Systems Engineering,
Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., August 1996.
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The NPV capital costs for the ALWR scenarios decrease smoothly for
cases 3 through 8, with values of $3951, $3547, $3382, $3352, $3301, and $3256
million, respectively. This decrease is solely due to the fact that as the
amount of capacity built at one time decreases from 1360 to 170 MW,
construction costs are moved further into the future so that their discounted
value decreases. Recall that in cases 5 and 7 the first of every four MHTGR
units includes the cost of common facilities. These cases fall into the smooth
decrease of cases 4, 6 and 8 because they are intermediate steps in pushing the
capital costs further into the future. As mentioned before, case 8 was the
reference case against which the others were compared, so its cost above is
zero. It is possible to make the unit additions still smaller until they are
effectively continuous with a different technology such as DSM or
photovoltaics, but this would require EGEAS to model and report sub-year
time periods. EGEAS can do this, but it would raise seasonal modeling issues,
and for strategic planning annual increments are usually the smallest used.
Also, it is clear from the decreasing slope of cases 3 through 8 above that most
of the benefit of reduced unit size has already been captured by the geometric
progression down to one eighth of original capacity.
Figure 5.6 below shows the changes in the net present value of the 20
years of annual NEPOOL total dispatch costs (chiefly fuel costs and variable
O&M). As before, case 8 is the reference case so it is the zero against which the
other cases are compared.
Figure 5.6 - Change in NPV System Dispatch Cost Due to Unit Size
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This figure shows that the two ALWR cases are both $170 million
cheaper than case 8. They are equal because the capital cost of the two cases
does not affect their operating cost. Case 3 is $265 million cheaper than case 8
and $95 million cheaper than cases 1 and 2 even though the MHTGR has a
higher dispatch cost than the ALWR (10.33 v. 5.93 94$/MWh, compared to
current NEPOOL nuclear units which range from 5.4 to 6.2 94$/MWh). The
difference is that the MHTGR produces more energy because it has a higher
capacity factor than the ALWR, with an equivalent outage rate of 10.5% v.
17.2% respectively for unplanned forced outages and planned maintenance
outages. This energy from the MHTGR unit is sufficiently cheaper than the
energy it displaces from units higher in the dispatch order that it makes up
for its cost premium over the ALWR. This is only true however when both
units are built with 1360 MW of capacity in the year 2001. As more, smaller
MHTGR units are built further into the future in cases 4 through 8, the
amount of generation from more expensive units grows. Plus, this smaller
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benefit due to cheap variable cost is discounted more as it occurs further into
the future, so that cases 4 through 6 have savings of $110, $37 and $37 million
with respect to case 8. As with cases 1 and 2, cases 5 and 6 and cases 7 and 8
have equal costs because their differences in capital cost do not affect their
equal dispatch costs.
As discussed above, the MHTGR has a lower dispatch cost and higher
capacity factor than the ALWR, and the capacity factor can give the MHTGR
lower total system dispatch costs, depending upon unit size and the amount
of excess capacity. The analysis has already considered sensitivity to MHTGR
unit size and ALWR capital costs, but these results also indicate that
sensitivity analysis of dispatch cost and capacity factor may also be
worthwhile. Of these two, dispatch cost is less interesting because it would
take a large change in relative dispatch costs to make a change in the system
dispatch order. Without the system dispatch effects of such a change in
dispatch order, the sensitivity analysis of dispatch costs is relatively simple.
On the other hand, changes in capacity factor require system modeling to
assess their impacts. As noted in Chapter 4, the equivalent forced outage rate
(EFOR) was used to include both forced outages and maintenance, so that an
EFOR of 10% would mean a capacity factor fo 90%. EFOR for the MHTGR
design was varied from 5% to 20%, including the design base case of 10.5%
and the ALWR level of 17.2%. Results for these sensitivity cases are shown
below in Figure 5.7, which show the results as lines superimposed on the bar
graph results of Figure 5.6 above.
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Figure 5.7 - Dependence of MHTGR Total Dispatch Costs on Capacity Factor
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As this figure shows, the effects of capacity factor can be significant, and
on a scale with the cost effects already found for unit size. Second, the effects
of capacity factor are much larger than the effect of differences in dispatch cost
between the ALWR and MHTGR units. Comparing the ALWR (case 1 or 2)
to the MHTGR built with the same size (case 3) and capacity factor (an EFOR
of 17.2%, shown by the crosshatched square) shows a NPV difference of only 8
million 95$ due to the difference in dispatch costs (5.9 v. 10.3 94$/MWh).
Third, the impact of changes in capacity factor is approximately linear for each
MHTGR case, decreasing slightly from case 3 to case 8 and having an average
NPV value of 51 million 95$ for each 5% change. The chief conclusion from
this sensitivity analysis is that capacity factor has an effect approximately
equal to effective unit size for the MHTGR, and both need to be considered in
making an investment decision.
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The relative impact of the eight unit size cases considered on total NPV
system cost is shown below in Figure 5.8, which simply shows the sum of the
capital and variable costs presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 above.
Figure 5.8 - Change in Total NPV System Cost Due to Unit Size
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Although the first ALWR case appears most attractive, this is based on
a low and conceivably unrealistic estimated capital cost. For the MHTGR
units, this figure shows that the capital cost benefits outweigh the variable
cost increases as smaller units are added more often into the future, with a
net present value reduction of $430 million as unit size is decreased eight fold
from 1360 to 170 MW. Assuming a 30 year life and 10% interest rate, the
annual benefit of this eight fold reduction in unit size is $45.6 million per
year. It is also clear that given equal capital costs, the increased base case
capacity factor of the MHTGR can give it an advantage over the ALWR that
can range from $95 to $525 million or $10.1 to $55.7 million per year,
depending upon the number of reactors built at one time. Using the
dependence of variable cost for the MHTGR upon capacity factor shown in
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Figure 5.7 above gives the total system cost sensitivity results shown below in
Figure 5.9. As before, results for different EFOR levels are presented as lines
superimposed on the based case bar graph results of Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.9 - Dependence of MHTGR Total System Costs on Capacity Factor
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On the high cost end, this figure shows the obvious result that the
ALWR and MHTGR technologies will have the same impact on total system
costs if they have the same capital cost (1800 94$/kW) and capacity factor
(82.8%). Fuel cost differences are so small that they are difficult to see. On the
low end, a very good EFOR of 5% would give the MHTGR a capacity factor of
95% and a net cost low enough to offset almost all the capital cost advantage
of the ALWR (1370 v. 1800 94$/kW).
If the EPRI estimate of capital cost of 1370 $/kW for the ALWR is
correct, then it still has a $72 million or $7.64 million per year advantage over
the MHTGR added as 170 MW single units and having the base case EFOR of
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10.5%. This is not a big difference. In fact, by looking at the difference
between cases 1 and 2 it is clear that the capital costs of the ALWR would only
have to rise to 1422 94$/kW before the MHTGR is competitive with it. This is
less than one expert's opinion quoted above of 1433 94$/kW. By looking at
the cost and capacity differences between cases 3, 4, 6, and 8 (all MHTGR units
having equal cost), the marginal and average benefit of unit size reduction
can be found, as shown in Table 5.2 below.
Table 5.2 - Marginal and Average Benefit of Unit Size Reduction
Size Reduction
From (MW) 1360 680 340 1360.0
To (MW) 680 340 170 170.0
NPV (95 M$)
Capital Cost 404.4 195.0 95.9 A 695.3
Variable Cost -155.0 -73.0 -37.0 -265.0
Total Cost 249.4 122.0 58.9 430.3
Marginal Benefit Average
(95 $/kW) 366.7 358.9 346.3 361.6
(95$/kW/yr) 38.90 38.07 36.74 38.35
Notice that the average value of 362 95$/kW for MHTGR unit size
reduction is slightly over the 20% of the 1800 94$/kW capital cost. This is a
large enough amount to indicate a strong drive for smaller plants. Also, it is
interesting to compare the annualized benefit for unit size ($38.4/kW/yr.)
with the same annualized benefit for overall reserve margin from Section 5.1
of $96.6/kW/yr.). It makes sense that the unit size value is approximately
40% of the reserve margin value, because the unit size cost of excess capacity
is only incurred for part of the 20 year study period.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the results of this section for reduced unit
size represent a minimum. Building smaller units consecutively instead of
as a single large unit, has an another benefit due to the additional flexibility in
planning. If load growth is low, or the relative costs of different fuels shift it
is possible to simply delay or stop building future units. Additional benefits
can be obtained if the construction period is reduced so that unit commitment
decisions can be made with less lead-time and better information. Although
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these two benefits were not explored in the present analysis (the ALWR and
MHTGR units both have a supposed 5 year construction period), the financial
management tools of options theory, such as contingent claims analysis, can
analyze the benefits of these and other choices under conditions of stochastic
uncertainty. The field of options theory is based upon the study of financial
options (such as puts, calls, and derivative) pioneered by Black and Sholes3 1
and Merton 3 2 . When conditions approximate certain assumptions which are
plausible for financial markets (i.e. market equilibrium, risk free alternatives,
and option independence), these tools can be used in many areas like capital
acquisition under uncertainty. Options theory as applied to the electric utility
industry has a growing literature, including optimization models using
mixed integer and stochastic programming techniques 33 . It is also gaining
direct use by utilities such as Boston Edison which has used it to structure its
RFPs for new capacity and to analyze the bids submitted 34 . Other specific
applications include the use of contingent claims analysis to analyze the
values of exhaust gas scrubbers v. fuel switching for coal plants3 5, and coal
gasifiers v. natural gas for combined cycle plants36. The most direct
application found of contingent claims analysis to the MHTGR technology
considered in this section is by Thomas 3 7, which includes consideration of
value over plant lifetime, the value of construction lead times, the value of
modular flexibility, the value of capital cost intensivity, and the value of dual
inputs or outputs (e.g. fuel switching or trading off electric generation v.
process heat production).
Although options theory has many advantages over the conventional
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis that produces levelized busbar costs, it
also has some problems. Chief among these is that all the emphasis is still
31 Black, F. and M. Scholes, "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities", Journal of
Political Economics, 81, 1973, pp. 637-654.
32 Merton, R. C.,"Theory of Rational Option Pricing", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, Spring
1973, pp. 141-183.
33 Bienstock, D. and J.F. Shapiro, "Optimizing Resource Acquisition Decisions by Stochastic
Programming", Management Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, February 1988, pp. 215-229.
34 Boston Edison presentation at M.I.T. Electric Utility Program Workshop, September 1995.
35 Herbelot, O., Option Valuation of Flexible Investments: The Case of a Scrubber for a Coal
Fired Power Plant, M.I.T. Energy Lab Working Paper MIT-CEEPR 94-001WP, March 1994.
36 Herbelot, O., Option Valuation of Flexible Investments: The Case of a Coal Gasifier, M.I.T.
Energy Lab Working Paper MIT-CEEPR 94-002WP, March 1994.
37 Thomas, J. S., Modular Gas-Cooled Reactor Economics: The Application of Contingent-
Claims Analysis, S.M. Thesis, M.I.T, October 1991.
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upon analyzing a specific utility option, and not upon how the option
interacts with the existing system. This suggests that there may be ways to
improve option analysis by incorporating system simulation modeling for
contingency valuation at nodes of the decision tree which is structured to
reflect the flexible option choices available.
5.3 Dispatchability of Uncontrolled Resources
Some resources like photovoltaic and wind generation are
undispatchable, while other resources may only have limited dispatchability,
like hydropower with limited dam capacity or cogeneration that must supply
both heat and electricity. Because the marginal cost of electricity varies over
time, the value of electricity from an uncontrolled or limited dispatch
resource depends upon its correlation with system load. The value of
resource dispatchability can be measured by varying it through the addition of
both storage capacity and inverter capacity in different amounts. (Inverter
capacity is required to convert NDT generation and DC storage to match the
AC grid's wave form and voltage, and because of storage, inverter capacity can
exceed 100% of NDT generation capacity). This analysis has been done for
both photovoltaic and wind resource generation, and Section 5.3 describes the
characteristics of the technologies chosen, the range of storage and inverter
parameters chosen, the storage optimization algorithm developed and the
marginal cost supply curve methodology used. This section describes the
results of the analysis, describing the value supply curves derived and how
they depend on dispatchability, initial time distribution of the resources, and
energy losses.
The first graph in Figure 5.10 below shows the total value per MWh of
both photovoltaic and wind generation for the year 1995 (in 1995 dollars), as a
function of storage capacity, where storage is expressed as a percentage of the
maximum day's generation for the year. This graph shows separate curves
for different levels of inverter capacity, but for clarity all curves are only
labeled as wind or solar.
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Figure 5.10 - Value per MWh of NDT Generation
as a Function of Storage Capacity
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Several things are clear from this graph. First, without any storage the
average value of energy from wind generation (15.8 $/MWh) is less than that
from solar generation (21.6 $/MWh, based on median year weather data for
the two sites selected . This difference of 5.8 $/MWh is due to the fact that
solar generation is more correlated to system load than wind generation.
Load is greater during the day and NEPOOL is now a summer peaking utility
so that solar generation without storage occurs at hours with higher system
marginal cost. Since these results are per MWh of energy, this is true
regardless of the different capacity factors and losses of the two technologies
which are also very important to their attractiveness.
Second, with adequate storage added the average value of electricity
from both resources is approximately equal to 25 $/MWh. This means that
the value per MWh of adding storage for wind generation is higher
(approximately 9 $/MWh) than for solar generation (approximately 4
$/MWh). The value of wind generation storage also increases more quickly
with storage than for solar, but both reach the same maximum value. This is
because the value of the electricity is based only the NEPOOL marginal cost
supply curve and the time distribution of generation, and with sufficient
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storage both technologies can shift their generation to the most valuable
hours.
Third, the average value of inverter capacity can be greater for PV
generation. The two families of wind and PV curves overlap in Figure 5.10
above, but the lowest wind and solar curves represent inverter capacity that is
25% of generation capacity. Increasing inverter capacity from 25% to 100% can
increase the average value per MWh by about 3.2 $/MWh for PV generation,
compared to 1.9 $/MWh for wind generation. This value comes from the fact
that limited inverter capacity can limit generation at peak load hours where
the marginal cost of electricity is the highest. At 25% inverter capacity, the PV
curve rises and then falls, whereas the wind curve rises monotonically. This
is due to the fact that the average PV value starts out higher (due to the
greater correlation with system load), and the fact that the PV generation
starts low and then increases as shown in Figure 5.15 below.
While Figure 5.10 above shows the average energy value per MWh, it
is also worthwhile looking at the total value of generation and total energy
generated. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 below show the total value of energy
generated separately for the PV and wind plants.
Figure 5.11 - Value of Total 1995 Generation as a Function
of Storage Capacity for a 1000 MWe PV Plant
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Figure 5.12 - Value of Total 1995 Generation as a Function
of Storage Capacity for a 1000 MWe Wind Plant
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These graphs show that given a minimum of inverter capacity, the
maximum value of adding storage capacity is $2.8 million for PV and $6.2
million for wind generation. For both resources it is clear that the marginal
benefit of additional storage capacity falls off rapidly, and after storage capacity
reaches approximately 40% of the peak day's generation there is little benefit
in additional storage. For wind the initial marginal benefit of storage is
greater (the slope is steeper), but this decreases quickly. After 40% storage is
reached storage benefits for wind are basically flat, whereas for PV generation
the total values continues to rise slightly. Table 5.3 below shows the marginal
benefits of storage in absolute dollars and in dollars per MWh of storage
capacity, neglecting the lower cases with inadequate inverter capacity. To
compare these annual benefits of storage with the capital costs of purchasing
storage capacity these annual benefits must be converted to the net present
value of the stream of future savings. Using the same NPV factor as before of
9.43, the NPV benefits are also shown in the table below. Note that this table
gives results in dollars per MWh of storage capacity, which should not be
confused with MWh of NDT generation.
Table 5.3 - Marginal Benefits of Storage for PV and Wind Generation
Storage Increment
From (%) 0 10 20 40 60 80
To (%) 10 20 40 60 80 100
PV (MWh) 556 556 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113
Wind (MWh) 665 665 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330
Marginal Benefit
PV
(95M$) 1.336 0.543 0.707 0.173 0.158 0.096
(95 $/MWh/yr) 2,400 976 635 155 142 87
(95$/MWh) 22,628 9,201 5,990 1,462 1,342 817
Wind
(95M$) 4.505 1.249 0.392 0.058 0.005 0.000
(95 $/MWh/yr) 6,772 1,878 294 44 4 0
(95$/MWh) 63,841 17,707 2,776 410 37 0
Total
0 0
40 100
2,226 5,564
2,661 6,652
Average
2.586 3.013
1,162 542
10,953 5,105
6.209 6.209
2,334 933
21,999 8,799
Note: Marginal benefits are averaged over inverter capacities from 50% to 200%.
These benefits do not depend upon the cost of PV or wind generation,
or upon the cost of storage or inverter capacity. However because the results
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put a value on storage and inverter capacity, it is instructive to look at the
costs of these for the purposes of comparison. The cost of battery storage can
vary widely, depending primarily upon the interrelated factors of battery
lifetime (both in years and cycles) and how deep the average discharge cycle of
the battery is intended to be. For information on the range of battery costs, a
local consulting firm was consulted 38. Battery costs can range from $75 to
over $800 per 100 amp hours at 12 volts, or $62 to $666 per kWh. Cheap
batteries ($100 or less) can last 5 years without problems given a low discharge
cycle, but may only last 1 year with a 20% discharge cycle. Medium price
batteries (usually used for marine applications) cost $130 to $150 and can last
1000 cycles at 20% discharge, 600 cycles at 50% discharge, and 300 cycles at 80%
discharge. The most expensive batteries ($800) can last up to 20 years, but are
generally used for backup power supplies, so they are continuously trickle
charged and rarely cycled. Obviously the tradeoff is between more batteries
for a lower discharge cycle or buying batteries more frequently. From this
limited data, it appears that a medium cost battery at a 50% cycle is most cost
effective, requiring a battery capacity twice the effective storage capacity at a
cost of $250/kWh for 600 cycles. Once the battery life and the salvage value of
the batteries is known, it is then possible to find the net present value of the
original and replacement batteries. Assuming somewhat conservatively that
600 cycles at 50% is equal to 2 years of service, no salvage value, a 7% real
interest rate and a 30 year plant life gives a net present value of $1716/kWh of
effective storage capacity. Without salvage value or economies of scale, this
number is conservatively high, but it gives a crude estimate of the cost of
storage.
For comparison with a more specific utility application, the EPRI TAG
was consulted for data on its reference battery storage designs39. This design
is a 20 MW design sized for one hour of storage. Because of the projected
deep cycle use for load leveling, the heavy duty data were used. This gives a
battery first cost of 128 95$/kW. Assuming a 30 year planning horizon, a daily
discharge cycle (365/yr), and interpolating from EPRI data gives a NPV
replacement battery cost of of approximately 354 95$/kW, for a total of 482
38 Conversation with Mr. Bill Kanzer of Ascension Technologies, Waltham, MA.
39 Electric Power Research Institute, Technology Assessment Guide, 1993, Exhibit 43, p. 8-203
and 8-206.
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95$/kW. The chief difference between these two sources appears to be
economies of scale, which are based on manufacturing capacity rather than
unit size. The EPRI data is based upon production of 500 MWh of storage
capacity (or 25 units) per year.
Because the value of dispatchability was calculated independent of the
storage technology, there are several changes to the storage algorithm that
could be made to optimize storage and more accurately choose and price the
battery requirements. First, in the algorithm written energy losses were fixed,
rather than a function of energy in and out of storage. EPRI estimates storage
losses of approximately 25% for its design, which would require some
alteration of the energy swap criterion, but not the nested search for high and
low hours. Second, some additional statistics could be added to track the
annual distribution of discharge depth for each cycle.
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 above show that the marginal benefits of more
inverter capacity decrease rapidly, but this is clearer if the horizontal axis is
changed. Figures 5.13 and 5.14 below show the 1995 total value of NDT
generation as a function of inverter capacity for PV and wind generation.
Figure 5.13 - Value of Total 1995 Generation as a Function
of Inverter Capacity for a 1000 MWe PV Plant
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Figure 5.14 - Value of Total 1995 Generation as a Function
of Inverter Capacity for a 1000 MWe Wind Plant
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From these two graphs it is apparent that there is no significant benefit
to increased inverter capacity above 50% of generation capacity, except for the
PV case with 0% storage where there is a slight marginal benefit up to 75%
inverter capacity. Second, the marginal value of inverter capacity from 25%
to 50% is approximately the same for all levels of storage capacity above 10%
for both wind and PV, (averaging $2.45 million for PV and $1.27 million for
wind respectively). For both PV and wind the gross generation capacity is
1000 MW, but on-site generation losses were subtracted out before calculating
inverter capacity. This means that 100% of inverter capacity is 909 MW for
PV and 870 MW for wind, and the marginal benefit per MW from 25% to 50%
is 2.70 $/kW for PV and 1.46 $/kW for wind. Inverter capacity lasts longer
than battery storage capacity, and using the NPV factor of 9.43 for the assumed
30 year life means that present value marginal benefit per MW of inverter
capacity is 25.41 $/kW for PV and 13.79 $/kW for wind. Table 5.4 below shows
the absolute and marginal values of inverter capacity from 25% to 50% as a
function of the storage capacity. Once a storage capacity of 40% has been
reached, the marginal benefits of inverter capacity level out, so this table also
shows the average of the columns for 40% through 100%.
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Table 5.4 - Marginal Benefit of Inverter Capacity from 25% to 50%
Storage Capacity Average
0% 10% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 40% -100%
PV (25% to 50%)
(95M$) 5.582 4.272 3.031 2.207 2.278 2.347 2.385 2.304
(95 $/kW/yr) 24.6 18.8 13.3 9.7 10.0 10.3 10.5 10.1
(95$/kW) 231.6 177.2 125.8 91.6 94.5 97.4 99.0 95.6
Wind (25% to 50%)
(95M$) 0.543 0.976 1.126 1.261 1.321 1.327 1.327 1.309
(95 $/kW/yr) 2.5 4.5 5.2 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0
(95$/kW) 23.5 42.3 48.8 54.6 57.3 57.5 57.5 56.7
For comparison, the cost of inverter capacity was also surveyed using
the same two sources as for storage costs. Without the economies of scale,
inverter capacity is approximately $750 to $1000/kW, including conversion
from DC to AC and power conditioning4 0. The EPRI data does not give
inverter cost separately, but it should make up almost all of the plant's
balance of cost after battery costs, which is 350 95$/kW4 1. As with batteries,
economies of scale for inverter capacity depend upon manufacturing capacity
and not installed unit size, and the EPRI cost is based upon a production of
2000 MW per year. From these costs, it appears that the largest marginal
benefit of inverter capacity is only about two thirds the cost of inverter
capacity. However, this is too simple, since the value of NDT generation
without any inverter capacity is zero, because PV generation is DC and even if
wind generation is AC it must be matched to system voltage and frequency.
Even without storage capacity the inverter capacity does not have to equal the
peak generation capacity, but without storage there is more incentive to keep
inverter capacity high because any generation above inverter capacity must be
dumped, and this is very expensive. From this perspective it is clear that the
addition of storage capacity can reduce the need for inverter capacity by up to
60% from the original generation capacity with out any significant costs, and
by even more with relatively minor costs. This represents a credit which can
be added to the benefits of storage given above.
40 Conversation with Mr. Bill Kanzer of Ascension Technologies, Waltham, MA.
41
..Electric Power Research Institute, Technology Assessment Guide, 1993, Exhibit 43, p. 8-203
and 8-206.
147
Originally it was thought that there might be some benefit of inverter
capacity greater than 100% of generation capacity to get more benefit during
peak load hours. However it seems clear from the results that peak
generation from the inverter is more limited by the amount of generation
available in preceding hours than by inverter or storage capacity. The initial
range of parameter variation for inverter capacity was from 50% to 200% (half
and double the base value of 100%), but review of these preliminary results
led to the addition of cases at the 25% level. The present results amply
illustrate and quantify this component value, but for application to a real
NDT site it is clear that sizing optimum inverter capacity would improve
with more data points between 0% and 50% .
As mentioned above the real reason that value for cases with both low
storage and inverter capacity falls off so dramatically is that not all generation
from the resource can be delivered to the system. If there is a period with
plenty of generation during several cheap hours (i.e. low system load), then
the storage capacity will be full. Excess generation above the inverter capacity
will then have to be dumped and the total benefit will fall. Figures 5.15 and
5.16 below confirm this by showing the total annual PV and wind generation
delivered to the system load
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Figure 5.15 - Total 1995 Generation as a Function
of Storage Capacity for a 1000 MWe PV Plant
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Figure 5.16 - Total 1995 Generation as a Function
of Storage Capacity for a 1000 MWe Wind Plant
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The first difference between these two graphs is that for PV sufficient
storage capacity will eventually produce maximum energy to the system.
Even with only 25% inverter capacity, 60% storage will allow the full 750
GWh to the grid. For the wind case, 25% inverter capacity limits output to
691 GWh, or 0.6% less than the full amount of 695 GWh, even with 100%
storage. Second, at 25% inverter capacity level storage has a more rapid
impact on energy production for wind than for PV, reaching the maximum
level at 20% v. 60% of full storage.
The value supply curves for the benefits of storage and inverter
capacity discussed above are independent of the technology used (although
the default storage technology is assumed to be batteries). The supply cost
curves for storage and inverter capacity are basically linear, although there
may be some economies of scale. By using both the supply cost and benefit
curves, the optimum amount of storage and inverter capacity can be found.
Although this section has presented results based on the amount of
storage and inverter capacity, it is important to remember that the emphasis
is still on the value of how dispatchable a resource is and that storage and
inverter capacity is just a way of variable way of providing and measuring the
value of dispatchability. The value of stand-alone storage which is charged
directly by the system grid instead of by an NDT resource will be even higher
than the results presented here because of the reduced constraints on the time
and amount of energy available for charging. On the other hand, storage
added to NDT resources may have other benefits including power quality and
reliability improvements, savings of T&D capital costs, and reduced T&D
energy losses, depending upon where the installation is sited. These
secondary benefits have been discussed elsewhere in this thesis and are not
quantified here, but since some of them are correlated with peak load (i.e.
reliability and need for T&D capacity), these component values may be
synergistic with the value of storage for dispatchability.
Inverter generation can also be increased effectively instantaneously, so
NDT storage may form part of the synchronous spinning reserve
requirement. This is possible only when there is stored energy available and
inverter generation is below maximum capacity, so it is more likely to
happen at below peak hours. Spinning reserve is rarely needed for
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emergencies so it would not affect the storage optimization algorithm. The
marginal cost of the spinning reserve will be worth less than at peak hours,
and this benefit should not be valued at the overall average rate quantified in
the next section below, but it does form an additional benefit of storage
distinct from the value of dispatchability.
5.4 Spinning Reserve
Spinning reserve is necessary for load following and in the event of
forced generation or transmission outages. As described in Chapter 4, the
NEPOOL Operating Procedure No. 8 (OP-8) states that the operating reserve
requirement is that capacity equal to 100% of the largest contingency loss
(generally the largest unit in service) should be synchronous reserve available
in 10 minutes, and an additional 50% of the second largest contingency loss
should be asynchronous reserve available in 30 minutes. The Polaris model
combines these two reserve categories since it is an hourly model for a single
standard of 150%. This section describes the results of varying this standard
for the NEPOOL region. Figure 5.17 below shows the relationship between
spinning reserve level and NEPOOL 1995 system operating costs.
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Figure 5.17 - Changes in NEPOOL Total Dispatch Cost
as a Function of Spinning Reserve (%)
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As can be seen in this figure, there can be some significant benefits
achieved by operating below the 150% level specified by NEPOOL Operating
Procedure No. 8. However, as explained in Chapter 4, the NEPOOL system
routinely operates at a spinning reserve of approximately 50% based on the
level set by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC). This
reduction from 150% to 50% reserve margin has an annual savings of $19.81
million. As shown, the bottom end of this curve is fairly flat, so further
reductions in spinning reserve below 50% do not increase savings
significantly. Given the current operating point for spinning reserve, this
figure does not so much show the benefits of further reductions, but rather
the benefit of the reductions already in place (or equivalently, the cost of any
increases in spinning reserve). Spinning reserve is based on the size of the
largest unit in operation, and it is unlikely that any new plants or non-
dispatchable resources built will be larger than the current nuclear baseload
units. If such a unit were built, or if two units (e.g. two 1000 MWe nuclear
units) were to have any credible common failure modes through shared
facilities then the increased level of spinning reserve (in MW) would be an
additional cost which such a plant would bear. Otherwise, any cost increase
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will only be incurred if some new utility option increases the spinning
reserve standard required above the current level of 50%.
The other primary point of interest in this figure is the step function
superimposed on the gradual increase from 100 to 110% . This step function
was unexpected but appears reasonable, since as the spinning reserve level
increases the plants which are required to provide it not only use more fuel,
but at some point the mix of plants used shifts to include a different mix of
fuels. The Polaris model used to model spinning reserve divides its total
variable operating costs (fuel and variable O&M) between those for units
which are considered to be energy limited and those for units which can be
dispatched at will. Figure 5.18 below shows the total variable operating for
the NEPOOL system split into these energy limited and dispatchable
components. For the purposes of the Polaris model, nuclear plants are
considered to be energy limited, along with hydro, some NUGs, and some
power purchases, so this line basically represents base load capacity, while the
demand unit line represents intermediate and peaking units.
Figure 5.18 - NEPOOL Demand and Energy Limited
Unit Costs as a Function of Spinning Reserve (%)
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As expected, almost all the spinning reserve related increase is reflected
in the dispatch related operating costs, including the step function, while the
energy limited units show only a slight, flat cost increase. To investigate this
story further, Figure 5.19 below splits the costs for dispatchable units by fuel
type, and shows the changes in fuel consumption costs as spinning reserve
increases. The fuel categories shown are those present in the NEPOOL Polaris
database, and includes two categories for non-utility generators.
Figure 5.19 - Changes in NEPOOL Fuel Costs
as a Function of Spinning Reserve (%)
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Based on this figure it can be seen that as the spinning reserve level
increases, the sudden step function cost increase is primarily the effect of
increased consumption of number six fuel oil. A slight increase in distillate
use at this point is offset by a slight decrease in coal use.
Although the graphs above have show changes in costs as a function of
the percent spinning reserve for the NEPOOL system, these costs are of course
more directly linked to the absolute amount of spinning reserve in MW
required by the percentage standard. Figure 5.20 below restates both axes, and
shows the relative change in costs as a function of the absolute amount of
spinning reserve. This graph is based upon the size of the single largest unit
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in the NEPOOL system, which is the 1253 MW Millstone Number 3 nuclear
unit. This graph is also much more useful for comparison with other
systems, since their largest single units will be of different sizes.
Figure 5.20 - Changes in NEPOOL Dispatch Costs
as a Function of Spinning Reserve (MW)
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For comparison with the other component values calculated, the
difference in total system costs between the levels of 50% and 150% of $19.81
million was divided by 100% times the 1253 MW for Millstone Number 3, to
give an annual spinning reserve value of 15.81 $/kW. The uncertainty in
this result is low, since it is based only on historic unit data used for the
modeling year of 1995. Multiplying by the previously assumed 30 year
present worth factor of 9.427 used in the other sections gives a NPV value of
149.0 $/kW. This value for spinning reserve is approximately a third of one
estimate current in the industry which is approximately $4/kW/month42 .
Although this number is not based on concrete calculations, it does make
some sense that the average value of spinning reserve to the system as a
whole will be smaller than the value of spinning reserve to specific
generating units which supply it. For either system or unit values of
42 Ongoing conversations with Dr. Richard Tabors.
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spinning reserve, the method in which the costs or benefits will be divided
under a competitive marketplace remains to be determined.
Spinning reserve is one of a number of ancillary services which are
necessary to secure system operation. In response to its proposed ruling on
open access to power transmission, FERC received different numbers and
classifications of ancillary services from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (7),
NERC (12), Houston Light & Power (20), and the New York Power Pool (38).
As noted by ORNL, spinning reserve was worth unbundling because there is
a low cost and a high benefit for doing so 43 . FERC's Order 888 dated April 24,
1996 settled on 6 classes of required ancillary services, one of which was
spinning reserve, and left open the possibility for other non-required services.
The FERC order rules that the transmission provider must offer to provide
spinning reserve service only to those transmission customers in its control
area, and that transmission customers must pay for this service, but may
acquire it from the transmission provider, a third party, or through self
supply. Under one form of further deregulation, an independent system
operator (ISO) would purchase spinning reserve services from independent
generators and interruptible customers. Given a competitive market, the cost
paid for different levels of spinning reserve by the ISO should approximate
the cost curve shown in this section.
5.5 Dispatchability for Thermal Units
Whereas the previous section focused upon the value of
dispatchability for uncontrolled resources, this section focuses upon the value
of controllable generation units. Even though these units can be turned on
and off on command, this dispatchability is still constrained by the physical
and economic constraints discussed in Chapter 3. This section presents the
results for changing the dispatch constraints on five individual, generic,
thermal generating units. These units span a range of dispatch cost, fuel and
technologies. Unit 1 is a coal-fired base load unit, units 2 and 3 are
intermediate oil-fired units, unit 4 is gas-fired combined cycle unit, and unit 5
43 Hirst, E. and Kirby, B., Electric-Power Ancillary Services, p. 2, ORNL/CON-426, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, February 1996.
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As described in Chapter 4, the run time constraint is the number of hours
advance notice required until a unit can be started. The down time constraint is
the number of hours after a unit is shut down before it can be started up again.
It was originally expected that changing dispatch constraints would be of
little value for baseload units which rarely cycle on and off, that it would be of
little value for peaking units that are already very dispatchable, and that it could
be of significant value for intermediate plants in the loading order. Figure 5.21
below confirms this and shows the range of changes in total system cost due to
changes in both minimum run times and minimum down times plotted against
the variable dispatch cost of the five generic test units modeled. Individual
component value supply curves are not shown because they overlap. These
curves are shown separately in following figures. Note that the results have
been normalized by unit size so that units for the vertical axis are in units of
$/kW.
Figure 5.21 - Change in Total Annual Dispatch Cost as a
Function of Unit Variable Cost, Units 1-5
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This graph confirms the original expectation that the effects of changing
dispatch characteristics for an intermediate load unit can have significant effects.
The variations in total costs shown are in comparison with the base values for
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significant effects. The variations in total costs shown are in comparison with
the base values for each units minimum down time and run time
parameters, as given in Chapter 4. The cost variations may be negative as the
constraints are relaxed and positive as they are tightened. As can be seen,
system and unit costs varied over the range of parameters modeled by as
much as approximately $8/kW for generic unit number 2, $2/kW for unit
number 4 and 1$/kW for unit number 3. The variation for the baseload unit
1 and the peaking unit 5 were approximately zero. The range of variation is
considerably larger for unit costs than for overall system costs, as shown
below in Figure 5.22 through 5.26.
Even the largest cost variation due to changes made in the dispatch
constraints is small compared to total 1995 dispatch costs, approximately $0.66
million difference in system costs and $4.66 million in individual unit costs
compared to total system variable dispatch costs on the order of $2.079 billion.
This is because the variation is a change in operation for a single plant out of
several hundred, and the largest generic unit was approximately 600 MW out
of a total system capacity of 26 GW. The results of changing constraints on a
single unit cannot be isolated and seen in real life because they would be
obscured by random noise and the impossibility of repeating an entire year
exactly except for different constraint levels. The ability of the Polaris model
to repeat a year's dispatch exactly except for changes due to a single units
dispatch constraints allows the results to be isolated and observed.
As figure 5.21 shows, the variable cost for unit 4 lies between units 2
and 3, instead of between units 3 and 5 as originally intended. The generating
units which were removed from the system and replaced by the generic units
were originally chosen based on variable cost data from the AGREA EGEAS
database. The unit that was modified in size to create unit 4 had burned oil in
the EGEAS database and burned natural gas in the NEPOOL Polaris database,
which accounts for its change in dispatch cost. This difference between the
databases gave results for unit 4 which were larger and in a position where
more definition was desirable, so no additional runs were performed for a
unit with the original dispatch cost of unit 4. Additional results would have
been most preferred between units 1 and 2, with a variable cost of
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approximately 20 mills/kWh, but the number of runs which could be
performed at NEES were limited.
Figure 5.21 above gives the range of variation in system and unit costs
for each of the five units, but does not show the relative size of system v. unit
costs or their dependence upon the hourly variation in the minimum down
time and minimum run time dispatch constraints. Figures 5.22 through 5.26
below show these results for the individual generic units 1 through 5, and are
each followed by discussion of their individual results.
Figure 5.22 - Change in Dispatch Cost as a Function
of Dispatch Constraints, Unit 1
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For this generic baseload coal fired unit, the base parameters were 12
hours minimum run time and 36 hours minimum down time (points A and
B). Varying the minimum run time from 4 hours to 24 hours had no effect
on either the total unit or system costs, and the system cost line with the
square symbol overlaps the unit cost line with the round symbol which
cannot be seen.. Since baseload units rarely shut down, their usual run times
obviously exceed even the largest minimum values tried.
159
The minimum down time was varied from 6 hours to 48 hours. The
single 12 hour increase over the base value had no impact on either unit or
system cost, because there are few if any times when it would be desirable to
shut down a base load unit and then be limited by the minimum down time.
Reducing minimum down time had a benefit of approximately 0.3 $/kW
which appears first for the unit cost at the 24 hour level and then for the
system cost at the 6 hour level. The impact on system cost is slightly larger
than the impact on unit cost, which is counter to intuition and results for the
other units. Normally relaxing the dispatch constraints used will reduce the
units run time, and this is picked up by a cheaper unit so that system cost
drops less than unit cost. In this case it appears reducing the down time
allows unit 1 to be shut off and some other unit is dispatched which has a
higher cost. As noted in Chapter 4, the Polaris model makes an initial
dispatch, refines it for feasibility only by allowing units to run longer, and
then optimizes by only by keeping a unit running when this is cheaper than
incurring startup costs. This limited optimization means that some
seemingly contradictory results may appear, especially when the scale of the
results is relatively small, as is the case for units 1 and 5 where the results are
small in comparison with units 2, 3 and 4.
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Figure 5.23 - Change in Dispatch Cost as a Function
of Dispatch Constraints, Unit 2
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For this large, intermediate load, oil fired unit the impacts of varying
the dispatch constraints were the largest of all the generic units modeled. The
results were also more consistent than for the other units where the results
were smaller. The base parameter levels were 6 hours for minimum run
time and 12 hours for minimum down time (points A and B). Relaxing these
base constraints decreased unit and system costs and tightening them
increased costs, although the effect of the run time constraint on system cost
was the lowest impact. The maximum impact was caused by the downtime
constraint, with benefits below the base value of 4.14 and 0.61 $/kW for the
unit and system costs respectively. Most of the benefit was obtained by
reducing the minimum down time from 12 to 8 hours, with a smaller
marginal reduction to 4 hours. Increasing the minimum downtime
constraint to 24 hours raised the unit and system costs by 3.64 and .489 $/kW
respectively in a more linear fashion.
Figure 5.24 - Change in Dispatch Cost as a Function
of Dispatch Constraints, Unit 3
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This figure shows the results for generic unit three, which is a large,
high intermediate load plant burning number 6 oil. This unit had the third
highest impacts, and minimum run and down times of 6 and 12 hours
respectively (points A and B). Reducing minimum down time on this unit
had a greater impact than reducing minimum run time, with a total
variation of 0.8 and 0.2 $/kW respectively over the range of 4 to 24 hours. In
this case, the costs for both constraints increase more (and more steeply) as the
minimum times increase than they decrease as the minimum times drop.
For the minimum down times, both system and unit costs decreased from 12
hours to 8 hours, but increased again slightly from 8 to 4 hours. This follows
minimum at 8 hours in the number of hours run for the year by this unit
shown in Figure 5.25 below, so there appears to be an non-optimal interaction
between startup costs and run costs in Polaris.
Figure 5.25 - Change in Dispatch Cost as a Function
of Dispatch Constraints, Unit 4
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Generic unit 4 is a mid-range intermediate load combined cycle plant
that had the second largest overall variation of costs over the range of
dispatch constraints. As mentioned above, this unit had a lower actual
dispatch cost than originally thought, which was due to a fuel switch from oil
in the EGEAS database to natural gas in the Polaris database. However the
range of minimum run and down times considered were both still
considered appropriate regardless of the fuel used. Both run and down time
constraints varied over a range of 1 to 8 hours with a base value of 4 hours
(point A). For this plant the costs of tightening the constraints were again
higher than the benefits of reducing them. The run time constraint had the
greater impact, with a total variation of 2.41 and 0.18 $/kW for unit and
system costs over the range modeled. The variation in system cost over the
range of down times modeled was essentially zero.
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Figure 5.26 - Change in Dispatch Cost as a
Function of Dispatch Constraints, Unit 5
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This generic unit was a oil distillate fueled peaking unit with
combustion turbine technology. The base minimum run and down times
were 0 and 1 hours respectively (points A and B). Because peaking units are
very dispatchable it makes sense that reducing them has no benefit, and that
costs can only increase as minimum run and down times increase. As with
the base load unit, the overall cost variation was very small (0.16 and 0.10
$/kW for unit and system costs), and some unevenness in the graphs was
attributed to error.
Another way of looking at the impacts of dispatch constraints is by
observing their effects on unit starts per year and unit hours of operation.
These results can be significant for calculating the costs and benefits of unit
operation which do not depend upon unit dispatch and its interaction with
the rest of the system. There are some fixed costs which are incurred at each
startup and other variable costs which depend upon the number of hours of
operation. The total of these for the year should be compared against the
benefit of the increased generation. Also, startup emissions are greater than
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steady state emissions (as with a car or lawn mower), and these increased
emissions have a value which can be set against the component value of
dispatch constraints due to higher generation. All this information together
should enable plant operators to more rationally optimize the way in which
each unit is dispatched.
Figures 5.27 and 5.28 below show these results for startups per year and
hours of run-time per year. The range of the results obscures some details in
Figures 5.25a and 5.26a, and their scales have been expanded in Figures 5.25b
and 5.26b so that the results for some units can be seen in more detail.
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Figure 5.27a - Unit Starts as a Function of Dispatch Constraints
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Figure 5.27b - Unit Starts as a Function of Dispatch Constraints
Runtime
-- [-- R1
...-0-- .... R2
--- t--- R3
--- ~g--- R4
------- R5
Downtime
......... .. D 1
---- D54
-D5
0 6 12 18 24
Minimum Runtime & Downtime (Hrs)
166
\
Unit 2
Unit 3 ----
- ------- Unit 5
III I
Figure 5.28a - Unit Operation as a Function of Dispatch Constraints
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Figure 5.28b - Unit Operation as a Function of Dispatch Constraints
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These figures show the results in complementary ways. As expected,
the number of hours of operation are in the reverse unit order from the
dispatch costs, with the baseload unit having the most hours of operation and
the peaking unit having the least. The unit order by number of starts is less
obvious. The baseload unit 1 has very few starts, but unit 2 has the highest
number and the annual number drops as the dispatch cost rises until the
peaking unit has even fewer than the baseload. This makes sense, since units
above base load cycle less frequently according to the number of which days
reach a peak load requiring them. On both graphs the effect of minimum run
time and especially minimum down time is most striking for unit 2, whereas
these constraints have less effect for all the other units. Overall, there seems
to be a significant correlation between the range of costs shown in Figure 5.21
as a function of the dispatch cost and the annual number of starts shown in
Figure 5.27, which makes sense since both cost and startups depend upon the
how the unit's position in the dispatch order interacts with the unit's
dispatch constraints.
To summarize the results of this section it is possible to draw several
general conclusions.
* The results found in this section are the first time that the unit and
system effects of existing unit dispatch constraints have been
quantified, and may be important for setting the optimum level of
dispatch constraints whether in the existing or future competitive
market. Under competition, generators and an independent system
operator may use this information to set a price on how quickly
generating units can respond to dispatch requests.
* The results in this section are not large but are still significant. The
maximum 30 year NPV decrease in unit cost was approximately 39
1995$/kW. This is considerably smaller than other component values
quantified and discussed in this chapter, but the different sources of
value found are not necessarily competitive, and these results may be
large enough to affect dispatch for some units.
* Results are highest for large, low intermediate load plants. Based on
the marginal cost curve for the NEPOOL system and Figure 5.21, the
largest results lie in a variable cost range that roughly corresponds to
oil-fired units, from 20 to 35 mills/kWh.
* Results are larger for larger units. The cost/kW results presented
above are more general, but they obscure the obvious fact that relaxing
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constraints on the largest units is most valuable. Unit 2 has an
approximate capacity of 600 MW, so varying the minimum down time
over the range considered had a total impact of about 4.66 million
1995$ per year on total unit cost.
* The relative effects of the two constraints shift as the overall
responsiveness of the unit changes. Minimum down time has a
greater impact on results for units 1, 2, and 3, while minimum run
time has a greater impact on units 4 and 5.
* System cost reductions do not go up proportionately with unit cost
reductions. The gap between these cost effects is largest for unit 2
which had the largest overall results
* Although the range of results is due to the exogenously chosen range
of variation chosen for the two constraints, the results with this range
are based on historic system data which is relatively certain. The
largest source of uncertainty for this component value was judged to be
possible inaccuracies in the Polaris model. It was mentioned in
Chapter 4 that the dispatch optimization method used by Polaris is a
relatively simple one. If a more sophisticated dispatch algorithm were
to be used, the results presented above should represent minimum
amounts that could be achieved.
The results presented above have been given in $/kW for the single
year modeled. In order to include the benefits of dispatchability in the
evaluation of a new utility plant, the present value of these benefits over the
life of the plant can be calculated by the same present worth factor used for the
other results. If unit 2 was new and had an expected life of 30 years, the range
of dispatch constraints modeled can have a total net worth of approximately
$73 for the plant and $10 for the system as a whole.
It should be remembered that under deregulation the value of dispatch
constraints depends upon ones point of view. Increased total unit cost
indicates increased unit generation and revenue for the owner, so that there
is an incentive for an independent generator to decrease the dispatch
constraints. For the overall system the savings per unit are much smaller,
but the incentive offered to relax dispatch constraints can be offered to many
plants. This points out several uses for the results of this section.
First, present utility planners and plant operators can compare the
value supply curve for the two dispatch constraints modeled here
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against the current operational, economic, and environmental factors
which are currently used to set these constraints. The value of these
dispatch constraints has never been calculated before, so plants have
been dispatched and operated on the basis of how the unit should
operate relative to other generators, and of how faster or more frequent
operation would increase maintenance costs and emissions. With this
new information, generators will have more economic data to
optimize dispatch constraint levels.
* Second , under vertical utility dis-integration, a network dispatcher or
coordinator will want the units to set their dispatch constraints based
on their system value rather than their unit value. The independent
system operator needs to send price signals to the generator based on
these constraints so that individual plant operators do not maximize
their own operation in a way that is uneconomical from the system's
point of view.
* Third, this study has obtained results for individual generating units.
For intermediate load plants where this component value exists the
benefits should be cumulative as more than one unit change their
operation. It will take more study beyond the scope of this thesis to
determine whether these benefits are linearly additive or whether and
how much their benefit per kW diminishes as more units claim this
component value.
5.6 Comparison of Relative Scale for Component Values Modeled
The results discussed in the preceding sections have been presented
both as the annual value for 1995 and as the net present value of 30 years of
future benefits. This section compares the relative scale of the five sample
component values analyzed, as shown below in Table 5.5. This table shows
mostly benefits per kW averaged over the ranges described in parentheses.
The three exceptions are that the value of reducing reserve margin through
nuclear unit elimination is negative (a net cost), the value of storage for NDT
generation is given in terms of $/MWh, and the value of thermal unit
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constraints is given as the maximum range of impact across the units and
parameters modeled.
Table 5.5 - Relative Scale of Component Values Modeled
Reserve Margin
Proportional Reduction
(Average for 30% to 5% RM reduction)
Nuclear Reduction
(Average for 7 LWR reduction)
Unit Size
(Average for 8x size reduction, 1360->170 MW)
NDT Dispatchability
Storage Capacity, PV
Storage Capacity, Wind
(Average over 100% storage capacity,
and inverter capacity from 50->200%)
Inverter Capacity, PV
Inverter Capacity, Wind
(25->50% inverter capacity, average over
storage capacity from 40->100%)
Spinning Reserve
(Average from 50% to 150% SR)
Thermal Dispatch Constraints
System Cost
Unit Cost
(Over range for low intermediate load unit)
1995
($/kW/yr)
96.6
-42.5
($/kW/yr)
38.35
($/MWh/yr)
542
933
($/kW/yr)
10.14
6.02
($/kW/yr)
15.81
($/kW/yr)
1.10
7.78
30 Yr. NPV
($/kW)
911
-401
($/kW)
362
($/MWh)
5109
8795
($/kW)
95.6
56.8
($/kW)
149
($/kW)
10.4
73.3
In general, the size of the benefits above depend upon the range of
parameters that were varied for each section. The component values for
reserve margin (fractional reduction), unit size, and spinning reserve were
roughly uniform over the range of variables studied, so that the marginal
values per kW were approximately equal to the average over the entire range.
For the value of NDT dispatchability, the marginal values of storage and
inverter capacity were initially very high and then decreased. Since the
optimization of NDT dispatch depends upon the interaction of both storage
and inverter capacity, the marginal value for a single variable can be
misleading. In this case, the averages shown above were taken where they
were significant along one axis and relatively consistent along the other.
Finally, the thermal dispatch constraint was most dependent not only upon
the range of parameters chosen (minimum run and down times), but also
upon the marginal cost of the generation unit studied.
5.7 Sample Application of Component Values to Specific Utility Options
In order to tie together the theory of Chapters 2 and 3, and the analysis
and results of Chapters 4 and 5, it may be useful to consider the example of
three different utility options. The first option is an MHTGR, considered for
use in low intermediate load service, the second option is solar PV generation
with storage, and the third is a DSM dispatch option based on an air
liquefaction plant. Each of these examples is reviewed for the range of
component values which it can supply, and each of these component values
is discussed, including whether it is generic or specific and whether it has
been quantified in this thesis.
MHTGR - Like other nuclear reactors, the MHTGR has a high capital
cost (1800 94$/kW for 4 units) and a low variable dispatch cost (11 94$/MWh)
which require a high capacity factor for it to be competitive. The MHTGR has
a higher variable cost than PWRs and the ALWR (10.3 v. 5 to 6 94$/MWh),
but its capacity factor is high enough (approximately 90% availability) to be
competitive with conventional coal power plants in some design studies and
using certain fuel price forecasts 44 . This thesis has addressed how the
advantage of smaller size could make the MHTGR more competitive with
the ALWR. The question is, are there more component values which the
MHTGR can claim which would help to make the MHTGR competitive with
other base or intermediate load technologies? For the sake of comparison, a
range of available base load coal-fired technologies were reviewed using the
EPRI Technology Assessment Guide. These units ranged in size from 200 to
500 MW with capital costs of approximately 1340 to to 2120 94 $/kW. An
44 ABB/Combustion Engineering, Inc., Bechtel National, Inc., Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates,
General Atomics, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.,
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Commercialization and Generation Cost
Estimates, DOE-HTGR-90365, issued by Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates, September 1993..
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advanced pulverized coal (APC) design was chosen with a size of 300 MW
and capital costs of 1746 94$/kW with AFUDC for comparison. Review of the
MHTGR indicates that the following seven component values may apply.
1) Size - The value of reducing unit size is related to the amount of size
reduction possible and the capital intensivity of the technology. The
cost of four 170 MW MHTGRs built at once is 1800 94$/kW overnight.
By interpolating from the results presented in Figure 5.8 it can be seen
that reducing the effective size of an MHTGR plant from 680 MW to
the 300 MW of an APC unit would reduce the NPV system cost by 136.8
million 95$, or 201.2 95$/kW. Since the results from the EGEAS model
include interest during construction, this value can be subtracted from
the MHTGR cost of 2068 94$/kW which includes AFUDC. This means
that approximately 60% of the MHTGR's cost premium over the APC
can be cut by building it in 'units' of 300 MW rather than 680 MW at a
time..
2) Reserve Margin - Reserve margin is necessary to allow for planned
maintenance and unplanned forced outages. Units that have a high
availability have less need for reserve margin. The MHTGR has an
availability of 89% compared to 84% for the APC, which means that for
a unit size of 300 MW, the APC will require on average 15 MW more
reserve capacity. From Section 5.1 above, the net present value of
reducing reserve margin while maintaining similar system
composition is 911 $/kW, so the MHTGR will deserve a comparative
credit of 13.67 million 95$, or a net reduction of 45.6 95$/kW.
3) Spinning Reserve - The MHTGR has a very fast response time for
power changes so it can be used for spinning reserve, but unless there
is sufficient baseload capacity that the unit is used for intermediate load
it will never be available for spinning reserve. Therefore, although
this component value is theoretically available, for the present case it
remains zero.
4) Dispatchability - The fast response time of the MHTGR means that it
does not have the same dispatch constraints as a coal fired unit.
However the results from Section 5.5 above show that unless there is
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sufficient excess capacity that the MHTGR is used for intermediate load,
this dispatchability will not have any value.
5) Fuel Risk - The cost of nuclear fuel is a small fraction of overall
MHTGR costs, so this technology has a relatively low fuel risk. This
relative advantage is best analyzed by applying an appropriate risk
premium to each fuel. This financial risk component value has not
been analyzed in this thesis, but as discussed Chapter 3 there are several
possible analytic tools for evaluating this risk.
6) Capital Cost Risk - The MHTGR is not a new nuclear technology, but
the direct Rankine cycle design discussed in this thesis is new. Even
with demonstrated inherent safety during a loss of coolant accident,
public attitudes about nuclear reactors will likely lead to opposition
that may exacerbate the cost risk of a capital intensive new technology.
Modularity, short lead times, and standardized design will reduce this
risk, so that the capital cost risks of existing PWRs will not be directly
comparable. This risk has not been quantified in this thesis, but would
deserve considerable attention.
7) Environmental Emissions - Although spent fuel is an environmental
concern, the cost of its disposal will be covered by the current
generation surcharge and any costs of environmental externalities are
so uncertain and so far in the future that their discounted present
value is hard to determine. However, the MHTGR does have an
advantage in its lack of emissions and solid waste from scrubbers. This
comparative advantage is best analyzed by charging each competing
technology for the cost of its emissions, rather than giving the MHTGR
a credit. The most defensible cost for such emissions appears to be the
marginal cost for the most efficient strategy that will reduce total
system emissions to their mandated levels.
All the component values listed above are generic, rather than specific
to any particular network location. This thesis has demonstrated methods for
calculating component values 1 through 4 listed above, which together give a
total NPV benefit of 247 95$/kW, compared to the capital cost difference
between the MHTGR and APC of 322 94$/kW. The MHTGR already has a
174
higher capacity factor and lower fuel cost than the APC, so the additional
component values should make the MHTGR much more competitive on a
levelized cost basis. The fuel risk and environmental benefit component
values further favor the MHTGR over the APC, but technological uncertainty
and political opposition may be determining unless demonstration unit(s)
and NRC design approval reduce the capital cost risk.
Solar PV - As a distributed, non-dispatchable energy resource, solar
photovoltaic generation can claim a different set of component values. These
include the following
1) Dispatchability - The addition of storage and inverter capacity can
make solar and wind generation effectively dispatchable and gain a
component value credit based on shifting generation to more valuable
hours with higher spot prices. To show the use of the value supply
curves shown in Figure 5.11, assume that PV generation is built using
storage equal to 30% of the annual peak day's generation and inverter
capacity equal to 50% PV capacity after losses. Choosing the 50%
inverter capacity curve and interpolating along the storage capacity
curve shows that the annual value of PV generation with and without
storage is 19.1 and 22.2 million 95$ per year respectively for 1000 MW of
PV capacity, indicating net annual and net present component values
of 2.1 $/kW and 19.8/kW respectively. Note that these values are per
kW of overall PV capacity, and differes from the results presented
above which were based on storage and inverter capacity.
2) Generic T&D Credits - Distributed generation will avoid thermal
transmission losses and some distribution losses, based on the exact
siting. Thermal losses are higher at peak hours, so by shifting
distributed generation to these hours the avoided losses are slightly
higher (approximately 10%) than average thermal T&D losses . These
avoided losses can be used reduce the size of an equivalent distributed
generation option by 10%, or to give it a cost credit of 11%. In addition,
distributed generation will avoid the average NPV cost for new T&D
capacity, which is estimated to be 857 $/kW per kW of existing
generation. This large average value will only be available if PV
generation is widely distributed across the network below the
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distribution level and in large enough quantities that significant
amounts of new T&D construction is avoided, but nevertheless it
illustrates the large benefit which may be available.
3) SpecificT&D Credits - In addition to the average T&D benefits just
described, distributed generation in specific locations may have specific
aT&D component value based on reduced maintenance, replacement,
and new T&D capacity requirements. This value will require site
specific study and may make the total T&D credit either higher or
lower than the average value of 857 $/kW given in 2) above.
4) Reliability - The addition of storage capacity to distributed generation
produces a reliability benefit by reducing stress on the network and
providing local power if transmission or distribution lines fail. The
value of this incremental reliability depends upon both network
location and customer needs, and thus requires specific evaluation.
5) Fuel Risk - Because solar generation requires no fuel, it will receive a
relative advantage when a risk premium based on the price volatility
of other fuel is added to other generation options.
6) Capital Cost Risk - Although the capital costs of PV generation are
high, the capital risk is not. This is based on small unit size and short
lead times which produce flexible capacity additions for following load
growth, and the low risk of cost overruns based on technical problems
or safety concerns. If capital cost risks are applied uniformly to
competing utility options, solar generation will gain a relative
advantage from this component value.
7) Environmental Emissions - PV generation has clear environmental
advantages with no emissions, and only possible fabrication impacts
and recycling inefficiencies if battery storage is used. As with the
financial risk benefits of 5) and 6), PV will receive a relative benefit
when the environmental costs are added to competing options.
All of these seven component values are generic, except for the specific
T&D and reliability values which are related to network location. The five 1)
and 2) can be added together to produce a net credit for PV generation, while
176
5), 6) and 7) are effectively zero and will produce a relative credit when the
appropriate costs are charged to competing options.
Dispatchable DSM Options - In comparison with the two generation
options discussed above, a DSM option can offer some component value
benefits by scheduling consumption and reducing the transmission and
distribution capacity necessary to serve it. An air liquefaction plant is an
excellent example of such an option, because electricity is the major expense
in production and the consumption can be readily controlled and
rescheduled. This DSM option has the following component values.
1) Spinning Reserve - If load can be reduced quickly enough, then
customers can compete with generators in supplying spinning reserve.
This service can be controlled either by the customer or directly by the
utility. The value to the customer of supplying this ancillary service
depends upon when the load is scheduled and its correlation to system
load which determines the marginal cost of spinning reserve supplied
by generators. Because an air liquefaction plant will schedule its
consumption at hours when the spot price is low, the value of
spinning reserve which it can supply will be less than the average
value of the overall level of spinning reserve which was determined
in Section 5.4 above. Further analysis to find this value would be
worthwhile, but under a competitive market it will be determined by
bids from both generators and consumers.
2) Load Dispatchability - Just as a solar PV plant can dispatch its generation
by the addition of storage and inverter capacity, an air liquefaction plant
can schedule its production by the addition of both storage capacity and
excess production capacity. Production capacity can be gained either by
increasing the designed size of the compressors and liquefiers, or by
reducing the target level of production. By producing liquid air when
the marginal system cost (spot price) of electricity is low, the total cost of
production can be reduced. As discussed in Chapter 4, a storage
optimization algorithm for this application was developed by
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Daryanian 4 5, analogous to the NDT generation storage algorithm
developed for this thesis. This prior work reports average annual
savings of 10.5% of total electricity cost, based on analysis of one
representative day for each of the four seasons. The analysis used spot
prices from the PJM power pool, an 18% non-cyclable compressor load,
and a load factor of 75% (equivalent to excess capacity of 33%). Storage
was not reported to be a signficant constraint, and sensitivity analysis
produced savings dependence upon storage and production capacity
which can be called value supply curves in the context of this thesis.
Combined with the costs of storage and production capacity, these curves
can be used to determine the optimum amount of these variables.
3) T&D Credit - By operating at off peak hours, a dispatchable load will
reduce peak load stresses upon the transmission and distribution
system. This reduced stress can produce a component value credit by
reducing necessary maintenance or deferring the replacement of old
T&D capacity or the construction of new T&D capital. An air
liquefaction plant is a large enough load that it will generally be
connected directly to the system at the transmission level, so any
distribution benefits will not apply. Because this is a component value
which is specific to network location it is not evaluated in this generic
example, but the cost of upgrading or building new transmission lines
means that it can be very substantial if the system is stressed near its
limits at the location in question.
The results of this chapter are representative examples of component
values which are generic (or system wide). These results show that there can
be very significant value in unit/system interactions and in system wide
analysis which have not been used in the prior, conventional analysis of
limited, generation options. There is reason to believe that the other
component values discussed in Chapter 3 and above for three specific utility
options may be equally significant, especially in certain places for values
which are specific to network location.
45 Daryanian, B., The Definition and Application of an Optimal Response Algorithm for
Electricity Consumers and Small Power Producers Subject to Spot Prices, S.M. Thesis,
Technology and Policy Program, Mechanical Engineering Department, MIT, 1986.
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6.0 Conclusions
Electric utility planning is a complex and important problem based on
the size, complexity and importance of the electric utility sector. The utility
industry has undergone rapid change in the last 20 years, which is only
accelerating with the present advent of deregulation, competition, and
industry dis-integration. Utility planning has evolved along with the
industry to include demand side options, independent power producers, open
bidding, spot pricing, emissions controls and trading, and integrated resource
or least cost utility planning. Nevertheless, the basic paradigm for utility
planning has remained regulatory hearing approval based on the lowest
average or levelized cost of technological options added to the utility system.
This paradigm produces a number of planning problems, including a limited
choice of options, a focus on options alone without consideration of how they
interact with the system, and the neglect of significant sources of value.
These sources of value include system dispatch, transmission and
distribution, reliability, and financial risk. Current industry trends mean that
these values which have been only implicitly or unevenly included in utility
planning may now have real market value, enabling unbundled services to
be priced or a wider range of options to be compared on a more even basis.
This thesis discusses a new methodology for finding and quantifying
new sources of value in the utility planning process, in order to address the
problems mentioned above. The nature and deficiencies of the planning
process are discussed in Chapter 1, which then outlines the approach of the
rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the
thesis methodology. It outlines a new framework for comprehensive
identification of both utility options and sources of value, based on the chain
of utility functions and the time frames relevant to different aspects of utility
construction and operation. Once these sources or components of value have
been identified, this thesis proposes a new methodology for generic analysis
of these values separate from the options which possess them, based on a
subset of relevant option and system characteristics. This methodology is
extended by the new concept of producing supply curves for these component
values by parametric variation of one or more of the related option or system
characteristics. Chapter 3 discusses individual component values identified,
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five of which were selected as examples to demonstrate the methodology
quantitatively. Chapter 4 discusses the data and modeling assumptions used
in the analysis of the five component value examples, including a new and
original storage optimization algorithm. Chapter 5 discusses the results of the
analysis for these five component values, compares them on a common basis,
and presents examples of full value analysis for three utility options. This
chapter presents the general and specific conclusions of the analysis.
6.1 General Conclusions
Based on the research and analysis results, this thesis draws the
following general conclusions.
1) Current planning practices have serious deficiencies. These include a
focus on individual technological options rather than the full range of
utility options or option/system interactions, and on average or
levelized pricing that does not include the full range of component
values available to utilities. Planning practices are dictated by utility
regulations which vary significantly between states. The onset of
competitive deregulation will eliminate most of these regulations, and
create the opportunity and necessity for new types of private planning
and public regulation which can benefit from the methodology of this
thesis.
2) Many of these deficiencies can be remedied by incorporating new
sources of value in utility operation and construction. These
component values can be related to system dispatch, transmission and
distribution, reliability and quality of service, financial risk, and
environmental costs. It is obvious that values related to these
categories exist, but to date they have been given limited and uneven
recognition and application related to specific technologies such as
photovoltaics.
3) The framework outlined by this thesis provides a new and
comprehensive way of searching for and identifying both new options
and new component values, based upon the sequential progression of
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utility functions and the time scales associated with different aspects of
utility planning and operation.
4) The specific component values identified can be separated from specific
individual options that may provide them. The values identified
depend upon certain sets of option and system characteristics, and can
be calculated from these characteristics without considering a particular
technology. Values which are based systemwide characteristics are
generic and can be applied to all options, while those values which
depend upon site specific system characteristics are specific and can
only be applied to options at that site.
5) The component value identified can be quantified using a variety of
appropriate models, including hourly and load duration curve
production cost models. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the analysis and
quantitative results of five generic component values which have not
been calculated before. Specific conclusions for these sample
component values are presented further below.
6) Parametric analysis of the relevant option and/or system characteristics
can be used to establish the cost or benefit associated with variable
amounts of each component value. By varying one or more of the
characteristics, a response curve or surface can be mapped out, which
can replace future calculations with interpolation. These supply curves
can be used to optimize the size or amount of a single option, or be
used to apply the component value to many individual options
without specific calculations.
7) The component values calculated can be of significant size. The
generic values analyzed in this thesis range from approximately -400 to
900 $/kW NPV over a 30 year period. One value was found on an
energy basis, with a marginal value of dispatchability approximately
equal to 8800 $/MWh of battery storage capacity for a 30 year period.
8) Component values which are specific to certain system circumstances
or network locations may be as large or larger than the generic values
calculated in this thesis. This conclusion is based in part on the
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average size of some component values like transmission and
distribution costs (i.e. approximately 40% overall system capital costs),
because when an average cost is this large then in some specific
instances it must be considerably above average. This indicates that
there is considerable incentive for further investigation of specific
component values, including network dependent values associated
with transmission and distribution, reliability and quality.
9) The component values identified and discussed have value both under
both current utility structure and under competitive deregulation and
utility disintegration. These values may be ignored or only implicitly
considered by current planning aimed at regulatory approval. Under
deregulation, some values will automatically be used by players
planning based on market incentives, but others (such as spinning
reserve or transmission costs) will require unbundling and a market
created so that they can be bought and sold and a market prices
established.
10) It is not necessary to use all the component values discussed or
quantified to create a perfectly level playing field for competing
options, but adding any or all of the component values to the current
average or levelized cost basis will be an improvement. The examples
presented in Section 5.7 show that the component values
demonstrated in this thesis can apply to a range of utility options, and
that full value estimation can make a difference in the comparison of
different utility options.
6.2 Conclusions for Subset of Example Values
In addition to the general conclusions drawn above, it is also possible
to draw some specific conclusions from the results for the set of c omponent
values analyzed as examples of the thesis methodology. These conclusions
include the following.
1) Reserve Margin - Capital investment in generation is expensive, with
NEPOOL's 1995 capital recovery costs equal to $6.06 billion. NEPOOL
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reserve margins are high compared to historical levels for the country
as a whole, and this reserve margin can be very expensive. The value
of reserve margin depends upon the composition of the system which
has a lower reserve margin. This analysis has shown that reducing
reserve margin while keeping system composition proportionally the
same can save approximately 100 $/kW in 1995 and approximately 900
95$/kW over a 30 year period. However, if system reserve margin is
reduced by not building baseload units (such as the NEPOOL nuclear
units considered), then fuel costs will exceed capital cost savings and
costs can increase by as much as 43 $/kW in 1995 or approximately 400
95$/kW over a 30 year period.
2) Unit Size - When unit capital costs are high and unit size is large
compared to total system load growth, smaller unit size can defer
capital expenditures and reduce NPV capital costs. This section has
compared the Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (MHTGR) to
the Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR), using the modularity to
reduce the effective MHTGR size from 1360 MW(equal to the ALWR)
to 680 MW, 340 MW and finally to 170 MW, by building 8 units once, 4
units 4 years apart, 2 units 2 years apart, and one unit per year for 8
years. The results of this analysis indicate that capital cost savings
exceed increases in system fuel costs, producing an average size related
savings of 365 $/kW. This savings reduces the effective capital cost for
the MHTGR when it is compared to the ALWR from 1800 $/kW to
1435 $/kW, indicating that the ALWR would be preferred only if its
price was below 1435 $/kW.
3) NDT Dispatchability - Non-dispatchable technologies like wind and
solar PV generation possess value based on the time correlation of
their energy resource with marginal system costs (spot prices). By
adding energy storage between the NDT generation and the system
load a variable amount of dipatchability can be produced to improve
this value. This value depends both upon the amount of storage, and
upon the amount of solid-state inverter capacity available for
generation from storage. A new algorithm was created to optimize
NDT storage based on these two variables. Results show that the initial
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value of wind energy is approximately 16 $/MWh v. 22 $/MWh for
solar based on their resource patterns over time. The maximum
benefits of storage capacity for both wind and PV generation are
reached at 40% of the maximum day's generation for the year 1995.
The average NPV benefit of increasing storage from 0% to 40% is 1162
95$/MWh for PV and 2311 95$/MWh for wind. The maximum
benefits of inverter capacity are generally reached by 50% of total
generation capacity for both wind and solar. The marginal benefit of
inverter capacity from 25% (the lowest used) to 50% is 95.6 95$/kW for
PV and 56.7 95$/kW for wind.
4) Spinning Reserve - Spinning reserve is generator capacity (or
interruptible load) available to meet emergency needs on short notice,
given as a percentage of the largest unit in service or just in MW. This
value depends upon the level of spinning reserve standard
maintained. NEPOOL operates at about the 50% level recommended
by NERC, rather the the higher 150% level called for by NEPOOL
Operating Procedure 7 . Based on hourly modeling by Polaris, the
difference in total annual NEPOOL system costs associated with these
two levels is $19.8 million. Given the largest baseload unit size of 1253
MW, this is equivalent to an annual reduction of 15.8 $/kW or an NPV
savings of 149 $/kW. Although this is not the largest component
value calculated, it is still significant. By operating at the lower NERC
level, NEPOOL has already reaped this benefit, but under deregulation
spinning reserve will be unbundled as one of several ancillary services,
and this component value will serve as the basis of a real market
value.
5) Thermal Unit Dispatch Constraints - Thermal generation units are
limited in how quickly they can be started and stopped. This section
evaluated the value of the dispatch constraints provided by minimum
startup and minimum run times. These constraints have been
provided by plant operators to system dispatchers in the past based on
technical limits, environmental emissions and other considerations,
but they have not been based on their economic impact on system
dispatch costs. Using the hourly Polaris model, minimum run times
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and and down times were varied for five different generation units
covering a range of dispatch costs from baseload to peaking. The
results of this analysis show that the value of dispatch constraints is
most dependent upon dispatch cost, with the only significant value
occurring for intermediate units. Results depend upon how widely the
constraints were varied, but within the limits chosen the largest change
in total unit dispatch cost was approximately 8 $/kW. Changing
dispatch constraints on a single unit affects the dispatch of similar
units, so the total system impact is significantly lower, with a total
maximum range of approximately 2 $/kW. This was the smallest
component value found, but it provides important new data for setting
dispatch constraints. Due to limitations of the Polaris model in
dispatch optimization, the actual value of dispatch constraints may be
somewhat higher. The impacts of improved optimization and
investigating the additivity of changing more than one set of unit
constraints at a time are possible topics for further research.
6.3 Overall Conclusions
Utility planning is a complex and important subject with significant
problems under both current and prospective industry structures. This thesis
presents a new methodology for finding and evaluating new sources of value
and applying them to a wide range of utlility options. The results of this
thesis indicate that the five component values investigated to demonstrate
this methodology produce results which range from small to very large, and
it is reasonable to assume that some of the component values discussed but
not analyzed may be equally large. These results indicate that the thesis
methodology represents a significant improvement when added to
conventional existing planning methods which are fundamentally based on
average or levelized technology costs alone.
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APPENDIX 1
1.0 A Historical Perspective of Value of Service
In order to look at the question of the value of electrical service in
electric utility planning, it is useful to have a historical perspective on the
technical and regulatory ways in which both value and planning practices
have evolved. This appendix addresses this evolution from the early history
of electric utility service, and in so doing addresses the context and
inadequacies of current electric utility planning practices.
The value of electricity, like any other value, is not inherent in the
thing itself but instead created by the estimation of people who need or desire
it. For a good or service in an economic market, this need or desire is
expressed by a willingness to pay. Electricity is a secondary good which is not
consumed directly, but rather provides a wide variety of services which
people value differently. The value of electricity depends upon the value of
these services. Each customer may place a different value on electricity
because the portfolio of services provided by electricity varies between
customers, and because customers have different needs for these services. A
customer will be willing to pay much for some electrical services and less for
others, depending upon the value of goods or services created and the prices
of competing sources of energy services. This creates a demand curve for each
customer, and in aggregate a demand curve for the electric utility market.
Competition in the electric utility market has always existed, but under
monopoly regulation it has been limited. The traditional view has been that
the natural monopoly of transmission and distribution led to utility
regulation, and in turn the historic price has been set to provide a fixed rate of
return to the utilities. Since electricity has been a monopoly good, utilities
and customers have focused on the regulated price of electricity rather than
its value. Price levels have been expressed through rate structures (flat and
declining block rates) that have not reflected a utility's marginal cost curve,
but overall prices have still determined how electricity has competed with
other sources of energy services, and hence the total demand for electricity.
Because of the regulated obligation to serve all customers, generation capacity
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has been added to the rate base to meet this demand. Economies of scale led
for a long time to declining prices and steady load growth. Diseconomies of
scale came not from additional generation, but from extending transmission
and distribution lines from urban centers to more distant rural customers,
and this extension was due to the regulated obligation to serve and
governmental policy rather than strictly economic incentives. While the
laws of supply and demand have never been repealed in the electricity
market, demand curves and supply curves have shifted over the long term
rather than through direct, short term competition.
1.1 Historical Evolution of Electrical Services
As discussed in Chapter 2, a comprehensive theory of value for utility
planning will incorporate willingness to pay all along the chain of production
functions shown in Figure 2.1, for each of the multiple attributes of inputs
and outputs at each step. Recognizing this, it is useful to review how the
value of electrical service has evolved over the relatively short history of the
electric utility industry. In brief, this history is a story of how an expanding
range of electric utility services have made electricity more valuable, while
increased productivity produced declining real prices until the recent past.
Electrical technology progressed slowly from the early through the
mid-1800's, with the development of batteries, dynamos (generators), and
electric motors, but actual use of these novelties was rare. The first practical
electrical applications included time clocks and security alarms, and arc
lighting for theaters, fairs and exhibitions. It was Thomas Edison who
demonstrated the incandescent light in 1879, and created the first integrated
electric utility that tied together all the elements of generation, distribution,
and end-use (lighting) technology in 1882 with the opening of the Pearl St.
station in New York City46 .
With the start of public and private generation, the order in which new
electrical technologies penetrated the market reveals much about their end-
46 Nye, David E., Electrifying America, Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940, p.
30, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1991.
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use values and the way in which the public chose them based on not just cost
but their other advantages as well. Electrification in the US covered the
period from 1880 to 1945. The major areas of electrical use in order of their
adoption were public and industrial lighting, electrical streetcar
transportation, industrial motor drives, urban residential service, and rural
farm service. As with the development of any technology, the path of
development was a complex interaction between the technical possibilities
and the society which adopted them. Adoption must follow development,
but the perceived value of particular services is the spur to that development.
This process is not solely and objectively rational; fashion and preference play
major roles in choosing between the technological possibilities.
Public lighting began in the 1880's, starting with street lighting, and
progressed to theaters, hotels, department stores, clubs, and the private homes
of the rich. It was promoted by a series of world's fairs and exhibitions from
1894 to 1910, and was adopted for prestige and status as well as for its practical
advantages. In urban areas its chief competition was natural gas. Lighting is
an excellent example of how value can result from many end-use technology
characteristics, because electric lights were brighter, had better color balance,
produced no soot, water vapor or acid fumes, and were much safer because of
the reduced fire hazard. Electric streetlights were immune to blowouts from
the wind and could be switched on together without requiring lamplighters.
Edison recognized from the start the importance of selling light as opposed to
electricity, and installed wiring and fixtures as well as creating the generator
and distribution system. Initial service was unmetered and billed based on
the number of bulbs. Edison's stated goal was to "make electric light so cheap
that only the rich will be able to burn candles47 ."
Electric streetcars or trolleys succeeded horse drawn streetcars starting
in 1888, and served from the 1890's through the 1930's when they were largely
replaced by the automobile except in some densely populated cities. These
streetcars used individual motors powered by overhead wires. Besides being
cheaper than horses, they were cleaner, faster and more sanitary. These
streetcars led to the development of subways and were often linked to them
(Boston had the first subway in the US in 1897). Interurban service followed
47 McDonald, Forrest, Insull, p. 20, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.
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in-town service, and survived it for a short period. So called traction
companies also supplied electricity to customers along their tracks, competing
with private and municipal utilities. Many companies built amusement
parks at rail terminuses to provide complementary loads and raise load
factors, and some interurban lines provided the first rural electrification to a
limited number of farms. Streetcars had large impacts on the social structure,
linking cities and suburbs for commuting, shopping, recreation and
entertainment, and light freight delivery.
Electrical lighting in factories was common before 1900, but electric
motor drive penetrated the industrial market gradually from approximately
1900 to 1930. Electric motor drive replaced water or steam driven belts and
pulleys first as the prime mover for the pulley system, next powering groups
of machines and finally powering individual machines. In addition to cost,
electrical drive had many other advantages, including plant siting (away from
rivers), plant layout and process design, and product quality. Although the
safety risks of electrical shocks were introduced, the mechanical hazards of
exposed belts and pulleys were reduced or eliminated. Factory electrification
also included materials handling and transportation through cranes and
hoists, conveyor belts, and the assembly line. Electrical ovens replaced fossil
fuels due to even, constant, clean and controllable heat for drying, baking,
roasting, tempering, and heat treating.
As in industry, the first electrical service provided to urban homes was
lighting, with the first penetration into this market from approximately 1910
to 1915. The penetration of labor saving appliances was not prevalent until
after World War I, and the majority of urban homes were connected to utility
service in the decade following the war. The first appliances were electric
irons, vacuums, washing machines and fans, followed by other small
appliances, stoves, and finally refrigerators. These appliances were not only
cleaner than their predecessors, but also reduced labor and provided better
service. Radio was entirely new, and had a strong penetration from the early
1920s. Utilities conducted promotional campaigns to increase appliance
purchases and load growth, focusing on the services electricity could provide.
Rural electrification did not occur until the period of approximately
1935 to 1945. Unlike Europe, private US utilities were extremely reluctant to
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invest in rural distribution systems. It was not until 1935 that the Rural
Electrification Administration was created as part of the New Deal, and in
1936 legislation was passed to make it a lending agency to rural electric
cooperatives which constructed power lines. Rural farm services in a sense
combined those supplied to industry and urban homes decades earlier,
extending active hours and reducing labor. Like previous technological
changes in farming, it increased productivity and fueled the population shift
from rural to urban life.
Following World War II new electrical services emerged, many of
which like radar and computers had their roots in wartime research.
Semiconductors have led in turn to telecommunications, aerospace, and
computer services which define our modern age, from VCRs and CDs to
materials science and high temperature plasma technology. Just as
electrification spurred a society based on mass production, so these
technologies are producing one based on information and customized
production.
Although it is commonplace to assume that the pace of change has
increased, this depends not just on technological change but the inertia of our
technical infrastructure. The penetration in approximately a decade of
personal computers into offices and homes is not so different from the time it
took to bring public lighting or wire the majority of urban homes, and the
current sense of instant change related to the Internet is not so different from
that produced by the telephone or radio.
This historical review reinforces the point that the value of electricity
is based on the services that it provides, and that these services have evolved
into more and more valuable forms. Customers base their willingness to pay
(or their demand curve) on the quality of the services they receive and the
availability and quality of competing sources of these services. Following
W.W.II, most new kinds of electrical services can only be provided by
electricity, so the customers willingness to pay will be limited by the cost of
competing sources of electricity. . For large customers these include
industrial self generation or cogeneration, while for small customers there
have been few options.
If electricity has become more valuable, and competition is very
limited for some services, why has the price of electricity increased only in the
relatively recent past? The answer is that while the demand curve for
electricity has moved up, the supply curve has moved down even faster so
that the price has tended to drop. The regulated utilities could not extract the
consumer surplus through monopoly rents, and customers were not willing
to pay more necessary.
1.2 Historical Evolution of Industry Structure
The structure of the electric utility industry has naturally evolved in an
interrelated way with the customers and services which it supplies. The
original market for public and commercial lighting was supplied by private
generators, investor owned utilities (IOUs), and municipal generators, with
no particular standardization in the voltage or frequency of the equipment.
The addition of traction companies that also supplied customers with
electricity added another layer of complexity to the mix of early generators.
AC generation replaced DC generation in the 1890s due to two main
advantages. The AC induction motor had significant advantages over the DC
motor, but the main advantage was in the ability to use transformers to
increase transmission voltages and reduce transmission losses over long
distances. This increased the advantages of larger utilities who could reap the
benefits of a customer base with diverse loads and a flatter daily load curve,
and the economies of scale which could be achieved with larger generators.
This drive for larger, interconnected utilities also led to standardization of
voltage, frequency and equipment.
As utilities became larger, private commercial generation became less
attractive and these customers shifted to other suppliers, but private
industrial generation (self generation or cogeneration) remained strong.
Increasing economies of scale led to arguments against the inefficiency of
redundant, parallel distribution networks and to the concept of natural
monopoly, but this did not solve the question of whether it should be a
private or public monopoly. Voter distrust of large industries (like Standard
Oil) fueled the impetus for municipal utilities, but investor owned utilities
countered with arguments based on municipal corruption (which was rife),
better private efficiency, and the fear of socialism. In 1905 the National Civic
Federation created the Commission on Public Ownership which met from
1905 to 1907 and produced a report that recommended that private
monopolistic utilities should be regulated by state agencies. The Federation
was privately funded, and General Electric and several of the largest utilities
were represented on the Commission. The recommendation meant that
control of local IOUs would be removed from local elections to state
regulators who could be more easily lobbied, and municipal representatives
would face utility experts in a less friendly and familiar setting. The National
Electric Light Association (an industry group) and individual utilities lobbied
for this recommendation, and by 1921 all states but Rhode Island had adopted
the current state regulatory structure.
While municipal utilities did not disappear, the private investor
owned utilities became dominant. The share of industrial cogeneration
shrank until 1929, when private utilities produced 75% of all power. With
the start of the Depression however, industrial cogeneration experienced a
resurgence which did not end until the end of the Depression and the start of
W.W.II.
Even during the Depression electric utilities continued to grow,
engendering public suspicion of price gouging. This public distrust was not
allayed by the complex financial structure of utility ownership. Holding
companies controlled many subsidiary utilities through highly leveraged
ownership of voting (v. non-voting) common stocks. In 1932, the eight
largest holding companies owned 73% of all IOUs. The holding company
controlled by Samuel Insull (once Thomas Edison's private secretary)
controlled assets of at least half a billion dollars in 1930 with a total
investment of only $27 million. This situation led to the Public Utility
Holding Companies Act (PUHCA) of 1935, which disbanded holding
companies which controlled non-contiguous service areas and which could
not demonstrate their usefulness 48 .
48 Hyman, Leonard S., America's Electric Utilities: Past, Present and Future, 5th Edition, p.
111, Public Utilities Reports, Inc., Arlington VA, 1994.
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The Depression and this atmosphere of distrust led to two other
developments. The first was a resurgence of municipal utilities, which
outnumbered IOUs but still controlled a smaller fraction of the total market.
The second development was the entrance of the federal government into
the generation and wholesale distribution of power. In addition to the Rural
Electrification Act (described above), Roosevelt's administration created the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Bonneville Power Authority
(BPA) to develop hydropower resources on the Tennessee and Columbia
rivers. These agencies (and the single Boulder dam) were intended to
combine hydropower and economic development, and to serve as a yardstick
for the fairness of performance by the IOUs. During W.W.II, the TVA
expanded from hydropower to thermal generation in order to power the
gaseous enrichment of uranium at Oak Ridge for the Manhattan project.
Following W.W.II, the electric utility sector entered a period from 1945 to 1965
which has been termed the golden age or the good old days. Utility demand
grew steadily and economies of scale drove the price of electricity down in
both absolute and relative terms. Generation by industrial producers dropped
to almost zero, and municipal utilities became largely distributors of power
purchased wholesale from IOUs.
It is obvious from this brief review of history that competition is
nothing new to the utility sector. The point is however that since the
institution of state regulation (from approximately 1920 on) and the decline of
independent and municipal generation were several generations ago, the
industry has lost any direct personal or corporate memory of competition and
has accepted as gospel the regulatory compact based upon an assumed service
monopoly.
The golden years of the electric utility industry came to a close in 1965,
the year that the November blackout left 30 million people in darkness in
interconnected power pools covering 80,000 square miles throughout the
Northeast. A number of trends conspired to cause the industry's decline.
The blackout caused a perceived need for higher reserve margins and more
robust transmission systems, requiring new capital investments. The cost of
these capital investments were rising for several reasons. First, utilities were
shifting to more capital intensive generation, including nuclear plants.
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Public opposition and safety regulations combined to delay construction and
drive nuclear plant costs up. Second, environmental requirements increased
plant costs and reduced efficiencies. Overall efficiencies did not increase with
costs, and the trend of increasing economies of scale came to an end. In
addition to capital costs, fuel costs were rising. The cost of coal rose sharply,
and the cost of other fuels even more. In the face of these difficulties,
electricity prices stayed flat until 1970, declining in real terms as the cost of
living rose. Utility bookkeeping exaggerated utility incomes, since AFUDC
was counted as income for accounting purposes even though it did not
represent real cash flow.
As a result, the returns on utility stock declined and stock prices
dropped precipitously. Utility stocks had a low perceived risk and competed
with bonds. As bond yields rose independently, utility stock prices were
driven down further until competitive yields were reached.. Utility shares
dropped in price by half by 1975. Share prices were below book value, so that
new shares issued to pay for new construction diluted existing shareholders'
equity.
The fuel prices raised by the oil embargo of 1973-74 were passed on
through fuel adjustment clauses, and electricity load growth in 1974 was
negative for the first time since 1946. Expectations of resumed growth after
the embargo proved optimistic, and growth remained low by historic levels
causing excess capacity. Although electricity prices increased during the
1970's, utilities remained in weak financial condition. With the accident at
Three Mile Island (1979), the conversion of the Zimmer nuclear plant to
natural gas(1983), and the Washington Public Power Supply System bond
default(1983), the industry continued to suffer through the early 1980's, and
many nuclear utilities were pushed close to bankruptcy. Public Service of
New Hampshire became the first IOU in over 50 years to declare bankruptcy
due to cost overruns on its Seabrook nuclear unit.
Out of these troubled decades were sown the seeds of the current trends
which are pressing towards deregulation and competition. As a result of the
oil crisis, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) guaranteed in
1978 that utilities would be required to purchase power from independent
producers and other qualifying facilities at the avoided cost of the next utility
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generator otherwise required, although this was the subject of litigation until
1982 when PURPA was upheld by the US Supreme Court. This market access
granted to non-utility generators was increased by the Energy Policy Act of
1992, which has led to significant market penetration by independent power
producers, including industrial self generators and cogenerators, municipal
waste fired generators, and private suppliers. Deregulation of the natural gas
industry and increased confidence in natural gas reserves has promoted a
new generation of gas fired generation based on aero-derivative turbines
which have lower capital requirements and higher efficiencies than previous
utility capacity. Continued low load growth rates due in part to increased
emphasis on end-use efficiencies and load shifting have combined with this
new non-utility generation to keep reserve margins high by historical
standards. Efficiency gains still available and current load growth rates appear
to make new capacity unnecessary for 5 to 10 years, increasing pressures to
reduce costs by eliminating current high cost producers. FERC's 1988
approval of a utility merger required third party transmission access, and the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 removed provisions of the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935, guaranteeing open access for power wheeling and
wholesale competition. The Energy Policy Act does not directly permit retail
competition, but does allow the individual states to permit it. These reforms
have both contributed to competitive pressures for further competition in the
industry. Pilot programs for retail competition are in place in some states like
New Hampshire, and electricity futures trading has begun in several markets,
including the Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Mercantile
Exchange.
Obviously the problems and resulting trends of the past 30 years have
produced profound and rapid change in the once staid electric utility industry,
and if anything the pace of change appears to be accelerating. New generators,
excess capacity and open transmission access have produced incentives for
competition. Deregulation in the truck, airline, natural gas and
telecommunications industries have set the precedent in a continuing
political environment that seems certain to assure that these incentives will
result in dis-integration of the vertically integrated utility and open
competition between generators.
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1.3 Historical Evolution of Industry Planning
Given the historical evolution in the value of end-use services and
industry structure, the question is how utility planning and the concept of
value in planning has evolved over the same period.
From the beginnings of the industry through the end of the 'golden
age' in 1965, the planning process was relatively simple. Planning consisted
basically of the following four steps.
* Getting the load curve as flat as possible through the best possible blend
of customers and an appropriate rate structure.
* Doing the best possible job of load forecasting either by extrapolating
past total load growth, bottom up analysis, or top down econometric
analysis.
* Choosing the most cost effective new generation additions (base,
intermediate and peak load plants) through the correct balance of fixed
capital and variable (fuel) costs, based on the expected plant capacity
factor (hr./yr.).
* Designing a transmission and distribution system to handle normal
loads and outage scenarios without constraining normal plant
dispatch.
During the early days of the industry, the first step above was key,
because by mixing customers whose loads peaked at different times
generating plant could be much more efficiently utilized. However once
utilities covered large service areas and everyone was already a customer it
became much harder to influence the load duration curve.
As has been mentioned above, the investor owned utilities worked to
become regulated monopolies. Once they had accomplished this, state
regulatory laws and policies grew up that largely determined utility planning
and how utilities perceived value. These regulations varied in some
significant ways between states, but up until 1965 they were basically related to
rate of return on the rate base and rate structures. Rate base regulation
established utility revenues and rate structures established how customer
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prices were set. Good planning came to mean finding the best new additional
generation capacity, according to the supply planning guidelines and
decisions of the state regulators.
In return for being granted control of a 'natural' monopoly, the
utilities entered into the regulatory compact which allowed a fixed rate of
return on the rate base. Although utility accounting practices are a complex
and arcane subject with limited connection to real economic or customer
values, the rate base is basically composed of generation, transmission and
distribution capital asset costs minus depreciation. The National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners tracks state regulatory policies which
determine which assets are included in the rate base, how rate base assets are
valued, the valuation methods and time periods used, and how depreciation,
deductions, abandonment's, working capital, and construction work in
progress (CWIP) are handled, as well as the accounting and auditing practices
employed.
The approved rate of return on utility rate base varies nationally with
most states in the range from 8% to 12% 49. The larger the rate base the more
utilities earn, and this incentive towards higher capitalization was recognized
by Averch and Johnson in 196250. The utility industry is naturally capital
intensive, and as long as economies of scale drove utility costs per kWh down
this incentive was not perceived to be much of a problem. Most states (all but
12) also allow utilities to automatically pass changes in fuel costs on to
customers. These fuel adjustment clauses were adopted in the mid-1970's as a
result of the oil price shock. Although fuel costs are subject to periodic
review, this pass through can also be viewed as a disincentive to efficiency.
Both of these (dis)incentives played a role in the industry's troubles as capital
and fuel costs soared together.
The structural changes made in response to the industry's difficulties
have been briefly sketched above. These trends can also be traced by the
accretion of successive regulatory incentives and requirements which allowed
49 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Utility Regulatory Policy in
the United States and Canada, Compilation 1993-1994, Table 214, p. 465.
50 Averch, Harvey and Johnson, Leland, "Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint,"
American Economic Review, Dec. 1962.
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or produced the changes that occurred. These additions to planning
requirements and proceedings have included the following.
* Supply side planning was supplemented by demand side management
(DSM). These were then combined to form least cost utility planning
(LCUP), which was then replaced by integrated resource planning (IRP).
Regulations include how to deal with customer incentive programs,
and how utilities may evaluate, allocate and recover costs and
incentives for demand side activities. They also include required
elements of IRP plans, evaluation of externalities, and public
participation.
* The large size and cost overruns of nuclear units led to regulatory
review of whether additions to the rate base were 'used and useful,'
and whether in hindsight prudent planning was used as decisions were
made to begin and continue construction.
* Low nuclear plant capacity factors led to regulatory incentives for
improved performance.
* Environmental externalities were added to the 'least cost' choice of
new capacity and DSM by assigning monetary costs to emissions. The
choice of these externalities costs are subject to debate, and generation
units chosen based on them are not dispatched according to these costs
in operation.
* A significant number of states have authorized and/or required
competitive bidding for the acquisition of not just new generation
capacity, but of property, equipment and financial services.
* Regulations have begun to address the issues of pricing open access
transmission across utility networks.
Obviously, regulated utility planning has become much more complex
over the last 30 years. Requiring utilities to purchase power from qualifying
facilities at avoided cost was certainly the first step in recognizing the
marginal value of generation. Once it was clear that the utilities avoided cost
was not necessarily the cheapest power available, the utilities turned to IPP
generators and re negotiated or bought out many of their previous contracts
with PURPA qualifying facilities. DSM also recognized the value of avoiding
high marginal costs, but the questions of value lay more in how to really
establish actual savings and allocate the costs and benefits. Neither
development addressed the value of providing economic signals and
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incentives to retail customers through rates with hourly marginal cost (so
called time of day (TOD) pricing, also now called real time pricing (RTP) or
spot pricing). RTP pricing is now used in wholesale spot markets, but utilities
with retail TOD rates generally only switch between on-peak and off-peak
rates rather than setting hourly rates. Pumped or compressed air storage and
customer load management are currently utilities' chief methods of
flattening the load curve, but comprehensive wholesale and retail RTP
pricing has the potential to not only shift customers' loads but send the
correct signals all along the chain from generation to consumption.
Despite the regulatory complications added to utility planning, the
basic emphasis has remained firmly on how to choose the best technology to
add to the system. Planning has broadened to include both supply and
demand technologies, and a range of potential suppliers, but the focus has
remained on the technology in a stand alone fashion, without necessarily
considering how the technology and system will interact.
1.4 Current Directions, Requirements, and Deficiencies in Utility Planning
At the present time, the US is poised to follow some other countries
(chiefly Britain, which deregulated in 1987) into competitive utility markets.
California already has already debated several schemes for competition and
retreated briefly from implementation, while in Massachusetts proposals for
competition have currently been submitted by four major utilities and the
state Department of Energy Resources and are currently under review. As
mentioned above, New Hampshire has in place a trial program for retail
competition. A handful of other states are close behind in the deregulatory
process (including Rhode Island and Wisconsin), and the rest of the country
is watching closely.
It appears clear that the natural monopoly of transmission and
distribution will be maintained, although they will be separated and
separately regulated. Generation will be competitive and will have open
access to transmission lines which will charge regulated wheeling fees. The
least certain aspect is how best to structure purchase transactions in a way that
will accomplish both economic and security dispatch functions. Spot markets
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already exist for wholesale short term power purchases, and municipal and
industrial customers are already forming bargaining units to establish
purchasing power in the new market.
The main two prospective market structures are a power pool and
bilateral transactions. Under the pool structure, the power pool operates the
transmission system and is the sole purchaser of electricity from generators
and the sole seller of electricity to wholesale distributors. Supply and demand
are equilibrated through a bidding system for energy, capacity, VARS and
spinning reserve, and all generators are paid the marginal cost for these
services on an hourly basis. Distributors pay the pool this same spot price,
plus transmission costs, losses and overhead. This market coordinates
generation planning and dispatch over the full time spectrum from long
term (years) to short term (seconds). Retail customers pay the distributors
based on the hourly market price averaged over time and service territory
plus regulated distribution costs. England currently uses such a pool system,
but it does have some inefficiencies which makes a bilateral market system
appear more attractive. These include a lack of correct transmission pricing
and retail pricing which lacks information based on system load and network
location.
Under a system of bilateral transactions, any buyer may contract directly
with any seller, and the market is the only coordinating force. Under this
system, transmission and distribution prices are regulated based upon their
costs, and a network coordinator must be established to maintain system
synchronization and emergency control. Brokers would have free access to
coordinate transactions between generators and customers, either
individually or in groups. The chief questions under a bilateral system are
how to implement the coordination function and price both it and power
transmission and distribution correctly. The bilateral transaction system has
the most flexibility in unbundling electricity services which would maximize
value to both buyers and sellers, and appears likely to be the dominant choice
among the US states. Norway currently uses a system in which bilateral long
term transactions predominate, while maintaining a relatively small power
pool for spot market transactions.
Unbundling is the separation of different types of electrical service so
that they can supplied and billed individually, including energy (kWh),
demand (kW), and transmission and distribution, as well as ancillary services
like dispatch, frequency, reactive power, and power reserves required for
reliability and power quality. In addition, buyers will be able to pay a slight
premium for power with reduced emissions or price risks based on a blend of
fuel types and contracts. A seller may also sell electrical service directly, by
combining electricity with end-use technology (e.g. a more efficient appliance)
for a single price. Unbundling these services is directly analogous to the
proliferation of services under telephone deregulation, including call waiting
and forwarding, but the common carrier delivery is more analogous to the
gas pipeline. The electron entering the generator's end of the 'pipeline' is not
the same one that exits the customer's end, but since they are interchangeable
the contract preserves the benefits for both buyer and seller.
Under either form of deregulation, it appears that some fraction of
current utility generation capacity will be uncompetitive. In a competitive
marketplace the value of a generator will be the net present value of future
revenues minus future costs, which are primarily fuel and O&M. The
difference between the current depreciated value of capital cost yet to be
recovered and the free market value is called the stranded cost. Stranded cost
is most likely to be significant where capital costs are high (e.g. nuclear plants)
or where units are so inefficient that their future revenues are small.
Stranded costs are a transitional regulatory problem because utilities were
granted regulatory approval for plant construction and were assured of a
return on it. The problem is that forecasts of future revenues are uncertain,
the total of stranded costs is very large, and customers are unwilling to pay for
plants to be retired.
In addition to the problem of how stranded costs will be determined
and allocated, deregulation also poses several other questions including how
a competitive market can fulfill some of the social policies embedded in
present rate structures, including equity between different classes of
customers, and assistance or protection from disconnection for the poor.
Even if present utilities are separated into generation, transmission
and distribution companies, it is unclear at the current time which entities
202
will own or control these functions. Some current utilities may attempt to
fulfill as many market niches or functions as possible, while others may
choose to specialize. Rather than getting bogged down in who will be the
generator, transmitter, distributor, broker, dispatcher or coordinator, the
important thing to remember is that different sources of value are associated
with different utility functions, so each market player will need to consider a
different subset of the component values presented in this thesis.
This appendix has reviewed the historic context of utility values and
regulation to give the context for the issues and problems related to current
utility planning. In many ways the utility industry has returned to its roots,
because the current situation has many similarities to the early development
of power markets. Competition between utilities, utility mergers and
acquisitions, the entry of independent generators, the importance of
transmission in driving changes, and municipal bargaining power were all
familiar in the pre-monopolistic industry. The current industry is concerned
with high cost excess capacity, deregulation, dis-integration, and competition,
but it will require better planning tools to achieve its real long term goals of
cheap, clean and sustainable power.
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Appendix 2
This appendix contains the Fortran program written to implement
the storage optimization algorithm developed to shift generation by non-
dispatchable technologies (wind and solar PV) from hours with low system
marginal cost to hours with high system marginal cost, subject to the
constraints of storage capacity and inverter generation capacity. The
algorithm contained in this program is described in general terms in
Chapter 4, and the flow chart for this algorithm is shown as Figure 4.8.
Documentation in the program includes an outline, variable definition
list, and comments throughout the code.
C 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C 3456789 123456789 123456789 123456789 123456789 123456789 123456789 12
C
C Program - NDT-STOR.FOR
C I Purpose - To calculate generation from NonDispatchable
C Technologies (NDT's - i.e. wind & solar), distribute
C I generation to peak load hours according to the the amount
C of storage capacity, adjust system load, and calculate
C statistics.
C Written Sep/Oct 95 by Warren Schenler
C
program NDTSTOR
C Outline of algorithm
C --------------------
C Define variable names
C Define variable types/lengths, dimension arrays
C Initialize global variables
C Read fixed data
C Annual loop
C Planning period loop
C Read hourly data for each planning period
C Convert resource data to generation data
C Find highest available netload hour
C Find lowest available netload hour
C If storage constraints unviolated, swap energy
C Repeat until all possible swaps complete
C Update counters and statistics
C Write output for planning period
C Loop to next planning period
C Write output for year
C Loop to next'year
C Stop - error or out of data
C Define Variable Names
C
C paramfile Contains NDTech & storage parameters
C ndtrajfile Contains NDT installation trajectory
C genfile Contains NDT hourly resource data
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loadfile Contains hourly system load data
netloadfile Contains load data net of generation & storage
C statfile Contains summary statistics
ndtype
techname
ndunitcap
storage
storgencap
pdays
firstyr
pyears
siteloss
spurloss
TDloss
VOM
capyear
ndcap(yr)
Idmonl-2
genmon
Iddayl-2
genday
Idyrl-2
genyr
Idwkdayl-2
genwkday
Idampml-2
genampm
hrload(i)
hrresc(i)
hrgen(i)
hrstorin(i)
Type of nondispatchable technology (WIND or PV)
Name of nondispatchable technology (eg turbine name)
Nondispatchable unit capacity (MW)
Storage fraction (0 to 1) or capacity (MWh/MW)
Generation capacity from storage (multiple of NDT cap)
Number of days in storage opt. planning period
First year in planning period
Number of years in planning period
Energy loss at site
Energy loss from site to NEPOOL region
Energy loss within NEPOOL region (as for regular gen.)
Variable operation & maintenance cost
Year of new capacity level
Nondispatchable capacity (by year)
Month of year for system load
Month of year for NDT generation
Day of month for system load
Day of month for NDT generation
Year for system load
Year for NDT generation
Day of week (Sun=1,Sat=7) for system load
Day of week (Sun=l,Sat=7) for NDT generation
AM(1) or PM(2) for system load
AM(1) or PM(2) for NDT generation
Hourly system load
Hourly resource data
Hourly NDT generation
Hourly energy into storage
hrstorout(i) Hourly energy out of storage
hrnet(i) Hourly net load
daygen
maxdaygen
storcap
phr
anngen
capfac
annstor
storfrac
capcredit
annVOM
Total generation per day
Maximum daily generation
Storage capacity for current year (MWh)
Hours of planning period overlap
Annual generation (MWh)
Annual capacity factor
Annual storage (MWh)
Annual storage fraction (storage/gen)
Annual capacity credit (MW)
Annual VOM total ($)
Define variable types/lengths, dimension arrays
character paramfile30------------------------------ndtrajfile*30,genfile*30,oadfile30,
character paramfile*30,ndtrajfile*30,genfile*30,10adfile*30,
netloadfile*30 sta tab*1
real ndunitcap,storage,storgencap,siteloss,spurloss,TDloss,
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
1 VOM,ndcap(30),daygen,maxdaygen
real hrload(-25:750),hrresc(750),hrgen(-25:750),
1 hrstorin(-25:750),hrstorout(-25:750),hrnet(-25: 750),
2 maxloadl(11),maxload2(11),maxload3(11)
real storcap,anngen,capfac,annstor,storfrac,capcredit,annVOM,
1 gap,gaplow,gaphigh,lowld,highld,cumstor,minstor,maxstor,
2 tempcum,aveload
integer pdays,firstyr,pyears,capyear,genmon,genday,genyr,
1 rank(750),yr,curgenyr,pdayl,pday2,highhr,lowhr
integer phrl,phr2,phr,pos,nhigh,nlow,hrinok(750),hroutok(750)
integer ldmonl(-2:31),ldmon2(-2:31),lddayl(-2:31),ldday2(-2:31),
1 ldyrl(-2:31),ldyr2(-2:31),ldwkdayl(-2:31),
2 Idwkday2(-2:31),ldampml(-2:31),ldampm2(-2:31)
C Initialize global variables
C
do i=1,30
ndcap(i) = 0.
end do
C Read filenames and open files
C
read(*,fmt=10) len,paramfile
10 format(q,a30)
read(*,*) storgencap
read(*,*) storage
paramfile = paramfile(l:len)
do i=l,len
if(paramfile(i:i).eq.'.') then
pos = i-i
end if
end do
if(paramfile(1:2).eq.'PV') then
open (01,file='PV.DAT',status='old',carriagecontrol= 'list')
elseif(paramfile(1:4).eq.'WIND') then
open (01,file='WIND.DAT',status= 'old',carriagecontrol='list')
else
open (01,file=paramfile,status='old',carriagecontrol='list')
endif
rewind (01)
statfile = paramfile(l:pos)//'.SUM'
open (06,file=statfile,status='new',carriagecontrol='list')
write(*,20) paramfile
write(6,20) paramfile
20 format(' NDT/Storage parameter file: ',a<len>)
read(*,fmt=10) len,ndtrajfile
ndtrajfile = ndtrajfile(l:len)
open (02,file=ndtrajfile,status='old',carriagecontrol='list')
rewind (02)
write(*,30) ndtrajfile
write(6,30) ndtrajfile
30 format(' NDT capacity trajectory file: ',a<len>)
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read(*,fmt=10) len,genfile
genfile = genfile(l:len)
open (03,file=genfile,status='old',recl=150)
rewind (03)
write(*,40) genfile
write(6,40) genfile
40 format(' NDT hourly resource file: ',a<len>)
read(*,fmt=10) len, loadfile
loadfile = loadfile(l:len)
open (04,file=loadfile,status='old',recl=80)
rewind (04)
write(*,50) loadfile
write(6, 50) loadfile
50 format(' Hourly system load file: ',a<len>)
netloadfile = paramfile(l:pos)//'.NET'
open (05,file=netloadfile,status='new',
write(*,60) netloadfile
write(6,60) netloadfile
60 format(' Net hourly system load file:
write(*,70) statfile
write(6,70) statfile
70 format(' Summary statistics file:
C Read fixed parameter data
C -------------------------
read(01,fmt=10) lenl,ndtype
read(01,fmt=10) len2,techname
read(01,*) ndunitcap
read(01,*) !storage Pre
read(01,*) !storgencap rea
read(01,*) pdays
read(01,*) firstyr
read(01,*) pyears
read(01,*) siteloss
read(01,*) spurloss
read(01,*) TDloss
read(01,*) vom
carriagecontrol='list')
',a<len>)
',a<pos+4>)
sently get these two data by
ding com file
close (01)
write(*, *)
write(*, *)
write(*, *)
write(*,*)
write(*, *)
write(*, *)
write(*, *)
write (*, *)
write(*,,*)
write(*, *)
write(*, *)
write(*, *)
'Type of NDT:
'Technology name:
'NDT Unit capacity:
'Storage:
'Storage gen cap:
'Storage opt days:
'First year:
'Planning period:
'Site loss:
'Spur line loss:
'T & D loss:
'Variable O&M:
',ndtype
',techname
',ndunitcap
',storage
',storgencap
',pdays
',firstyr
',pyears
',siteloss
',spurloss
',TDloss
',vom
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tloss = (1+spurloss)*(1+TDloss)
C Read annual capacities, fill in trajectory, round up
C to integer multiple of unit capacity, and test write.
C
read(02,*)
do i=l,pyears
read(02,*,end=80) capyear,ndcap(capyear-firstyr+l)
end do
80 do i=2,pyears
if(ndcap(i).eq.0.) then
ndcap(i) = ndcap(i-1)
end if
end do
do i=1,pyears
ndcap(i) = ndunitcap*real(nint(ndcap(i)/ndunitcap))
end do
write(*, *)
write(*,*)'Year NDT Cap'
do i=l,pyears
write(*,90) firstyr+i-1, ndcap(i)
end do
90 format(i5,fl0.0)
close (02)
C Annual loop. Initialize annual variables.
C -----------------------------------------
100 do 400 yr = 1,pyears
anngen = 0.
capfac = 0.
annstor = 0.
storfrac = 0.
capcredit = 0.
annVOM = 0.
do i = 1,11
maxloadl(i) = 0.
maxload2(i) = 0.
maxload3(i) = 0.
end do
C Find storage capacity for year if NDT capacity has changed.
C First check NDT type, then read data. NDT resource data may have
C more than 1 year, so if year changes reset current year and rezero
C counter. If year read is beyond current year in annual loop, stop
C and find size of storage. Note that storagen generation capacity
C grows with NDT capacity, and that the maximum day's generation is
C assumed to constant from year to year.
C
if(yr.gt.1)then
if(ndcap(yr).eq.ndcap(yr-1)) then
go to 200 ! Storage capacity remains constant.
end if ! Go to planning period loop.
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end if
curgenyr = 0
if((ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'WIND') .or.
1 (ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'Wind') .or.
2 (ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'wind')) then
if(techname(l:len2).ne.'AOC33350') then
write(*,*) 'Wind turbine type not recognized'
endif
110 read(03,120,err=150,end=160) genmon,genday,genyr,
1 (tab,hrresc(i),i=1,24)
120 format (312,24(A1,F4.1))
if(genyr.ne.curgenyr) then
curgenyr = genyr
maxdaygen = 0.
elseif((1900+genyr).gt.(firstyr+yr-1)) then
go to 160
endif
daygen = 0.
do i=1,24
if((hrresc(i).lt.4.0) .OR. (hrresc(i).gt.25.0)) then
hrgen(i) = 0.
else
hrgen(i) = -34.253 - 7.6058*hrresc(i) +
1 4.7113*(hrresc(i)**2) -
2 0.16918*(hrresc(i)**3)
endif
hrgen(i) = hrgen(i)/(l+siteloss)
daygen = daygen + hrgen(i)
end do
maxdaygen = max(daygen,maxdaygen)
go to 110 ! Read next day
elseif((ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'PV') .or.
1 (ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'pv')) then
130 read(03,140,err=150,end=160) genmon,genday,genyr,
1 (tab,hrresc(i) ,i=1,24)
140 format (312,24(A1,F5.3))
if(genyr.ne.curgenyr) then
curgenyr = genyr
maxdaygen = 0.
elseif((1900+genyr).gt.(firstyr+yr-1)) then
go to 160
endif
daygen = 0.
do i=1,24
hrgen(i) = ndcap(yr)*hrresc(i)
hrgen(i) = hrgen(i)/(l+siteloss)
daygen = daygen + hrgen(i)
end do
maxdaygen = max(daygen,maxdaygen)
go to 130 ! Read next day
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else
write(*,*) 'NDT type not recognized'
endif
150 write(*,*) 'Error reading generation resource file'
160 rewind (03)
C If storage variable read is 0->1, then capacity is this fraction
C of the maximum daily generation. If >1, then storage equals
C this number of hours at peak capacity. Generation capacity from
C storage is given as a fraction (0-1) of raw NDT generation
C capacity, so redefine and reduce by site losses to give equivalent
C net capacity.
C
if(storage.1t.0.) then
write(*,*) 'Negative storage capacity not allowed'
elseif(storage.le.l.) then
storcap = storage*maxdaygen
else
storcap = storage*ndcap(yr)
endif
storgencap = storgencap*ndcap(yr)/(l+siteloss)
write(*,*)
write(*,*) 'MaxDayGen Storage StorCap NdtCap InvCap'
write(*,170) maxdaygen,storage,storcap,ndcap(yr),storgencap
write(*,*)
170 format(5F10.1)
C Initialize data before planning period loop.
C
do i=1,750
hrstorin(i) = 0.
hrstorout(i) = 0.
end do
do i=-25,750
hrgen(i) = 0.
hrload(i) = 0.
hrnet(i) = 0.
end do
C Planning period loop. Initalize data for period.
C
200 continue
do i=1,750
hrresc(i) = 0.
rank(i) = i
end do
pdayl = 0
pday2 = pdays
phr = 0
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ihrl = 0
idayl = 0
if((pdays.le.0) .or.(pdays.gt.31)) then
write(*,*) 'Planning period must be 1->31 days'
endif
C If planning period is an even number of weeks, read first line for
C day of week and adjust first planning period to end on Saturday.
C Note: Mo=l,Tu=2,We=3,Th=4,Fr=5,Sa=6,Su=7.
C
if(mod(pdays,7).eq.0) then
read(04,220,err=600,end=600) Idmonl(1),lddayl(1),idyrl(1),
1 Idampml(1),ldwkdayl(1), (hrload(i),i=1,12)
220 format(T1,I2,T3,I2,T5,I2,T7,I1,T16,I1,T21,12F5.0)
rewind(04)
if(ldwkdayl() .le.3) then
pdayl = pdays-ldwkdayl(1)
else
pdayl = pdays-ldwkdayl(1)+7
endif
pdays = pdayl
end if
C Check NDT type to choose generation function (hrgen = f(hrresc)).
C Read data for planning period. As generation is calculated, keep
C track of annual generation and 10 highest hourly system loads,
C before and after NDT generation. If data ends before end of year,
C write error message and exit. At year end, abbreviate current
C planning period if needed.
C
240 if((ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'WIND') .or.
1 (ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'Wind') .or.
2 (ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'wind')) then
do k=l,pdaysj = 24*(k-1)
read(03,120,err=600,end=600) genmon,genday,genyr,
1 (tab,hrresc(i),i=j+l+phr, j+24+phr)
read(04,220,err=600,end=600) Idmonl(k),lddayl(k),Idyrl(k),
1 Idampml(k),ldwkdayl(k), (hrload(i),i=j+l+phr,j+12+phr)
read(04,220,err=600,end=600) Idmon2(k),ldday2(k),idyr2(k),
1 ldampm2(k), dwkday2(k), (hrload(i), i=j+13+phr,j+24+phr)
if((ldmonl(k).eq.12).and.(lddayl(k).eq.31)) go to 241
end do
go to 242
241 pdays = k
242 continue
C In this case input files have been well examined, but for more
C general applications, this section should check for the same
C dates in resource v. load data, leapyears, missing or out of
C sequence data. etc. Resource data may need to rewind if fewer
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C years are available than needed to match forecast load data.
do i = 1+phr,24*pdays+phr
if((hrresc(i).lt.4.0).or.(hrresc(i).gt.25.0)) then
hrgen(i) = 0.
else
hrgen(i) = -34.253 - 7.6058*hrresc(i) +
1 4.7113*(hrresc(i)**2) -
2 0.16918*(hrresc(i)**3)
hrgen(i) = hrgen(i)/(l+siteloss)
end if
anngen = anngen + hrgen(i)
maxloadl(11) = hrload(i)
j = 10
do while((maxloadl(j+l).gt.maxloadl(j)).and.(j.ge.1))
swaptemp = maxloadl(j+l)
maxloadl(j+l) = maxloadl(j)
maxloadl(j) = swaptemp
j = j - 1
end do
hrstorout(i) = min(hrgen(i),storgencap)
hrstorin(i) = hrstorout(i)
hrnet(i) = hrload(i) - hrstorout(i)/tloss
maxload2(11) = hrnet(i)
j = 10
do while((maxload2(j+l).gt.maxload2(j)).and.(j.ge.1))
swaptemp = maxload2(j+l)
maxload2(j+l) = maxload2(j)
maxload2(j) = swaptemp
j = j - 1
end do
end do
elseif((ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'PV') .or.
1 (ndtype(l:lenl) .eq. 'pv')) then
do k=l,pdays
j = 24*(k-1)
read(03,140,err=600,end=600) genmon,genday,genyr,
1 (tab, hrresc(i),i=j+l+phr, j+24+phr)
read(04,220,err=600,end=600) Idmonl(k),lddayl(k),idyrl(k),
1 Idampml(k),ldwkdayl(k), (hrload(i) ,i=j+l+phr,j+12+phr)
read(04,220,err=600,end=600) Idmon2(k),ldday2(k),Idyr2(k),
1 Idampm2(k),ldwkday2(k), (hrload(i),i=j+13+phr,j+24+phr)
if((ldmonl(k).eq.12).and.(lddayl(k).eq.31)) go to 243
end do
go to 244
243 pdays = k
244 continue
do i = 1+phr,24*pdays+phr
hrgen(i) = ndcap(yr)*hrresc(i)
hrgen(i) = hrgen(i)/(l+siteloss)
anngen = anngen + hrgen(i)
maxloadl(ll) = hrload(i)
j = 10
do while((maxloadl(j+l).gt.maxloadl(j)).and.(j.ge.1))
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swaptemp = maxloadl(j+l)
maxloadl(j+l) = maxloadl(j)
maxloadl(j) = swaptemp
j = j - 1
end do
hrstorout(i) = min(hrgen(i),storgencap)
hrstorin(i) = hrstorout(i)
hrnet(i) = hrload(i) - hrstorout(i)/tloss
maxload2(11) = hrnet(i)
j = 10
do while((maxload2(j+l).gt.maxload2(j)).and.(j.ge.1))
swaptemp = maxload2(j+l)
maxload2(j+l) = maxload2(j)
maxload2(j) = swaptemp
j = j - 1
end do
end do
end if
C The basic optimization algorithm used is to store energy in
C cheap hours (low system load) and to generate in expensive hours.
C The steps are as follows. First, find the highest available
C hour(s) and the energy gap to the next lowest hour or available
C generation capacity. Second, find the lowest available hour(s)
C and the energy gap to the next highest hour or available NDT
C generation. Hours are marked 0 = unavailable, 1 = available,
C 2 = highest/lowest, and 3 = excess(free) generation above inverter
C capacity. If storage constraints (0<=cumstor<=storcap) are not
C violated, a swap is made. If can't swap, mark low hour as
C unavailable and find next highest hour. If no available low hours,
C mark high hour as unavailable and go to next lowest hour. If a
C swap is made, all hours are remarked available. If no swap is
C possible, exit to next section. An epsilon of 0.5 is used to
C allow for roundoff error and speed of computation, since all output
C is rounded to whole integers.
C
260 continue
C Diagnostic write for each energy swap
C cumstor = 0.
C do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
C cumstor = cumstor + hrstorin(i) - hrstorout(i)
C templ = (hrstorin(i)-min(hrgen(i),storgencap))/tloss
C temp2 = (hrstorin(i)-hrstorout(i))/tloss-templ
C write(*,262) i,hrload(i),hrgen(i)/tloss,templ,temp2,
C 1 hrnet(i),cumstor,hrinok(i),hroutok(i)
C end do
C write(*,*)
C262 format(i4,f9.1,3f7.1,2f9.1,2i3)
C Start search for new high hour by reinitializing markers
C for all hours.
C
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do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
hroutok(i) = 1
end do
265 continue
C Sweep through hourly net loads to find the highest hour
C marked available and with unused generation capacity.
C Track the high net load, the first hour with this load,
C and number of hours with this load. Find the minimum
C energy gap to available capacity in peak hours and the
C next highest net load.
C
highld = 0.
highhr = 0
nhigh = 0
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
if(hroutok(i).eq.2) hroutok(i) = 1
if((storgencap-hrstorout(i).gt.0.5).and.
1 (hroutok(i).eq.1)) then
if(hrnet(i).gt.highld+0.5) then
gaphigh = min((hrnet(i)-highld)*tloss,
1 storgencap-hrstorout(i))
highld = hrnet(i)
highhr = i
nhigh = 1
elseif((hrnet(i).ge.highld-0.5).and.
1 (hrnet(i).le.highld+0.5)) then
gaphigh = min(gaphigh,storgencap-hrstorout(i))
nhigh = nhigh + 1
elseif((hrnet(i).lt.highld-0.5).and.
1 (hrnet(i).gt.highld-gaphigh/tloss)) then
gaphigh = min(gaphigh, (highld-hrnet(i))*tloss)
end if
end if
C Diagnostic write for high hour data sweep
C write(*,268) i,hrnet(i), (storgencap-hrstorout(i))/tloss,
C 1 nhigh,highhr,highld,gaphigh/tloss
C268 format(i3,f8.0,f6.1,i4,i3,f8.0,f6.1)
end do
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
if((hroutok(i).eq.1).and.
1 (storgencap-hrstorout(i).gt.0.5).and.
2 (hrnet(i).le.highld+0.5).and.
3 (hrnet(i).ge.highld-0.5)) then
hroutok(i) = 2
end if
end do
if(nhigh.eq.0) go to 280 ! EXIT OPTIMIZATION FOR THIS PERIOD
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C Reinitialize all low hour availability markers.
C
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
hrinok(i) = 1
end do
C Sweep through planning period to find hour with the lowest net
C load that is marked available and has energy available for
C storage. Exactly analogous to high hour search, EXCEPT search
C first for hours where hourly generation exceeds inverter capacity.
C If not stored this energy is wasted, so it is essentially free.
C If no low hour is available, loop above to 265 to find next
C lower high hour.
C
270 continue
lowld = 100000.
lowhr = 0
nlow = 0
capgap = 100000.
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
if(hrinok(i).ge.2) hrinok(i) = 1
if(((hrgen(i)-hrstorin(i)).gt.0.5).and.(hrinok(i).eq.1)) then
if(capgap.eq.100000) then
lowld = 0.
gaplow = 0.
nlow = 0
end if
if(hrgen(i)-hrstorin(i).lt.capgap) then
capgap = hrgen(i)-hrstorin(i)
lowhr = i
end if
nlow = nlow + 1
elseif((hrstorout(i).gt.0.5).and.(hrinok(i).eq.1)) then
if(hrnet(i).lt.lowld-0.5) then
gaplow = min((lowld-hrnet(i))*tloss,hrstorout(i))
lowld = hrnet(i)
lowhr = i
nlow = 1
elseif((hrnet(i).ge.lowld-0.5).and.
1 (hrnet(i).le.lowld+0.5)) then
gaplow = min(gaplow,hrstorout(i))
nlow = nlow + 1
elseif((hrnet(i).gt.lowld+0.5).and.
1 (hrnet(i).lt.lowld+gaplow/tloss)) then
gaplow = min(gaplow, (hrnet(i)-lowld)*tloss)
endif
end if
C Diagnostic write for low hour data sweep
C write(*,272) i,hrnet(i),hrstorout(i)/tloss,
C 1 (hrgen(i)-hrstorin(i))/tloss, nlow, lowhr,
C 2 lowld,gaplow/tloss,capgap/tloss
C272 format(i3, f8.0,2f6.1, i4,i3, f8.0,f6., f9.1)
end do
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if(lowld.eq.0.) then
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
if((hrinok(i).eq.l).and.
1 (hrgen(i)-hrstorin(i)).gt.0.5) then
hrinok(i) = 3
end if
end do
else
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
if((hrinok(i).eq.l).and.
1 (hrstorout(i).gt.0.5).and.
2 (hrnet(i).le.lowld+0.5).and.
3 (hrnet(i).ge.lowld-0.5)) then
hrinok(i) = 2
end if
end do
end if
if(lowld.eq.0.) gaplow = capgap
C If no low netload hours are available or if the low hour
C is above the high hour, then mark the high hour as
C unavailable and loop to find the next lower high hour.
C
if((highld-lowld.lt.0.5).or.(nlow.eq.0)) then
hroutok(highhr) = 0
go to 265
end if
C One goal is to swap as much energy as possible without repeating
C the previous high/low search. To swap energy for all the high/low
C hours identified, the hourly gap is converted to a total energy gap.
C A weighted energy average is found, and if the proposed swap
C raises/lowers the low/high hour above/below the average, then the
C gap is reduced so high/low hours meet at the average. If a sweep
C through the planning period shows that the storage constraints are
C unviolated, then the energy exchange is made. Note that when there
C is excess generation (hrinok=3) hrstorin is increased, but when
C 'non-excess' energy is stored, hrstorout is decreased.
C
gaplow = gaplow*nlow
gaphigh = gaphigh*nhigh
gap = min(gaplow,gaphigh)
aveload = lowld + (highld-lowld)*real(nhigh)/real(nlow+nhigh)
if(((lowld+gaplow/real(nlow)).ge.aveload) .and.
1 ((highld-gaphigh/real(nhigh)).le.aveload) ) then
gap = (real(nlow)*(aveload-lowld)+
1 real(nhigh)*(highld-aveload))*tloss/2
end if
cumstor = 0.
minstor = 100000.
maxstor = 0.
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do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
cumstor = cumstor + hrstorin(i) - hrstorout(i)
if(hrinok(i).ge.2) then
cumstor = cumstor + gap/nlow
elseif(hroutok(i).eq.2) then
cumstor = cumstor - gap/nhigh
endif
minstor = min(minstor,cumstor)
maxstor = max(maxstor,cumstor)
end do
if((minstor.ge.-0.5).and.(maxstor.le.storcap+0.5)) then
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
if(hrinok(i).eq.3) then
hrstorin(i) = hrstorin(i) + gap/nlow
elseif(hrinok(i).eq.2) then
hrstorout(i) = hrstorout(i) - gap/nlow
hrnet(i) = hrload(i) - hrstorout(i)/tloss
elseif(hroutok(i).eq.2) then
hrstorout(i) = hrstorout(i) + gap/nhigh
hrnet(i) = hrload(i) - hrstorout(i)/tloss
end if
end do
C Diagnostic write for high/low hours and energy gaps
C write(*,274) nlow,lowhr,lowld,gaplow/nlow/tloss,nhigh,highhr,
C 1 highld,gaphigh/nhigh/tloss,aveload,gap/tloss,
C 2 minstor,maxstor
C274 format(2(i4,i3,f8.0,f6.1),f8.0,2f6.1,f8.1)
go to 260 ! Start over looking for lowhr/highhr
end if
C If the energy swap above violated storage constraints, attempt
C to swap energy between a single pair of hours. The energy gap is
C reconverted to a single hour basis. If the swap causes the
C high/low hours to reverse, the gap is again reduced to meet in the
C middle. The hourly storage sweep is repeated, and if OK a swap
C is made. If storage constraints (low,high or both) are less than
C the gap size, the gap is reduced and the swap is made. If no
C swap is possible, the low hour is marked as unavailable. Loop
C to 270 to find next higher low hour.
C
gaplow = gaplow/nlow
gaphigh = gaphigh/nhigh
gap = min(gaplow,gaphigh)
aveload = (lowld+highld)/2
if(((lowld+gaplow).ge.aveload).and.
1 ((highld-gaphigh).le.aveload))then
gap = (highld-lowld)/2
end if
cumstor = 0.
minstor = 100000.
maxstor = 0.
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
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cumstor = cumstor + hrstorin(i) - hrstorout(i)
if(i.eq.lowhr) then
cumstor = cumstor + gap
elseif(i.eq.highhr) then
cumstor = cumstor - gap
endif
minstor = min(minstor,cumstor)
maxstor = max(maxstor,cumstor)
end do
C Diagnostic write for high/low hours and energy gaps
C write(*,276) nlow,lowhr,lowld,gaplow/nlow/tloss,nhigh,
C 1 highhr,highld,gaphigh/nhigh/tloss,aveload,
C 2 gap/tloss,minstor,maxstor
C276 format(2(i4,i3,f8.0,f6.1),f8.0,2f6. 1,f8.1)
if((minstor.ge.-0.5).and.(maxstor.le.storcap+0.5)) then
if(hrinok(lowhr).eq.3) then
hrstorin(lowhr) = hrstorin(lowhr) + gap
elseif(hrinok(lowhr).eq.2) then
hrstorout(lowhr) = hrstorout(lowhr) - gap
hrnet(lowhr) = hrload(lowhr) - hrstorout(lowhr)/tloss
end if
hrstorout(highhr) = hrstorout(highhr) + gap
hrnet(highhr) = hrload(highhr) - hrstorout(highhr)/tloss
go to 260
elseif(((minstor.lt.-0.5).and.(minstor.gt.-gap+0.5)).and.
1 (maxstor.le.storcap+0.5)) then
gap = gap+minstor
if(hrinok(lowhr).eq.3) then
hrstorin(lowhr) = hrstorin(lowhr) + gap
elseif(hrinok(lowhr).eq.2) then
hrstorout(lowhr) = hrstorout(lowhr) - gap
hrnet(lowhr) = hrload(lowhr) - hrstorout(lowhr)/tloss
end if
hrstorout(highhr) = hrstorout(highhr) + gap
hrnet(highhr) = hrload(highhr) - hrstorout(highhr)/tloss
go to 260
elseif((minstor.ge.-0.5).and.
1 ((maxstor.gt.storcap+0.5).and.
2 (maxstor.1t.storcap+gap-0.5))) then
gap = gap-(maxstor-storcap)
if(hrinok(lowhr).eq.3) then
hrstorin(lowhr) = hrstorin(lowhr) + gap
elseif(hrinok(lowhr).eq.2) then
hrstorout(lowhr) = hrstorout(lowhr) - gap
hrnet(lowhr) = hrload(lowhr) - hrstorout(lowhr)/tloss
end if
hrstorout(highhr) = hrstorout(highhr) + gap
hrnet(highhr) = hrload(highhr) - hrstorout(highhr)/tloss
go to 260
elseif(((minstor.lt.-0.5).and.(minstor.gt.-gap+0.5)).and.
1 ((maxstor.gt.storcap+0.5).and.
2 (maxstor.lt.storcap+gap-0.5))) then
gap = min(gap+minstor,gap-(maxstor-storcap))
if(hrinok(lowhr).eq.3) then
hrstorin(lowhr) = hrstorin(lowhr) + gap
elseif(hrinok(lowhr).eq.2) then
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hrstorout(lowhr) = hrstorout(lowhr) - gap
hrnet(lowhr) = hrload(lowhr) - hrstorout(lowhr)/tloss
end if
hrstorout(highhr) = hrstorout(highhr) + gap
hrnet(highhr) = hrload(highhr) - hrstorout(highhr)/tloss
go to 260
end if
hrinok(lowhr) = 0
go to 270 ! Look for next higher low hour.
C Update statistics for planning period. Find next to last hour in
C period when stored energy is zero. Then increase this period up
C to an integral number of days. Print net hourly loads for
C planning period, then take the trailing period and tack it in
C front of the next planning period, to reduce planning distortion,
C due to end of period effects.
C
280 continue
do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
maxload3(11) = hrnet(i)
j = 10
do while((maxload3(j+l).gt.maxload3(j)).and.(j.ge.1))
swaptemp = maxload3(j+l)
maxload3(j+l) = maxload3(j)
maxload3(j) = swaptemp
S= j-1
end do
end do
do i = phr+1,24*pdays+phr
annstor = annstor + hrstorin(i)
end do
phrl = phr
cumstor = 0.
i = 24*pdays+phr
do while ((cumstor.ge.0.).and.(cumstor.lt.0.5).and.
1 (i.ge.24*pdays+phr-24))
cumstor = cumstor - hrstorin(i) + hrstorout(i)
i = i -1
end do
phr2 = 24*pdays+phr - i - 1
if(phr2.eq.24) phr2 = 0
do while ((cumstor.gt.0.5).and.(i.ge.24*pdays+phr-24))
cumstor = cumstor - hrstorin(i) + hrstorout(i)
i = i -1
end do
if(i.gt.24*pdays+phr-24) phr2 = 24*pdays+phr - i
ihr2 = 24 - mod(phr2,24) ! # hrs to complete full day(s)
if(ihr2.eq.24) ihr2 = 0
if((ldmonl(pdays).eq.12).and.(lddayl(pdays).eq.31)) ihr2 = 0
iday2 = (phr2+ihr2)/24 ! Integer # of days to move
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C Adjust planning (pdays) period by leading and trailing intervals,
C Copy trailing day data to leading days below as well.
C
C Summary diagnostic write for each planning period
C cumstor = 0.
C do i = 1,24*pdays+phr
C cumstor = cumstor + hrstorin(i) - hrstorout(i)
C templ = (hrstorin(i)-min(hrgen(i),storgencap))/tloss
C temp2 = (hrstorin(i)-hrstorout(i))/tloss-templ
C write(*,310) i,hrload(i),hrgen(i)/tloss,templ,temp2,
C 1 hrnet(i),cumstor,hrinok(i),hroutok(i)
C end do
C310 format(i4,f9.1,3f7.1,2f9., 2i3)
C write(*,*) phr2,ihr2,pday2,iday2
C write(*,*)
do k = -idayl+l,pdays-iday2
j = 24*(k+idayl-1) - ihrl
write(05,320) Idmonl(k),lddayl(k),Idyrl(k),ldampml(k),
1 Idwkdayl(k),(int(hrnet(i)),i=j+1,j+12)
write(05,320) Idmon2(k),ldday2(k),ldyr2(k),ldampm2(k),
1 Idwkday2(k), (int(hrnet(i)),i=j+13,j+24)
end do
320 format(T1,I2,T3,I2,T5,I2,T7, Ii, T16, Ii, T21,125)
do i = -ihr2+1,phr2
hrload(i) = hrload (24*pdays+phrl-phr2+i)
hrgen(i) = hrgen (24*pdays+phrl-phr2+i)
hrstorin(i) = hrstorin (24*pdays+phrl-phr2+i)
hrstorout(i) = hrstorout(24*pdays+phrl-phr2+i)
hrnet(i) = hrnet (24*pdays+phrl-phr2+i)
end do
do i = phr2+1,24*pdays+phrl
hrload(i) - 0.
hrgen(i) = 0.
hrstorin(i) = 0.
hrstorout(i) = 0.
hrnet(i) = 0.
end do
do i = -iday2,0,1
Idmonl(i) = Idmonl(pdays+i)
Idmon2(i) = Idmon2(pdays+i)
Iddayl(i) = Iddayl(pdays+i)
Idday2(i) = Idday2(pdays+i)
Idyrl(i) = Idyrl(pdays+i)
Idyr2(i) = Idyr2(pdays+i)
Idampml(i) = Idampml(pdays+i)
Idampm2(i) = Idampm2(pdays+i)
Idwkdayl(i) = Idwkdayl(pdays+i)
Idwkday2(i) = Idwkday2(pdays+i)
end do
do i = 1,pdays
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Idmonl(i) = 0
Idmon2(i) = 0
Iddayl(i) = 0
Idday2(i) = 0
Idyrl(i) = 0
Idyr2(i) = 0
Idampml(i) = 0
Idampm2(i) = 0
Idwkdayl(i) = 0
Idwkday2(i) = 0
end do
C write(*,*) Idmonl(0),lddayl(0),idyrl(0),pdays
phr = phr2
ihrl = ihr2
pdays = pday2 ! Reset planning period days after first period.
idayl = iday2
C If end of year continue, otherwise loop to next planning period.
C
if((ldmonl(0).ne.12).or.(lddayl(0).ne.31)) then
go to 240
end if
C Write summary statistics for year and loop to next year.
C Adjust capacity credit up 10% for T&D losses from regular capacity
C to customer. (Not nec. same as NDT TDloss read above, since PV's
C are locally distributed generation.
C
maxloadl(11) = 0.
maxload2(11) = 0.
maxload3(11) = 0.
do i = 1,10
maxloadl(11) = maxloadl(ll) + maxloadl(i)
maxload2(11) = maxload2(11) + maxload2(i)
maxload3(11) = maxload3(11) + maxload3(i)
end do
maxloadl(ll) = maxloadl(l1)/10.
maxload2(11) = maxload2(11)/10.
maxload3(11) = maxload3(11)/10.
C Increase capacity credit by 10% overall system TD loss
capcredit = (maxloadl(l) - maxload3(1))*(1.10)
avecapcred = (maxloadl(ll) - maxload3(11))*(1.10)
capfac = anngen/(ndunitcap*8760)
annVOM = anngen*VOM/100. ! MWh*cent/kWh/100 = kS
storfrac = annstor/anngen
write(6,*)
write (6,350)
350 format('Yr Maxl Max2 Max3 CapCred AnnGen CF VOM-k$
1 AnnStor StorFrac')
write(6,360) Idyrl(0),maxloadl(l),maxload2(1),maxload3(1),
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1 capcredit,anngen,capfac,annVOM,annstor,storfrac
write(6,360) Idyrl(0),maxloadl(ll),maxload2(11),maxload3(11),
1 avecapcred
360 format(I2,5F8.0,F6.3,2F8.0,F8.3)
400 continue
go to 700
C Stop - End or error reading data.
C
600 write(*,*) 'End or error reading data.'
700 continue
close (03)
close (04)
close (05)
close (06)
stop
end
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